دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی شماره 23260
عنوان فارسی مقاله

استقلال بانک مرکزی و تورم : شواهدی از کشورهای در حال ظهور

کد مقاله سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی ترجمه فارسی تعداد کلمات
23260 2011 17 صفحه PDF سفارش دهید محاسبه نشده
خرید مقاله
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عنوان انگلیسی
Central Bank independence and inflation : Evidence from emerging countries
منبع

Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)

Journal : Journal of Policy Modeling, Volume 33, Issue 3, May–June 2011, Pages 453–469

کلمات کلیدی
استقلال بانک مرکزی - تعصب ناشی از تورم - شاخص استقلال حقوقی - گردش مالی - پنل -
پیش نمایش مقاله
پیش نمایش مقاله استقلال بانک مرکزی و تورم : شواهدی از کشورهای در حال ظهور

چکیده انگلیسی

This paper is mainly devoted to an empirical study of the legal and real independence of the Tunisian Central Bank as well as to estimating the correlation between the inflationary bias and the real independence of the emerging countries while applying new data sources. Our contribution consists, particularly, in measuring the indicators of legal and real Central Bank independence through applying, respectively, the Jacome (2001) and Cukierman's (1992) methods. In a second part, we are carrying out a descriptive and comparative analysis of inflation relative to the Maghreb countries designed to check the inflationary bias reduction. However, the third part is consecrated to the study of correlation between the real independence and the inflationary bias, performed over a sample of emerging countries with a panel estimation ranging over the period 1971–2004. Our results conform those achieved by Cukierman (1992), showing an acceptable proxy of the real and legal independence as well as the beneficial effects stemming from inflation. These findings conform those of De Haan (2007) and confirm a positive and non-significant correlation between real independence and inflation.

مقدمه انگلیسی

Within the frame of establishing the Euro-Mediterranean zone, the North African countries of the MENA zone have adopted a set of reforms during the recent years. Among these reconstructions, we mention the revision of the Central Bank status, for the purpose of ensuring a much larger autonomy and curbing inflation as a major objective of their monetary policy. The Central Bank independence is nowadays a key concept in the theory and practice of the monetary policy. The credibility contribution, necessary to solve the inflationary bias problem, may be achieved in different ways: the monetary rule (reduction of the discretionary character of the monetary policy), reputation (taking into account the negative effects of the inflationary bias in the monetary decision making), conservatism (reorienting the monetary objective towards the struggle against inflation), and contract (a stimulus system). These solutions ensure the repudiation absence, from which disappear the temporal incoherence and the inflationary bias. The original theoretical literature analyses concerning the independence and credibility as appear in the studies of Kydland and Prescott (1977), lies in the problem of temporal incoherence and the goodwill to solve it, in particular, that relative to the monetary policy. If such a solution, which consists in adopting a rule-based policy, is relevant under very restrictive hypotheses, it quickly shows its limits especially when the economy is subject to the offer shocks. Some alternatives have been then suggested. The institutional change is based on the idea that the monetary policy independence from the government can jeopardize the pursuit of the price stability objective. The theories which founded and supported the independence of the Central Bank, mainly those of Barro and Gordon (1993), have noticed that this independence strengthens the credibility of the anti-inflation policy, when it is attached to the political power. The general interest is above any suspicion. Several similar empirical studies dealing with the same issue have also been carried out, among which are those of Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992) as well as, Lougani and Sheets (1995) who have built up indicators by which they assess the impact of the Central Bank independence from inflation. Their work shows that more independence coincides with weak inflation. In particular, Cukierman et al. (1992) have found that their legal indicator is significant for the industrialised countries and non-significant for the developing ones, while the rotation rate of the Central Bank governors is significant for the latter countries as well and for all the sample of their study. Campillo and Miron (1997) and Cottarelli, Griffiths, and Moghadam (1998), have introduced other explanatory variables in their inflation equation in addition to the independence indicator. However, they have ended up with reverse results: for the former authors, the idea of taking into account other relevant explanatory factors other than the Cukierman legal indicator, leads to the rejection of the idea that having an autonomous Central Bank may reduce the inflation level. Cottarelli et al. (1998), however, find that the independence indicator is significant. Other empirical studies such as those of Fischer and Zurlinden (1997), Walsh (1998), Gärtner (1997), Jordan (1997), and Posen (1998), identify a positive relationship between the independence and the sacrifice ratio, an indicator which establishes a correlation between the variation growth and inflation reduction. The sacrifice ratio estimates the deflation cost in economic growth terms. This cost would be higher in the case of independence. This conclusion is, however, contested by Fischer and Zurlinden (1997) who think that the relationship depends largely on the sample of chosen countries. Nowadays, there is a voluminous literature suggesting that the Central Bank independence can contribute to estimating the financial stability, as namely Das, Quintyn, and Chenard (2004), Oosterloo and De Haan (2004), Klomp and De Haan (2008), Meade and Crowe (2007) and Cukierman (2008). For instance, according to Garcia Herrero and Del Rio (2003) and mainly Quintyn and Taylor (2003), the empirical results have suggested that Central Bank independence is positively correlated with the financial stability. Based on the Jacome (2001) and Cukierman et al. (1992) studies, our task consists initially, in calculating legal and real independence indicators of Tunisian Central Bank, for the sake of gathering new data. Secondly, a descriptive and comparative analysis of the correlation between the inflationary bias and the Central Bank independence is going to be carried out about Tunisia in relation with the Maghreb countries, in order to detect comparable results concerning inflation. In the same sense, our investigation is going to be further developed so as to analyze the type of correlation relating to the macroeconomic variables while using the real independence variable as a study object, following the Campillo and Miron methodology (1997) concerning new variables. This measure will be applied on through a sample consisting of some emerging countries, under the panel estimation and over the time period ranging from 1971 to 2004. Therefore, our study is going to be divided in the following way: in the first part, we present a work methodology. As for the second part, it deals with the calculation results of the legal and real independence indicator of Tunisian Central Bank (TCB), as well as the descriptive analysis results of the panel method. However, the third part is consecrated to the results interpretation.

نتیجه گیری انگلیسی

In this paper, our aim was, firstly, to check the compliance of the banking regulations of the TCB with the inflationary bias theory. Moreover, by referring to different articles and laws about the establishment and the Central Bank organisation, we could find that the regulations which govern the Central Bank are endowed with some kind of independence either at personal, functional or political level. Secondly, and to prove these results analytically, we have calculated the legal and real independence degrees of the Tunisian Central Bank. These two indicators seem to be significant and validate such a legal and real independence, while getting closer to the Jacome (2001) and Cukierman (1992) theories. Thus, the Central Bank independence appears to be the institutional solution which helps to adopt a conservative objective. This help improve social welfare, in other words it may resolve the inflationary bias problem. Due to this, we have checked out, that Tunisia has an essential position relative to the struggle against inflation as compared to the other Maghreb countries. Then, within efficiency terms, we have been sure of the disappearance of the inflationary bias. Finally, the checking of the causal relationship between the real independence, inflation and other macroeconomic variables in a panel sample of 40 emerging and developing countries has showed a positive and non-significant relationship between the two variables. As for the other control variables, they are in compliance with numerous studies sustaining the fact that inflation is the correlation result of some macroeconomic variables rather than Central Bank independence whether legal or real.

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