هزینه های معامله از پروژه های CDM یک طرفه در هند، نتایج حاصل از بررسی های تجربی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|20341||2005||13 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||8296 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Energy Policy, Volume 33, Issue 18, December 2005, Pages 2385–2397
Recently, transaction costs in the context of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) gained considerable attention as they were generally perceived to be significantly higher than for the other Kyoto Mechanisms. However, empirical evidence on the amount of transaction costs of CDM projects is very scarce. This paper presents the results from an empirical survey designed to quantify transaction costs of potential non-sink CDM projects in India. The definition of transaction costs of CDM projects was derived from recent literature and observations made in the current market for Certified Emission Reductions (CERs). During the survey, parts of transaction costs of 15 projects were quantified. An assessment of the results showed that specific transaction costs depend, to a large extent, on economies of scale in terms of total amount of CERs generated over the crediting period. Total transaction costs were quantified for seven projects. The costs range from 0.07 to 0.47 $US/t CO2. As the projects have an emission reduction between 0.24 Mt CO2 and 5.00 Mt CO2 over the crediting period, the results support the assumption of Michaelowa et al. (Climate Policy 3 (2003) 273) that projects with emission reductions smaller than 0.20 Mt CO2 are not economically viable at current CER prices.
CDM is one of the Kyoto Mechanisms that allows the Annex B countries of the Kyoto Protocol (developed countries) to meet their internationally agreed greenhouse gas (GHG) emission targets in a cost-effective manner.1 The CDM provides for the transfer of Certified Emission Reductions (CERs)2 from potentially low-cost GHG mitigation projects in Non-Annex I countries (developing countries) to Annex B countries. Such projects are called CDM projects once they are registered by the Executive Board (EB) of the CDM.3 Annex B countries can use CERs for compliance with their emission targets. In a perfect CER market, the CER price would equal marginal abatement costs of GHG mitigation projects in Non-Annex I countries. However, the use of the Kyoto Mechanisms is associated with transaction costs. In the CER market, transaction costs lead to a CER price increase4 compared to the situation without transaction costs (Michaelowa et al., 2003). It is widely argued that transaction costs would be higher for CDM than for IET and JI because of the detailed regulations of the CDM (Bohm, 1999; Grubb et al., 1999; Vrolijk and Grubb, 2000). However, empirical evidence is very scarce (Fichtner et al., 2003; Michaelowa et al. 2003). As India is perceived to be among the most attractive Non-Annex I countries for CDM project development (Buen, 2002; Point Carbon, 2003), I conducted a survey on the transaction costs of CDM projects that are currently developed in India. The paper is structured as follows: Chapter 2 illustrates how the concept of transaction costs can be applied to unilateral CDM projects. Chapter 3 describes the strategy used to quantify transaction costs of CDM projects in India. Chapter 4 presents the results of the survey. Chapter 5 discusses the results. Chapter 6 summarises the findings and puts them into the context of the international debate on transaction costs of CDM projects.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
The results on transaction costs of CDM projects presented in this paper have been quantified by means of a survey among key players in CDM in India. (Parts of) transaction costs could be quantified for 15 unilateral non-sink CDM projects. Transaction costs of CDM projects in India do not seem to be prohibitively high. At least for seven projects, among which are two SSC projects, for which total transaction costs were quantified, the costs should not represent a barrier to viability at current CER prices, if the projects pass EB registration. It is important to highlight that none of the seven projects has an emission reduction lower than 0.24 Mt CO 2 over the crediting period. In this sense the results, although slightly lower in magnitude, support the rough cost estimates made by Michaelowa et al. (2003) for similar project sizes as presented in Table 1 . The assessment of all cost data also underlines the findings of Michaelowa et al. (2003) and Fichtner et al. (2003) that economies of scale in terms of CERs generated over the crediting period are the most important parameter for the magnitude of specific transaction costs. Unfortunately, total transaction costs for projects that Michaelowa et al. (2003) define as ‘‘micro- to small-sized’’ projects with emission reduc- tions lower than 0.20Mt CO 2 over a 10-year crediting period 23 could not be found during the survey. Conse- quently, the cost estimates made by Michaelowa et al. (2003) for such project types cannot be compared with empirical data. Interestingly, out of the 15 case study projects, only one has an emission reduction lower than 0.20 Mt CO 2 over the crediting period (0.15 Mt CO 2 ). This might serve as an indication that they are generally perceived not to be economically viable at current CER prices, a perception that might only be partially due to high specific transaction costs. As Michaelowa et al. (2003) rightly pointed out, ‘‘micro- to small-sized’’ projects are usually burdened by high specific abatement costs and high specific transaction costs. It can be assumed that, in the long term, transaction cost reductions will be achieved through market dynamics (competition among and learning effects of project developers, CDM consultants, OEs and bro- kers). Additionally, various starting points for a cost reduction that focus on actions that could potentially be taken by the EB have been proposed ( Woerdman, 2002 ; Fichtner et al., 2003 ; Michaelowa et al., 2003 ). On the basis of the results of the survey, it can be concluded that the efforts of private and public decision- makers could as a first priority focus on the (sub-) cost components PDD costs, costs for finding a buyer, validation costs and costs of the adaptation fee. Those are the costs that contribute the main share of specific transaction costs quantified in the survey for projects with emission reduction lower than 1.00 Mt CO 2 over the crediting period. At least two important aspects should be considered when proposing potential actions to reduce transaction costs by the EB. First, the measures should not undermine the environmental integrity of the CDM. Michaelowa et al. (2003) have pointed out which measures have a negative effect in this respect. Second, the overall aim of measures should be an optimisation of transaction costs rather than a reduction of transaction costs by any means. Michaelowa et al. (2003) have proposed a subsidisation of transaction costs for ‘‘micro- and mini-sized’’ projects by the international community. CER price forecasts let assume that especially those projects will, due to their relatively high abatement costs, not be economically viable in the first commitment period even at transaction costs of zero. 24 In this respect, subsidisation of transaction costs would express political will to see those projects happen under CDM (e.g. because of their perceived sustainability benefits) in the mid- and long-term if CER prices should increase rather than contribute to the cost-effectiveness of the CDM in the short term.