هماهنگی قیمت و خدمات در سطح تصمیم گیری برای یک زنجیره تامین همراه با وخامت مورد تحت مدیریت موجودی فروشنده
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|20810||2013||10 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Volume 145, Issue 2, October 2013, Pages 743–752, Volume 145, Issue 2, October 2013, Pages 743–752
This paper develops a Stackelberg game model of a one-supplier and one-retailer supply chain with deteriorating product to investigate how to coordinate the price and service level decisions under vendor-managed inventory (VMI) and examine system efficiency. We study the equilibrium price and service level decisions under the decentralized setting and the centralized setting, respectively; and design a generalized revenue-sharing mechanism to coordinate the supply chain. We find that the interaction between the retail price and the service level may invert the effect of deterioration rate on the retail price. The system efficiency of decentralized supply chain increases with market scale, price sensitivity, deterioration rate, the supplier's cost (including unit production cost, holding cost, and deterioration cost), and service investment efficiency, while decreases with production rate. In addition, we find that VMI may invert the effect of deterioration rate on the unit wholesale price of the decentralized supply chain; in the coordinated setting, the retailer should pay a higher transfer price to the supplier with VMI than that without VMI, the transfer price decreases with service investment efficiency, and higher service investment efficiency shrinks the transfer price difference.
In reality, some inventory items or products such as electronic components, meat, vegetables, fruit, and flowers, often deteriorate over time (Li et al., 2010). For deteriorating products, a supplier (manufacturer) has to produce more products than the market demand because a part of the products will be deteriorated. The deterioration of products affects the supplier's production planning and inventory management, which in turn influences the retailer's decision. The retailer must consider the deterioration of products when making the decisions. Thus, the inventory model of deteriorating items gradually becomes an interesting and significant subset of supply chain management. For deteriorating items, one of the challenges is how to reduce the deterioration cost for deteriorated product, production cost, and holding cost. The integrated policy may result in a significant cost reduction when it is compared with the decentralized setting (Yang and Wee, 2003). In particular, vendor managed inventory (VMI) can improve the inventory management performance of a decentralized supply chain (i.e., reduce mismatching between supply and demand). Service level influences the purchase choice of consumer. A higher service level attracts more consumers to buy the products. However, increasing service level incurs a higher service cost. Thus, the retailer should jointly make the price and service level decisions to maximize the profit. In this paper, we focus on how to coordinate the price and service level decisions for a decentralized supply chain with deteriorating item under VMI and the effect of the interaction between the retail price and service level decisions. Under VMI strategy, the supplier manages the retailer's inventory and makes the replenishment decision for the retailer. The supplier has an opportunity to organize the production and distribution process according to the actual demand. Nowadays many firms in different industries increasingly consider VMI as a strategic option to reduce cost and enhance their core competencies. For example, recently Samsung and Sony carried out VMI with Suning to build a new cooperation mode. And with VMI, DH Corporation and his distributor increased sales and their inventory levels are decreased. Point Spring and Driveshaft Company (PSD) improved inventory efficiency with VMI. VMI has become popular in high-tech industries, say, Dell and HP increased their performances through using VMI to reduce inventory levels and costs (Tyan and Wee, 2003). Under VMI, although the supplier and the retailer collaborate in inventory management, they make the price and service level decisions independently, e.g. Samsung and Suning. Owing to double marginalization effect, the decentralized supply chain is not coordinated, which decreases the channel profit. Much of the supply chain management literature focuses on how to design a contract to achieve supply chain coordination and various types of coordination schemes are proposed (Cachon, 2003). Revenue-sharing scheme is often used to regulate the relationship among the members of supply chain. However, the traditional revenue-sharing contract cannot coordinate the supply chain with service investment and deterioration cost (Cachon and Lariviere, 2005). In this paper, we focus on how to design a generalized revenue-sharing contract to coordinate the supply chain and investigate how VMI affects the coordination mechanism. This paper develops a Stackelberg game model of a supply chain consisting of one supplier and one retailer to investigate system efficiency, coordination of the decentralized supply chain under VMI and the effect of the interaction between the price and service level decisions on equilibrium outcome, where demand is sensitive to price and service level. The supplier produces a deteriorating item and manages the inventories at the own and retailer's sides. The two players maximize their long-term average profits. We first consider the decentralized supply chain, and then study the centralized system. We focus on the system efficiency of decentralized supply chain relative to the centralized system and how to coordinate it via a generalized revenue-sharing contract. We illustrate how the system efficiency depends on parameters. Some interesting managerial insights are generalized, say, a higher deterioration rate decreases the motivation of the players to coordinate their behavior because it raises the system efficiency. We also consider the case where the two players manage their inventories individually (i.e., without VMI). We compare it with the VMI setting to examine the effects of VMI on wholesale price and coordination mechanism. We find that with VMI, the retailer should pay a higher transfer price to the supplier than that without VMI. We illustrate the effects of the main factors including market scale, deterioration rate, the retailer's unit holding cost, and the service investment efficiency on the transfer prices under the two settings. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The related literature is reviewed in Section 2. Section 3 presents the basic model and analyzes the equilibrium outcome of the decentralized supply chain. Section 4 investigates how to coordinate the supply chain via a generalized revenue-sharing contract and examines the efficiency of decentralized system. Section 5 explores the effects of VMI on wholesale price, and coordination mechanism. Section 6 summarizes the results and indicates directions for future research.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
A good production planning and inventory management plays an important role in improving the profitability of a firm with deteriorating items. Much of the literature on deteriorating item considered this issue for a firm in the exogenous price environment. We extend it to consider a one-supplier and one-retailer supply chain with endogenous price and service level, especially, to examine the effect of the interaction between the supplier and the retailer, and the interaction between pricing and service level decisions. Owing to the deterioration of item, the supply chain often adopts a VMI mode. We focus on the pricing and service level decisions and coordination of the decentralized supply chain under VMI. In addition, we investigate the system efficiency of the decentralized supply chain and the effect of VMI on the prices including wholesale price and transfer price. With VMI, the supplier manages the production planning and inventory of the supply chain. We give the equilibrium price and service level decisions under the decentralized setting and the centralized setting, respectively. Under the decentralized setting, we find that a higher deterioration rate raises the unit wholesale price while a higher production rate decreases it, and larger price sensitivity decreases the retailer's unit profit. We design a generalized revenue-sharing contract to coordinate the supply chain. We find that when the market scale, price sensitivity, the supplier's cost (including unit production cost, holding cost, and deterioration cost), or deterioration rate increases, the members of supply chain have a lower incentive to coordinate their behavior. However, when the supplier's production rate or the retailer's service cost factor (ηη) increases, they have a higher incentive to coordinate their behavior. We also consider the case without VMI, where the two players manage their inventories individually. We study the equilibrium price and service level decisions of the decentralized supply chain and design a generalized revenue-sharing contract to coordinate it. Differing from the VMI setting, we find that a higher deterioration rate may decrease the unit wholesale price of the decentralized supply chain but increase the retail price. In addition, we also examine the effect of VMI on the transfer price in the coordination contract at equilibrium. This paper assumes that the order cycle of the retailer is fixed. The endogenous order cycle setting may be interesting. We assume that demand rate is certain and only consider the supply uncertainty from deterioration of product. One can integrate the demand uncertainty and supply uncertainty into a framework to study system efficiency and the coordination mechanism, which is interesting but challenging. A scheme other than revenue-sharing contract may be interesting.