همکاری بین سازمانی در روابط خریدار تامین کننده: هر دو دیدگاه
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|21212||2010||7 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Business Research, Volume 63, Issue 8, August 2010, Pages 863–869
Most empirical investigations of inter-organizational cooperation within channel dyads investigate the phenomenon from the perspective of only one partner. However, because investigating from both partners' perspectives is important especially when interdependencies exist between the channel partners, this study attempts to examine both perspectives in buyer–supplier relationships and explain why differences, if any, arise. The data that this study requires were collected from buyers responsible for supplier relationships in a Korean telecommunication service provider and from their partners. The results show that switching costs and inter-organizational trust are significant determinants of cooperation for buyers; technological uncertainty and the reciprocity of the relationship are significant determinants for the suppliers. In both sample sets, goal consistency significantly affects inter-firm cooperation.
In the new economy, as firms become more dependent on outside partners to meet sophisticated customer needs, managing inter-organizational relationships effectively becomes important to gaining a competitive advantage. Consequently, inter-organizational cooperation receives considerable research attention. However, most empirical investigations of inter-organizational cooperation within channel dyads have investigated the phenomenon from the perspective of only one partner (e.g., Bensaou, 1997 and Kim and Umanath, 2005). Investigating inter-organizational cooperation from the perspective of both partners is important, especially when channel partners depend on each other. Channel relationships that are asymmetric in dependence and power are more dysfunctional and less stable than symmetric relationships (Kumar and van Dissel, 1996). When dependence asymmetries occur, factors that influence the partner's cooperative actions differ according to the partner's status in the channel, that is, whether they have relative power or relative dependence. While the buyer's perspective in buyer–supplier relationships receives much attention (for exceptions, see Helper (1991) who focuses on the supplier's perspective), prior studies have shown a discrepancy in the perspectives between buyers and suppliers. For example, Forker et al. (1999) report that both parties have different views on the buyer's implementation of the supplier's development activities. Arkader (2001) has found that buyers' perspectives are different from suppliers' in regard to both the facilitators and the barriers of buyer–supplier relationships. For instance, buyers identify “problems due to environmental factors (especially, adverse logistics and tax systems)” as important barriers to cooperative relationships, while suppliers identify “organizational barriers (mainly, the existence of functional resistance and the loss of power by buyers in the purchasing departments)” (p. 92). Therefore, this study attempts to accommodate both partners' perspectives in the buyer–supplier relationships to determine whether the perspectives differ, and, if so, to explain why. This study develops a comprehensive model of the determinants of inter-organizational cooperation by synthesizing various theories relevant to inter-organizational relationships. The study then tests this research model by using matched samples from a buyer and supplier in the Korean telecommunication industry. The telecommunication industry includes the telecommunication equipment manufacturing industry as well as the telecommunication service industry. The manufactures of telecommunication equipment produce components that can be integrated into a whole system based on a certain agreed-upon protocol. Meanwhile, telecommunication service providers deliver services through an integrated system with these components. Effective service delivery requires mutual adjustments and cooperation between the telecommunication service providers and their equipment manufacturers, because modular technologies must be integrated. Further, customer needs are constantly evolving in this industry, as is the technology required to meet customer needs. In this type of environment, both trading partners benefit from cooperation because of the considerable interdependence between the buyers and suppliers.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
This paper attempts to explain the differences in the antecedents to the buyer–supplier cooperation in terms of dependence asymmetry between the buyer and the supplier. Increasing interdependence asymmetries may lead to higher levels of suspicion and conflict in the relationship. However, interdependence asymmetry does not necessarily cause irreversible and damaging conflict. Firms in a supply channel may behave differently because their strategic positions and market situations are different. Future research should explore the extent to which the interdependence structure influences the behaviors of firms. Additional researches need to incorporate various control mechanisms without equity ownership. Dyer and Ouchi (1993) point out potential negative consequences of equity ownership: “The autonomy and incentives that keep the company innovating and focused on continuous improvement are lost” (p. 56). Thus, future research needs to look into various control mechanisms with or without equity ownership. This study has limitations. First, this study's sample consists of one buyer organization and its multiple suppliers in a single industry (telecommunication industry), all of which were located in Korea. In addition, the supplier sample is skewed toward smaller firms in a monopsonistic situation. Therefore, the results are characteristic of only a single company in a single country. To increase the external validity of the findings of this study, future research that incorporates a sample from multiple companies in non-monopsonistic situations is needed.