دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی شماره 22513
عنوان فارسی مقاله

استراتژی رقابتی در بازسازی و تاثیر قوانین برگشتی

کد مقاله سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی ترجمه فارسی تعداد کلمات
22513 2007 18 صفحه PDF سفارش دهید محاسبه نشده
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عنوان انگلیسی
Competitive strategy in remanufacturing and the impact of take-back laws
منبع

Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)

Journal : Journal of Operations Management, Volume 25, Issue 6, November 2007, Pages 1123–1140

کلمات کلیدی
بازسازی - قوانین محیط زیست - قیمت گذاری - استراتژی رقابتی - لجستیک معکوس - زنجیره های تامین حلقه بسته -
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چکیده انگلیسی

This paper examines the impact of take-back laws within a manufacturer/remanufacturer competitive framework. Take-back laws require that firms take responsibility for the collection/disposal costs of their products. We consider two alternative implementations of take-back laws that are distinguished by the degree of control that the manufacturer has on returns sold to the remanufacturer. In one implementation, known as collective WEEE take-back, the manufacturer has no control over returns sold to the remanufacturer. The other implementation, known as individual WEEE take-back, gives complete control to the manufacturer. We develop a general two-period model to investigate questions of interest to policy-makers in government and managers in industry. Our results suggest that, in some settings, enactment of collective WEEE take-back will result in higher manufacturer and remanufacturer profits while simultaneously spurring remanufacturing activity and reducing the tax burden on society. A negative effect is higher consumer prices in the market. In other settings, we find that collective WEEE take-back introduces a structural change to the industry—creating an environment where remanufacturing becomes profitable when it is not profitable without a take-back law. With respect to individual WEEE take-back, we find that the manufacturer often benefits from allowing the remanufacturer to enter the market, though from a government policy-maker perspective, there are clear risks of monopolistic behavior.

مقدمه انگلیسی

As of 1996, the remanufacturing industry was a US$ 53 billion industry of approximately 73,000 remanufacturing firms (Lund, 1996). The sales figures were on par with the American steel industry. However, the direct employment figure of 480,000 was twice that of the American steel industry and equaled that of the consumer durables industry (Lund, 1996). Giuntini and Gaudette (2003) affirm that even though remanufacturable prices are typically 30–40% lower than new products, remanufactured products cost 40–65% less than new products to produce. An estimated 120 trillion BTUs per year of energy are saved from remanufacturing globally, accounting for about 16 million barrels of crude oil and about US$ 500 million in energy costs. Annual material savings resulting from remanufacturing activities worldwide is 14 million tonnes per year, which is the equivalent of a fully loaded railway train 1650 miles long (Giuntini and Gaudette, 2003). The motivation for remanufacturing is driven by economic considerations (Ginsberg, 2001 and Toffel, 2003) and, in recent years, legislators have started to mandate it. In December 2002, New Jersey enacted the Universal Waste Regulations Act, which governs the disposal of all electronic devices including computers. Under this regulation, organizations accumulating more than 220 pounds of universal waste at any time are designated as “small quantity universal waste handlers.” Responsibilities of such small quantity universal waste handlers include shipping the waste to a registered universal waste facility (http://www.thegreenpc.com/). The European Union (EU) has adopted a Directive on Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) such that, effective August 2005, EU member states must establish collection systems for electrical and electronics waste. Manufacturers bear all costs from collection points to waste treatment. Pending Minnesota bills such as HF 882 and SF 838 would make electronics manufacturers responsible for collection/disposal costs. In January 2005, California enacted the Electronic Waste Recycling Fee (SB20), which requires retailers to collect from consumers an electronic waste recycling fee on electronic devices (presently limited to video displays) to cover the net cost of a state authorized collector who collects, consolidates and transports electronic wastes. Maine enacted the Extended Producer Responsibility Act (LD 1892) by which municipalities collect electronics and invoice the manufacturers of returned product for the cost of collection and transport to recyclers. Residing in a state with no current disposal regulations does not exempt one from the risk of improper disposal. Interstate commerce laws mandate that any product between states must meet with the laws of each of the states the product passes over. Since one has no control of a disposed computer's eventual destination, it is essential to ensure that products meet the most stringent laws practiced in any state in the U.S. In Europe, under stiff recycling requirements, no more than 15% of a scrap vehicle can go to a landfill, and that target percentage drops to 5% in 2015 (http://www.reman.rit.edu/). The growing cost of landfill usage and the implementation of recent bills have lent support to the remanufacturing cause. These acts and other proposed bills present interesting research questions for analysis and topics for policy debate. In fact, the United States Environmental Protection Agency and industry representatives such as the Electronic Industries Alliance have been weighing the merits of various recycling models and differing implementations of take-back laws, which require that manufacturers bear responsibility for costs associated with collection and disposal for end-of-life units (EIA, 2001). In this paper, we seek to improve our understanding of the impact of take-back laws so as to guide government policy-makers and to inform corporate management. We compare and contrast a scenario where no take-back law is in effect with two possible implementations of a take-back law. The two take-back laws are distinguished by the degree of control that the manufacturer has on returns sold to the remanufacturer. In one implementation, the manufacturer has responsibility for collecting returns and has control over whether returns are recycled or sold to a remanufacturer. This implementation is known as individual WEEE take-back under the EU WEEE Directive. In another implementation, manufacturers pay a collection fee for returned product, and government has responsibility for collecting returns and has control over whether returns are recycled or sold to a remanufacturer. This implementation is known as collective WEEE take-back under the EU WEEE Directive. We consider an industry where the manufacturer does not engage in remanufacturing. A remanufacturing process is quite different from a manufacturing process in terms of equipment and labor skills required for disassembly and repair of cores (Guide et al., 2000), and the majority of manufacturers do not remanufacture (Ferguson and Toktay, 2005). However, this attracts third party remanufacturers who can cannibalize sales of the original equipment manufacturer (OEM). We analyze a two-period model where the manufacturer launches a new generation of a product in the first period. A remanufacturer acquires returns at the end of the first period, and the manufacturer and remanufacturer compete for sales in the second period. The life-cycle of the product is two periods, so there is no remanufacturing of returns at the end of the second period. Rather, the two-period cycle begins anew as a new generation of the product is introduced by the manufacturer. An important element captured in our analysis is the impact of the return rate on costs and future sales. Guide et al. (2000) note that imperfect correlation between demand and returns may lead to an excess or shortage of returns, making inventory management of returns a difficult task. Furthermore, disposal costs for excess returns (i.e., returns not used in remanufacturing) can be significant, and are likely to increase in the future. The economic and social costs of disposal increase as landfills get filled up (Renkow, 1994) and environmental protection groups protest against dumping in third world countries (Taylor, 2002). Landfill valuation not only depends on present land values but also on the increased value of landfill space over time, and besides the cost of managing the environmental effects of landfills there is also the after-care needed for closed landfills (including leachate and methane emission control). The next section outlines related literature on remanufacturing in a competitive environment. Section 3 presents the model and analysis, Section 4 reports results from a numerical study and discusses managerial and policy implications and Section 5 concludes the paper.

نتیجه گیری انگلیسی

In this paper, we define and analyze a model of an industry comprised of a manufacturer producing new products and a remanufacturer. The manufacturer operates without competition from a remanufacturer for a period of time after a new product is introduced. Eventually, as products are returned, a remanufacturer may enter the market and compete with the manufacturer. We use our model to predict industry behavior and resulting performance measures over alternative implementations of take-back laws, including the alternative of no take-back law. The take-back laws that we consider have been recently enacted or are under consideration by various state legislatures and are modeled after the European Union Directive on Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE). In particular, the EU Directive distinguishes between individual and collective WEEE take-back laws. Our objective is to lend insight into the impact of these laws on measures of interest to the manufacturer, remanufacturer and government policy-maker. The results of our study lead to three main conclusions. First, even though the manufacturer has the power to keep a remanufacturer from entering the market under individual WEEE take-back, this power is not exercised when return rates and unit collection/disposal cost are moderate. The manufacturer profits more from the revenue associated with returns sold to the remanufacturer than by operating as a monopolist. Nevertheless, due to the risk of monopolistic behavior, a policy-maker interested in promoting remanufacturing should be wary of individual WEEE take-back. Relative to collective WEEE take-back, individual WEEE take-back does offer the advantage of reducing the role of government (i.e., the manufacturer is responsible for collection/disposal), but is perhaps most suited to industries where remanufacturing, other than by the OEM, is not especially desired or valued. Second, the enactment of a collective WEEE take-back law can lead to increases in manufacturer and remanufacturer profitability while simultaneously spurring remanufacturing activity and reducing the tax burden on society. We observe this phenomenon over a range of moderate levels of return rate and unit collection/disposal cost. The responsibility for collection/disposal cost under collective WEEE take-back reduces the intensity of competition between the manufacturer and remanufacturer, and both firms become more profitable. Of course, while collective WEEE take-back shifts collection/disposal costs from government to private industry, thus reducing the tax burden on society, the lower intensity of manufacturer/remanufacturer competition also means higher prices for the consumer. Third, we find instances where the enactment of collective WEEE take-back creates a structural change in the industry that results in the introduction of remanufactured products. This occurs when unit collection/disposal cost is so high that remanufacturing is not profitable when there is no take-back law. The enactment of collective WEEE take-back creates incentive (i.e., through avoidance of collection/disposal cost at the end of period 1) for the manufacturer to raise prices to the point where the remanufacturer can profitably enter the market. While the result may be positive from the perspective of reduced tax burden and the emergence of remanufacturing where none existed before (and low prices for those consumers interested in remanufactured product), manufacturer profit decreases and new product prices increase. The merits of collective WEEE take-back noted above must be considered in light of practical difficulties and challenges that can arise. For example, in some settings the manufacturer can benefit from purchasing returns from the collection agency in order to keep the remanufacturer from entering the market. In addition, the agency responsible for collections typically collects products from a wide range of manufacturers. Products tend to get co-mingled, and one outcome is that recycling, instead of remanufacturing, tends to dominate (e.g., avoids the step of sorting products by manufacturer). Our analysis relies on the presence of controls and incentives that keep these behaviors from happening. Also, relative to individual WEEE take-back, collective WEEE take-back offers less incentive for manufacturers to redesign products to make it easier to re-use components in new products. We have not considered this effect. Our model is an abstraction of reality and relies on several assumptions that may limit the applicability of our conclusions. First, we use a two-period model—period 1 when the new product is introduced and no remanufacturing occurs, and period 2 when the remanufacturer may enter the market. The number of units returned in a condition suitable for remanufacturing at the end of period 1 represents an upper limit on remanufacturing volume over the duration of the product's life-cycle. In reality, returns become available more or less continually after some initial period of time. One consequence is that our model likely overstates the power of the manufacturer's first period price on industry performance, though we have attempted to mitigate this weakness by considering alternative first period pricing strategies. Second, we assume that the manufacturer does not choose to remanufacture its own products. While this is consistent with a number of industries, there are also many cases where this assumption does not hold. Third, our industry is very simple, comprised of a single manufacturer and a single remanufacturer. This structure gives the manufacturer more pricing power than would likely be possible when there are multiple manufacturers (and remanufacturers) competing for the same market. The impacts of relaxing these assumptions, as well as empirical research directed at testing the validity of our conclusions, are worthy topics for future research

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