تجزیه و تحلیل پروتکل کیوتو تحت پیمان مراکش: بهره وری اقتصادی و اثر زیست محیطی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|21295||2002||18 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Ecological Economics, Volume 43, Issues 2–3, December 2002, Pages 141–158
This article evaluates the environmental effectiveness and economic implications of the Kyoto Protocol (KP) after the Bonn agreement and the Marrakesh Accords. We will break it down into several components that correspond with major steps in the international process: pre-COP 6 version of the KP, with unrestricted international emissions trading but without sinks; withdrawal of the USA; and decisions on sinks in Bonn and Marrakesh. The Marrakesh Accords bring Annex-I emissions in 2010 without the USA at 0.5% under base-year levels; this corresponds to nearly 2% above the 1990-levels. The US withdrawal has by far the greatest impact in reducing the environmental effectiveness of the KP, whereas the impact of the decision on sinks is comparatively small. The US withdrawal also substantially reduces the permit demand and permit prices will drop dramatically. Hot air becomes increasingly dominant and may threaten the viability of the Kyoto Mechanisms (KM), especially in lower baseline (business-as-usual (BaU)) scenarios. Therefore, banking of hot air is of absolute importance to improve the environmental effectiveness of the protocol at moderately higher costs, while enhancing the development of a viable emission trading market. A strategy of curtailing and banking permit supply is also in the interest of the dominant seller, Russia.
On December 11, 1997, the parties at the third session of the Conference of the Parties (COP-3) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Kyoto agreed to the Kyoto Protocol (KP) (UNFCCC, 1998). Four years later, on the 23rd of July 2001, another landmark in international climate change policy was reached. Delegates of the resumed session of COP-6 in Bonn approved a political agreement on a number of key implementation issues of the KP. The Bonn agreement underwent a difficult birth (UNFCCC, 2001a). Parties had failed to close a deal earlier at the first session of COP-6 in The Hague. During the preparations for the follow-up, the new US administration declared the KP to be fatally flawed and announced that the USA would not agree to any outcome of the resumed session of COP-6. Yet, after fierce negotiations, all parties in Bonn, except the USA, agreed to the compromise drafted by the Chairman of COP-6, Jan Pronk, who is also the Dutch Minister of the Environment. Some praised the fact that several key parties had shown surprising flexibility in their positions to close the deal. Others, however, were critical of the generous offers that had stripped the KP of its environmental meaning. About 3 months after Bonn, November 2001, the international deliberations at COP-7 in Marrakesh succeeded in translating all the provisions of the Bonn agreement into legal texts (UNFCCC, 2001b). These Marrakesh Accords mark the end of a 4-year negotiating period and formally pave the way for entry intro force of the KP. Here, we will evaluate the environmental effectiveness and economic implications of the KP under the Marrakesh Accords. In Section 2, the main elements of the Bonn agreement and Marrakesh Accords relevant for our analysis will be briefly evaluated, while Section 3 will present the analysis. Next, our evaluation will be put into perspective in Section 4, which contains our calculation of the impact by key determining factors on the outcomes. Section 5 presents the conclusions.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
This article evaluates the environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency of the Marrakesh Accords. The Marrakesh Accords represent the culmination of a turbulent international negotiating process resulting in some major steps: the pre-COP-6 version of the KP, the withdrawal of the USA and the final decisions as agreed in Bonn and Marrakesh. Our evaluation focused on these three steps. • The Annex-I abatement efforts relative to BaU-emissions vary between 0 and 3%, depending on the scenario. If sinks are seen as efforts additional to emission reductions to capture the overall decreasing effect on CO2 build-up, this range would increase to nearly 6%. • The US withdrawal has had by far the greatest impact in reducing the environmental effectiveness of the KP. • The decisions on sinks further reduce the environmental effectiveness, although the impact is comparatively small compared with the US withdrawal. • In terms of CO2 equivalents, the Marrakesh Accords bring Annex-I emissions without the USA to 0.5% under base-year levels; this is nearly 2% above 1990 levels due to differences between 1990 and base-year emissions. • However, without a major buyer like the USA, permit demand is significantly reduced and as a consequence, permit prices may drop to around US$9/tC. Hot air becomes increasingly dominant and may threaten the viability of the KMs. • The BaU-scenarios also have a strong impact on the permit price. Lower baselines than the A1B scenario forecast a lower permit demand—far under supply. This oversupply pushes the permit price towards zero, hence undermining the emissions trading market and the viability of the KMs. • Banking large amounts of hot air is of absolute importance to improving the environmental effectiveness and enhancing the development of a viable emission trading market. A strategy of curtailing and banking permit supply is also in the interest of the dominant seller, the Annex-I FSU region. Banking all hot air will increase Annex-I abatement efforts to over 8% below BaU-emissions in the reference scenario. Full banking, even in the lowest B1 scenario, will lead to an abatement effort of at least 4%. • Hot air banking may bring the price up to a maximum of nearly US$30/tC. The outcome in the ‘middle’ is a permit price between US$15/tC and US$20/tC. • In quantitative terms, US re-entry has a similar effect, potentially raising the permit price to US$30/tC but, obviously, the potential for re-entry will be largely determined by the domestic political environment.