به سوی درک درست از جاذبه در روابط خریدار تامین کننده
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|21195||2009||11 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Industrial Marketing Management, Volume 38, Issue 8, November 2009, Pages 960–970
This paper explores how firms are attracted to one another within buyer–supplier dyads. It draws attention to ways of managing in a relational mode as an alternative to managing in a controlling mode. This study argues that in order to improve value creation and value transfer in buyer–supplier relationships it is not enough to optimize and coordinate management and control systems. Following Dwyer et al. [Dwyer, R., Schurr, P.H. and Oh, S. (1987). Developing buyer–seller relationships. Journal of Marketing, 51: 11–27.], it argues that mutual attraction is important in developing relationships. It is also argued that this can be achieved through a range of perceptual approaches and actions, which enhance performance between the parties involved. A conceptual model of attraction is developed with theoretical underpinnings in social exchange theory. It proposes three behavioral constraints: expected value, trust, and dependence. These components of attraction interact to draw dyadic parties closer together or push them apart. Finally, implications for research and practice are discussed.
Business academics have long recognized that firms are embedded in their wider external environments (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and that suppliers play a fundamental role in their competitiveness (Porter, 1996). Management and control of suppliers has therefore been a major focus in industrial research and practice for at least 15 years. The supply chain management and purchasing literature on how to manage suppliers has been very prolific (Goffin et al., 1997, Macbeth, 1987 and Monczka and Morgan, 1996). Supplier management has been discussed using different systems of reference. Some literature has concentrated on management of the immediate associates of a company using the term “managing the dyad” or “dyadic relationship” (Cousins and Spekman, 2003, Dwyer et al., 1987, Dyer and Singh, 1998 and Håkansson and Snehota, 1995); other literature examines the management of suppliers as embedded in networks (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000, Granovetter, 1973, Powell, 1990, Möller and Törrönen, 2003 and Ritter et al., 2004), or as embedded in supply chains (Lambert and Cooper, 2000 and Mills et al., 2004). Most of the existing literature on supplier management sees the buyer as principal and the supplier as agent (Eisenhardt, 1989), with a focus on how supplier resources and competencies can be leveraged in order to increase the buyer's expected value. With few exceptions (Dyer & Singh, 1998), value is therefore seen as largely pre-existing the buyer–supplier relationship, with the major managerial concern centered on how value can be transferred from the supplier to the buyer. With the emphasis on control, supplier resources/competencies are assumed both assessable and malleable. That is, if the right control mechanisms and proportion of controls are used, value will be transferred willingly from a cooperative supplier to the managing/controlling buyer. Two different sets of control mechanisms have been proposed in the existing research. The first, which we refer to as “information gathering”, is concerned with making visible those actions that affect buyer value. The methods applied in implementing this approach include access to suppliers' Enterprise Resource Planning Systems (Jacobs & Bendoly, 2003), Inter-organizational systems (Christiansen, Rohde, & Hald, 2003), and supply chain performance measurement systems (Beamon, 1999, Lambert and Pohlen, 2001 and Simpson et al., 2002). The second mechanism, which we refer to as “model building”, concerns reducing actions to a less complex and more manageable form. Marketing and purchasing strategies and, more specifically, buyer/supplier segmentation using portfolio models (Fiocca, 1982, Olsen and Ellram, 1997 and Turnbull, 1990) are applied in implementing this approach. This study argues that most of the existing research on supplier management and control does not properly recognize that for management and control mechanisms to work and thus for value to be created and transferred between the buyer and supplier, the dyadic actors need to see the relationship as attractive. More specifically, this study argues that in order to improve value transferal and even value creation (Dyer & Singh, 1998) in buyer–supplier relationships, it is not enough to optimize and/or coordinate management and control mechanisms. Previous research has, only to a limited extent, used and explored the importance of building and maintaining attraction in buyer–supplier dyadic relationships. Dwyer et al. (1987, p. 16) introduced “attraction” as part of their framework for developing buyer–supplier relationships defining it as the degree to which buyers and suppliers interactively achieved a reward–cost outcome in excess of some minimum level. Ellegaard (2003) introduced customer attractiveness as an alternative approach to supplier management and argued that this focuses motivational mechanisms and management processes in the pursuit of the highest possible value potential (p. 208). Harris, O'Malley and Patterson (2003, p. 9) defined attraction in professional services “as the extent to which relational partners perceive past, current, future or potential partners as professionally appealing in terms of their ability to provide superior economic benefits, access to important resources and social compatibility” and then explored the role of attraction in the initiation, development and maintenance of relationships between barristers, solicitors and barristers' clerks. Recent developments in industry support the growing importance of being attractive to key suppliers. First, most firms recognize that the important innovative competencies reside in a few key suppliers (Cordon, Vollmann, & Eklund, 2006). Second, some observers have suggested that a “supplier rebellion” is in the making, based on recent incidents of vendors not supplying — thereby forcing manufacturers to shutdown (Cordon, 2005). Third, concepts, such as supplier councils (Fawcett, Ogden, Magnan, & Cooper, 2006) are advising key buyer decision makers in strategic decision-making. Our objective is therefore to explore mechanisms that create attraction in dyadic relationships. More specifically, we are interested in the mechanisms that encourage a buyer and a supplier to jointly improve a buyer–supplier relationship. What makes a supplier interested in working jointly with a buyer? What makes a buyer interested in working jointly with a supplier? These are the major research questions that this study explores. Further, this article provides some indications of how such mutual interest can be influenced. This article adopts a conceptual approach drawing on social exchange theory and existing research on dyadic relationships and buyer–supplier value. The article is arranged as a progressive development of a conceptual model in three main steps. We begin by reviewing social exchange theory and its applicability to the study of buyer–supplier relationship formation and development. We discuss attraction as the force drawing social exchange actors together and propose an expression derived from social exchange theory describing attraction as composed of three components: Expected value, trust, and dependence. Second, in Sections 3, 4 and 5, we examine the literature to flesh out each of the three components of attraction. Third, as the final step towards the development of a conceptual model, we discuss how the components of attraction can be influenced to increase attraction. We conclude this article with a discussion of implications and avenues for future research and practice.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
Building on recent developments in industry as well as research, our objective in this paper was to explore the mechanisms that encourage a buyer and a supplier to jointly work together. With theoretical underpinnings in social exchange theory as well as literature focusing on long-term orientation and value in buyer–supplier relationships, the construct of attraction in buyer–supplier relationships was developed. In the context of a buyer–supplier relationship we propose to understand attraction as the force fostering voluntarism in purchasing and marketing exchanges, and further pushing a buyer and supplier closer together in a mutual advantageous relationship. Based on our review of social exchange theory we developed an understanding of attraction as a complex construct comprising both an extrinsic/intrinsic reward component and two moderating cost components. More specifically, the understanding of attraction developed in this study comprises three major components. First, and at the core, is the attracted party's perceived expected value of being associated with the other party, a composite of both extrinsic and intrinsic value components. Second, with the ability to moderate the perceived value, is the attracted party's perceived trust in the other. Third, again with the ability to moderate perceived value, is the attracted party's perceived dependence on the other party. In the context of a buyer–supplier relationship and building on three streams of existing literature: The value, the trust and the dependence perspectives on dyadic relationship formation and development, each of the major components in the expression was found to consist of a range of sub dimensions. First, and related to perceived expected value, existing literature propose different value perceptions related to a buyer and supplier. Although the sub-components “access to new buyers/suppliers” and “competency development” seem to be shared amongst buyers and suppliers, “cost reduction”, “time compression” and “innovation” and “price/volume” and “growth” seem to be more uniquely related to buyers and suppliers respectively. Second, and related to trust, existing literature propose a distinction between perceptions related to benevolence trust and perceptions related to integrity trust. Finally dependence between buyers and suppliers in buyer–supplier exchanges seem to be constructed in complex combinations of “expected association value”, “association alternatives” and the “level of transaction specific assets”. Now, what does the beginning understanding of attraction in buyer–supplier relationships which we have presented in this study imply for managers seeking to improve the buyer–supplier relationships in which they participate? The challenge for such managers is to provide mechanisms that create perceptions of own firm as valuable, and trustworthy in the eyes of their dyad associate. In fact, and in more detail, we can say that the challenge is to provide mechanisms that create the right combinations of perceived expected value, perceived trust and perceived dependence (Table 2). In order to do so, one managerial strategy would be to attempt to influence each of the three major components with no regard to the effect on the other two, using each of their sub-components as drivers in the change (Fig. 1). However since buyer and supplier perceptions related to expected value, trust and dependence are related and quite complex; another managerial strategy would suggest that the managerial efforts cannot be done in isolation. Instead, managers must consider policies that influence all three dimensions in a joint effort. We argue that conscious and careful application of investments, adaptations and communication in the dyadic relationship will help them do so. Further, we have proposed that buyer/supplier attraction is built on the perceptions of many different individuals working in different functions in each of the dyad companies. Thus perceptions related to buyer and supplier attraction are often conflicting or misaligned. Institutionalization will help management align these perceptions across the different actors and functions in the company. Regarding research, there are many interesting extensions. Although resting firmly on a range of both empirical and theoretical based studies, the arguments presented in this article are conceptual. It will be interesting to establish empirical tests for the hypothesis developed in this study. Another issue is the complex interrelationship between expected value, trust and dependence and their sub-components. Future research needs to further explore how the dynamics between these three components and their sub-components operate. The goal is to propose mechanisms that dyad actors can use to influence the various dimensions and to provide warnings for how seemingly common business approaches might lead to serious reductions in the attraction of one's firm to a supply chain dyad associate.