اعتماد و تعبیه رابطه ای؛ کاوش در تناقض الگوی توسعه اعتماد در روابط تامین کننده اصلی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|21247||2013||14 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||10850 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Industrial Marketing Management, Volume 42, Issue 2, February 2013, Pages 152–165
This paper explores the role of trust as an enabler and constraint between buyers and suppliers engaged in long-term relationships. According to the relational view, cooperative strategies require trust-based mutual commitments to co-create value. However, complete pictures of the positive and negative outcomes from trust development have yet to be fully developed. In particular, trust as an originator of path dependent constraints resulting from over embeddedness is yet to be integrated into the relational view. We use a case-based methodology to explore whether trust is an optimizing phenomenon in key supplier relationships. Two cases where trust development processes demonstrate a paradox of trust-building behaviors cultivate different outcomes constraining value co-creation.
Trust is identified within the resource-based view as a key antecedent of building relational capital with suppliers (Barney and Hansen, 1994 and Chen et al., 2009). Trust shapes inter-firm relational embeddedness, which Lawson, Tyler, and Cousins (2008) characterize as a range of integration activities reflecting close working practices between buyers and suppliers. Trust comprises the intangible attributes built over time to deal with the shared vulnerabilities in buyer/supplier relationships (Fawcett et al., 2004 and Moorman et al., 1993). By building relational embeddedness from mutually perceived trustworthy interactions, buyers and suppliers rely on one another despite an ever-present potential for opportunistic behavior (Handfield & Bechtel, 2002). High-trust relationships yield vital benefits for supply chain partners, including increased relationship satisfaction and enhanced firm performance (Johnston, McCutcheon, Stuart, & Kerwood, 2004), increased inter-firm learning (Dodgson, 1993 and Fawcett et al., 2012), lower governance costs (Dyer, 1997 and Dyer and Chu, 2003), reduced relational conflict (Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998), and an overall improvement in cooperation (Palmatier, Dant, & Grewal, 2007). This positions trust at the heart of relational governance (Poppo & Zenger, 2002) because of its ability to enhance performance regardless of governance mode (Gulati & Nickerson, 2008). Trust is therefore a core construct in the relational view (RV), is at the nexus of intra- and inter-organizational processes and exchanges, and gives insight into building future relational capital (Lavie, 2006, Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 1999 and Madhok, 2002). Accumulated relational embeddedness is productive of, and governed by, trust, as well as norms of mutual gain and reciprocity (Granovetter, 1985 and Larson, 1992). Absent a foundation of trust, collaborative supply chain alliances do not emerge and relational advantage is foregone (Gulati & Singh, 1998). Central to the trust-development challenge is the acceptance of vulnerability as firms seek to build collaborative relationships (Ring and Ven de Ven, 1992, Rousseau et al., 1998, Sako, 1998 and Zaheer et al., 1998). Because decision-makers are strongly averse to being vulnerable (McCarter & Northcraft, 2007) and opportunistic behavior is a perpetual risk in collaborative relationships (Hansen, Hoskisson, & Barney, 2008), building high levels of trust and relational embeddedness are costly and difficult to achieve. Although the positive outcomes from trust building within the RV are often articulated, research has only begun to explore the negative outcomes, which may result from such interconnectedness (e.g. Gargiulo and Ertug, 2006 and Villena et al., 2011). Specifically, inappropriate bonds built from trust may reduce efforts of both buyer and supplier to 1) stay vigilant against malfeasance, 2) capitalize on opportunities for leveraging existing relationships, and 3) monitor competing resource deployment options (Rowley, Behrens, & Krackhardt, 2000). Relationships exhibiting inappropriate trust may suffer from constraints on governance choices beyond what is optimal (Bendoly and Swink, 2007, Gargiulo and Benassi, 2000 and Uzzi, 1997). These realities suggest that trust in relationships is a careful balance, making it important to understand how this trade-off is addressed over time so strategies can be developed to optimize supply chain interactions (Grayson & Ambler, 1999). A re-assessment of trust in the RV therefore needs to account for the risks of embeddedness when modeling inter-firm value creation (c.f. Lavie, 2006). Despite acknowledging the theoretical importance of trust and embeddedness, and the more general volume of work supporting the relational view (e.g. Chatain, 2010, Cousins et al., 2006 and Leiblein and Miller, 2003), we find no studies detailing the benefits and risks of trust-enabled embeddedness. Indeed, Lawson et al. (2008) and Gulati and Sytch (2007) identify the need to extend our understanding of the conceptual inter-relationship between trust and embeddedness, and the consequent implications for relational capital. It could be assumed that greater degrees of trust and resulting embeddedness are wholly positive for the performance of relationships. However, a more balanced role for trust bonds needs to discern more systematically which features of interaction might enable or constrain key supplier relationships over their lifecycle. This requires re-conceptualizing trust as a construct shaped by local and broader relational norms, rather than ignoring its socially embedded nature (Wicks, Berman, & Jones, 1999). It also requires research in this under developed branch of the relational view to position the multi-faceted role of trust and embeddedness, which prompts us to consider the use of qualitative methods to achieve a richer case-based exploration of the ‘black box’ of pivotal processes over time.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
Recent literature argues that a detrimental “dark side” to trust exists; yet, there are few studies that detail the behaviors which characterize it. We sought to redress this critical gap. We identified two patterns of trust development (empathy-driven and capability-driven) that reflect a firm's approach to relationship development. Vitally, each development pattern appears to invoke different risks. Both patterns of trust are built over time, and develop from embedded internal cultural and policy norms, which carry over into external relationships. It is clear in both case studies that these norms, shared by those at each case company, have considerable influence over the expectations of relationships with suppliers. Although empirical research regarding the consequences of trust often assumes a positive, linear correlation with value co-creation, we observe a more complex and paradoxical interplay among these phenomena. Our findings provide empirical support and extend the conceptual arguments of Gargiulo and Ertug (2006) and Villena et al. (2011) concerning the possibility of a negative curvilinear relationship between relational capital (comprising trust, respect and reciprocity) and performance. Our research further suggests a sequencing of relational inertia and resource misallocation, the need to consider the roles of skill enhancement, along with specific types of information sharing, empathy, and dependability as features of trust. An on-going assessment of the degree of relationship intensity between partners is needed. Our findings further present a wider paradox when relationship quality is assessed between a buyer and supplier. At both focal companies, the behaviors that led suppliers to 1) value the buying firm as a partner, 2) seek deeper relational embeddedness, and 3) pursue a value co-creation strategy simultaneously sowed the seeds for relationship dissatisfaction. For both Coach and Colleague, relationship commitment is manifest across all four dimensions of information sharing, skill enhancement, interpersonal relationships, and empathy. However, we observed distinct patterns of effort and investment. Focusing on Coach, deep relationship commitment portends intense skill enhancement. Coach expects its suppliers to continuously improve and to work cooperatively on joint programs to improve efficiency and performance. Although Coach invests heavily in its suppliers, suppliers are expected to bring significant resources to the relationship. Without doubt it is useful to build trust via improved relationship performance with key suppliers; however, the consequent tensions caused by unbalanced capability building between firms may undermine longer-term relationships, hurting future value co-creation. In the case of Colleague, buying managers deliberately and repeatedly forewent opportunities to capitalise on the positive, harmonious relationship between themselves and their key suppliers. Although suppliers to Colleague complained about a lack of what they perceive to be openness, it reflects a lack of desire to engage in much deeper and more complex value co-creation relationships. Colleague is accepting of the result: An obvious inertia within the relationship with little chance of jointly created innovation. But, Colleague seems unwilling to engage in activities to alleviate this form of embeddedness. This ‘lock-in’ was a clear pattern across all its key supplier relationships, leading us to suggest a considerable challenge presents itself in circumstances of closely coupled harmonious relationships. In the case of Colleague this is deliberate co-creation under-achievement; in other firms the gradual building of a pattern of harmonious interactions with suppliers may lead to less obvious missed opportunities. Our study is only one of few seeking to describe and explore the dual role of trust as a supportive and detrimental feature of relationships. The case approach yields depth of insight into trust patterns, its key features and resulting outcomes. This lays the foundation for future studies which can empirically generalize these findings by developing specific measurement scales for trust patterns, relationship intensity and relationship performance. Variables important to consider resulting from this study will be the emergence of opportunism in key supplier relationships, the gradual loss of objectivity through relationship inertia, and the root motives of buyers and suppliers. Building on the approach used in this research to study the patterns of trust development over time, it may be fruitful to deploy methods aimed at longitudinal studies of relationships. Our study adopts a conservative methodology in the sense that we did not seek to track the full life of relationships and relied on reflection from multiple participants. An extended approach may be to use longitudinal multiphase designs (Rousseau et al., 1998). Although Anderson and Jap (2005) allude to likelihood of a difference in the prevalence of features reflective of trust-based risks in a given firm's key supplier relationships, it would be useful to assess whether, by tracking the complete life of a relationship, it inevitably suffers from close relationship risk. More generally, we have chosen a research strategy, which due to its data intensive nature, was best undertaken by studying dyads between one buyer and multiple suppliers. It may be useful to consider networked studies of the effect of trust. This may result in a clearer understanding of whether relationship inertia has a blinding effect on direct as well as indirect ties, and the breadth of relationships in an extended network, which can be resourced at one time. It will also allow the further elaboration of our research results concerning the consistency witnessed in the motives behind the patterns of trust development in Colleague and Coach.