هماهنگی کانال و هزینه معامله: تجزیه و تحلیل تئوری های بازی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|20201||2006||13 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Industrial Marketing Management, Volume 35, Issue 2, February 2006, Pages 178–190
Traditional research identified equilibrium marketing channel coordination by using a classical demand function, and classical economic theory often ignored transaction costs. This paper develops a transaction cost linear demand function to investigate channel decision marking when transaction costs exist. Game theory is used to compare a non-cooperative equilibrium of a differential game played under Stackelberg strategies. By focusing on the effect of the distributor's transaction costs with respect to the marketing decision variables, especially the transaction cost and profit distribution, a fuller understanding of the entire decision structure is obtained. Some results are surprising, which set up the benchmark comparisons for future work in this area.
Over the past decade marketing scientists have developed a significant and multifarious literature concerning the structure and coordination in distribution, and its related issues have also generated considerable researches in both the marketing and economic literature (Choi, 1991, Coughlan, 1985, Douglas, 1975, Ingene & Parry, 1995, Jeuland & Shugan, 1983 and McGuire & Staelin, 1983). Many of these studies have only limited to manufacturers and their channel intermediaries, and the analysis of competition and cooperation were confined to members in the general demand function. For example, the linear demand function is q = A − bp (where q = demand or sold volume, A = constant denoting demand or sold volume when price is zero, b = constant denoting the slope of the demand curve, p = the pricing (monetary cost). Thus at price p, A − bp units will be demand or sold volume. The slope of the demand curve is negative, indicating that customers will buy less of the product as its price increases). In reality, when the general demand function was being used, most of the past research papers have neglected the extra cost in price which are needed to be paid by customers. The extra cost is a nonmonetary expenditure, for example; the searching cost of information ( Salop & Stiglitz, 1997). Such as total customer cost, addressed by Kotler (2003, p.60) is the bundle of costs customers expect to incur in evaluating, obtaining, using, and disposing of given market offering. As Adam Smith had addressed over two centuries ago, “The real price of anything is the toil and trouble of acquiring it.” In other words, this total customer cost includes the buyer's time, energy, psychic and other costs. The buyer evaluates these elements together with the monetary cost to form a total customer cost (Kotler, 2003). These abstractions are useful in order to understand the customer's transaction cost. Therefore, the linear demand function can be written such as q = A − bp, in accordance with the concept of real price (p) from Adam Smith, that the p = pm + α, α is the extra cost for buyers to pay, which is identical with transaction cost. On the other hand, sellers also need to provide some extra cost in proportion, such as time, energy, and psychic costs that associated with buyers. The following example will support the point: more customers would be drawn and attracted to the sellers who offer free services such as information, delivery, training and maintenance (e.g., in order to improve the service to these dealer, Whirlpool developed a B2B trading partner portal to reduce the dealer's nonmonetary costs). Above example has clearly pointed out that a customer would estimate which offer delivers the most value. Customers are value-maximizes, within the bounds of time costs and energy cost ( Kotler, 2003). Whether or not the offer lives up to the value expectation affects both satisfaction and repurchase probability. Many factors may affect a customer's decision to purchase from certain channel stores. One particular aspect that is being examined closely is the costs which associated with the transaction process. In other words, if all other factors are equal; a customer would go with a channel that offers lower transaction costs. When customers purchase a product from a seller, they would go through a process which is called transaction cost analysis to evaluate the complete cost of acquiring the product from a specific source. If products are identical, then transaction cost is the major concern when a customer is choosing among several distributors. The transaction cost has been applied to analyze many issues such as strategic impact of information systems, resource allocation, and outsourcing decisions; however, little attention has been paid to marketing channel structure. Transaction cost is a viable theory to explain the acquisition decision in marketing channel. By focusing on a case of a single manufacturer selling an identical product to two competing distributors and adopting the two most popular powerful structures in pervious studies; (1) Manufacturer–Stackelberg; in this scenario the manufacturer uses the distributors' response function to decide its promotion allowances. The distributors determine the transaction cost so as to maximize total profit from the manufacturer given the respective promotion allowance. (2) Retailer–Stackelberg; the distributors use the manufacturer's response function to decide their transaction cost. The manufacturer determines the promotion allowance so as to maximize total profit from the distributors given the respective transaction cost (e.g., Choi, 1996). In game theoretic terms the first steps is to assume the manufacturer acts as a Stackelberg leader, second step is to assume the distributor acts as a Stackelberg leader; and then develop a transaction cost linear demand function model to investigate the following questions: 1.When the manufacturer or the distributor is a leader, will the leader be the more powerful player and receive higher profit? 2.When a manufacturer or a distributor is a leader, how do transaction cost, margin, sold quantities and the manufacturer's promotion allowance profit compare with the case of the Maunfacturer–Stackelberg and the Retailer–Stackelberg games? 3. How does the transaction cost sensitivities and the transaction cost efficiency index affect the channel's decision variables? The following Sections will review the literature on the use of marketing channel coordination and transaction cost. Section 3 develops a transaction cost linear demand function model derived from analytical equilibrium solutions for various quantities such transaction cost, sales volume and profit which lead back to the questions that are raised in this paper. Section 4 compares and analyzes the decision variables affected by the transaction cost sensitivity and the efficiency index of transaction cost. The final Section presents managerial implications and suggestions for future researches.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
The major contribution of this paper is that it combined and extended previous studies that only focused on a single structure to develop a transaction costs demand function model. By using the transaction cost model, the finding obtained is rather transparent and intuitive. At the begin- ning, the paper has indicated the previous channel-literature that they were using the classical demand function, which argued that the transaction cost can be ignored; therefore, a transaction cost demand function offers the approach to analyze channel coordination problems. The most important question is how the transaction cost impacts the channel member’s decision variable under different power games. The answer depends on the transaction cost structure (e.g., how much payment for seller and how much impact for buyer) and base on the market size, as well as on the model specification (e.g., channel structure). Derived from earlier analysis, a comparison of distributor transaction cost in the manufacturer, as a leader, and the distributor, as a leader, shows that the manufacturer promotion allowance, the distributor’s sales volume, margin and profits under the distributor as a leader exceeds under the manufacturer as the leader. Therefore, a leader can gain more controlling power in selling and obtain higher profit from a follower in marketing channel. These conclusions are also in accord- ance with the observed practice. When the distributor sets up a transaction cost for customers, the distributor will find that as a transaction cost sensitivity increases, the transaction cost put in by distributors also raise which leads to higher sales volume, as the substitutability of customers’ transaction cost increases. Therefore, the high transaction cost sensitivity indicates less differentiation that the seller needs to put in higher differ- entiation cost (e.g., place and equipment costs) to reduce the effect of transaction cost, and at the same time it will lead to lower seller margin as both the manufacturer and the distributor are leaders. In addition, the more transaction cost efficiency index increases, the more transaction cost will need to be input by sellers, this indicates that the customers will become more transaction cost sensitive, and the sellers will lose more margins by changing to a higher transaction cost. Another important finding is that, under some conditions, sales volume increases under the time when the manu- facturer is a leader and declines when the distributor is a leader. In addition, as transaction cost efficiency index increases, the manufacturer’s margin increases while the distributor is a leader and decreases when the manufacturer is a leader. These findings are interpretable in terms of the relative transaction of customers and channel structures. The explicit consideration of transaction cost has yielded a number of meaningful managerial insights as follows: 1. A powerful channel member needs the desire to control over its marketing channel so as to assure the delivery of service outputs and/or to expropriate profits. 2. By virtue of ‘‘owning’’ a marketing activity, a distributor increases the probability of gaining absolute control over how activity is performed across several levels of distribution. Controlling power permits a channel member to assure that the service outputs demanded by its customers will be appropriately delivered, and increases the differentiation of transaction cost by seller to pay. 3. The channel member has to attract customers through better service or merchandising, strong customer’s loyalties and increases the transaction cost paid by customers (e.g., the switch cost inside customers), so that they can pursue higher margin and higher sales. 4. The channel member who gets the major advantages of the transaction cost is the customers who can reduce expenses, as the channel members may provide an expenditure that lowers the searching and time cost by helping customers to locate the products. 5. The channel member would pay attention to the trans- action cost efficiency index of customers which will affect the behavior of a customer’s purchase decision. While the intention was to use a model as simple as possible to highlight the important issue, this work is obviously limited by some particular assumptions. In this paper, it is only assuming that the transaction cost efficiency index to customers is the same (e.g.. In reality, they affect each other tremendously since locations are different, customers are different and there are different preferences for each type of distribu- tion channel. It is important for future researches to consider the uniqueness of each distributor (e.g., serv- ices), preferences of different customers (e.g., perceived transaction costs), and an empirical analysis in the model. In addition, Ozer (2004) studied that the Internet leads to more successful new products, since it helps firms to identify large and growing markets, to reach otherwise hard to reach market, and to create demands for new products. Thus, the web and e-mail are becoming more fully integrated into the business communication mix ( Lichtenthal & Eliaz, 2003 ). More recently, some firms have chosen to rely exclusively on direct channels, bypassing all forms of Internet distributors ( Park & Keh, 2003 ). However, the Internet will affect the trans- action activities and transaction costs, which can be worthy research topics in the future. Hoping this research will set up the benchmark comparison for future researches.