روند تحقق ارزش در پیمان های توسعه سرمایه گذاری جدید نامتقارن: حاکمیت انتقال از اکتشاف تا بهره برداری
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|20156||2012||20 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||11785 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Engineering and Technology Management, Volume 29, Issue 4, October–December 2012, Pages 508–527
Based on a case study of three asymmetric new venture development (ANVD) alliances, we examine the governance of transitions from exploration to exploitation. We propose that role deficiencies, technological asymmetry, and the presence of a separate venture unit at established firms constitute important initial conditions influencing value realization in ANVD alliances. We further show that role-specific investments act as more appropriate mechanisms than contractual incentives to govern transitions from exploration to exploitation. Jointly, these findings provide new insights into the impact of structural and relational governance mechanisms on value creation in interfirm relationships.
In high-tech settings, formal collaboration between entrepreneurial firms (i.e., high-tech start-ups, university spin-offs) and more established organizations has become increasingly popular for the development of new venture activities (Bajeux-Besnainou et al., 2010, Dunne et al., 2009, Hagedoorn, 2002 and Schildt et al., 2005). Following its widespread dispersion in practice, academic research on asymmetric new venture development (ANVD) alliances has been proliferating (e.g., Kalaignanam et al., 2007, Narula, 2004 and Slowinski et al., 1996). Whereas these studies provide evidence for the potential value of ANVD alliances, they have remained relatively silent on how this value can be actually realized. In order to successfully launch a new venture into the market, a transition needs to be made from explorative activities such as experimentation, fundamental research and prototyping, to exploitative activities such as fine-tuning, upscaling and leveraging (Kazanjian and Drazin, 1990 and Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). Such transition is not evident, since previous studies (i.e., Dodgson, 1993, Doz, 1988 and Doz and Williamson, 2002) suggest that (i) the entrepreneurial partner might lack motivation to shift from explorative to exploitative activities and (ii) the established partner might lack the motivation to invest time and resources in supporting such a shift. Although these studies identify obstacles to the realization of value in ANVD alliance, they provide limited insights in how these problems can be addressed effectively. In the broader alliance governance literature, scholars have relied on two different perspectives to identify governance strategies that facilitate adjusting and steering partner behavior in interfirm settings. Whereas structural alliance governance scholars (e.g., Hennart, 2006 and Oxley, 1997) rely on transaction cost theory to emphasize the importance of contracts, relational governance scholars (e.g., Dyer and Singh, 1998 and Madhok, 1995) point to the relevance of relational-specific investments. Previous studies on ANVD alliances (i.e., Alvarez and Barney, 2001 and Sawers et al., 2008) have underlined the relevance of both structural and relational governance mechanisms in terms of risk mitigation, yet they have remained relatively silent on their implications for value realization. The main objective of this study is therefore to examine how partner organizations can actually create value in ANVD alliances. In particular, we assess the impact of structural and relational governance mechanisms on partners’ ability to transition from exploration to exploitation activities. In order to address this research objective, we have conducted a comparative case study of three ANVD alliances. Each case rests on the analysis of a wide variety of documents as well as interviews with managers and engineers of both partner companies. Based on an iterative process of within-case and between-case analysis, we subsequently build propositions on how firms govern the transition from exploration to exploitation activities in ANVD alliances. Our propositions point to (i) role deficiencies, (ii) the level of technological asymmetry, and (iii) the presence of a separate venture unit at the established firm as important initial conditions influencing the motivation and ability of partners to shift from exploration to exploitation activities. In addition, they suggest that relational investments are more proficient governance mechanism than contractual incentives when it comes to stimulating such a transition process. The paper theoretically contributes to both structural and relational governance perspectives. Whereas existing structural alliance scholars have mainly focused on the design of interfirm transactions between partners, we observe that particular intrafirm structures (i.e., dedicated venture unit) can also substantially influence the ability to create value within the interfirm relationship. At the same time, our data point to the inherent limitations of contracts in motivating partners to change their behavior in alliances. Whereas relational governance scholars (e.g., Dyer, 1997 and Kang et al., 2009) have mainly focused on the impact of physical relation-specific investments such as site-specific investment and customized equipment on value realization, our data point to the relevance of role-specific investments to enact synergies from complementary resources. In contrast to existing relational governance research, we question the role of goodwill trust as a sufficient social glue to keep partners together after value realization has taken place successfully. Instead, we emphasize the importance of balanced interdependence and intra-organizational changes for the continuation of interfirm relationships after value realization has occurred. The remainder of this paper is organized in six sections. First, we provide an overview of existing literature on the phenomenon of ANVD alliances. Based on this literature, we identify two obstacles to value realization in ANVD alliances. Relying on structural and relational alliance governance perspectives, we subsequently identify two potential strategies to address these obstacles. We then discuss the methodology of our study, after which we provide an in-depth description of the three cases, focusing on the process of value realization. In the fourth section, we discuss our main findings and develop propositions on the process of value realization in ANVD alliances. To conclude, we reflect on the theoretical and managerial implications of our study, its main limitations and opportunities for future research.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
Relying on transaction cost theory, structural governance scholars have provided important insights into how structural aspects of the transaction such as contract complexity (Reuer and Ariño, 2007), presence of shared equity (Sampson, 2004) and presence of interfirm control mechanism (Dekker, 2004) influence alliance outcomes. Our findings, however, suggest that not only the initial structural design of the transaction between firms but also the presence of specific structural elements within partner organizations can influence interfirm value creation processes. In particular, we observed that the presence of a dedicated venture unit within the established partner contributed to a high motivation of its members to contribute to turning the ANVD alliance into a success. This finding suggests that, in order to better understand interfirm value creation processes, structural alliance governance research should not only consider interfirm structural elements, but also intrafirm structural characteristics. Prior studies (e.g., Alvarez and Barney, 2001 and Sawers et al., 2008) have provided evidence that contracts can contribute to mitigating opportunistic behavior in ANVD alliances. Whereas these prior findings suggest that contracts might reduce transaction costs in ANVD alliances, our findings indicate that contracts are less effective in terms of stimulating joint value realization in this particular type of alliances. In particular, we observed that the presence of specific contractual clauses, providing strong financial incentives to the entrepreneurial partner to shift focus from exploration to exploitation, were insufficient to actually induce this necessary shift in behavior.