منطقه اسپاگتی یا تجارت خارجی استراتژیک: برخی از شواهد برای مکزیک
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|23625||2003||18 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Development Economics, Volume 72, Issue 2, December 2003, Pages 567–584
After signing 10 free trade agreements (FTAs) between 1993 and 2001, Mexico as a world leader in foreign trade policy continues to negotiate with countries such as Japan, Panama, Uruguay or Argentina. Criticism of multiple regional trade agreements (RTAs) arises from a consistency test, but also from the ability of a country to administer them. Mexico's multiple agreements have generally used the principle of NAFTA consistency, after the acceptance that NAFTA became a broader and deeper accord than results of the Uruguay multilateral achievements. An analysis of multiple RTAs is presented, including a game model of equilibrium, along with a political economy approach of why Mexico seeks multiple RTAs as its foreign trade policy.
The World Trade Organization has accounted for 90 regional trade agreements (RTAs) that have been created among its 136 member countries (formerly GATT contracting parties) since 1995. The figure seems impressive for the dynamism of countries in the world to opt for bilaterals during the past 5 years World Trade Organization, 2001a and World Trade Organization, 2001b. Besides Europe's activism, Mexico has become a world leader in signing 10 RTAs from 1993 to date mainly because it has sought a network of bilateral accords across the world, both with developing countries and also with countries in the developed world. What are argued reasons for this economy to generate a network of RTAs? A first hypothesis is trade diversification away from increased specialization and dependency from the US market during the past 7 years of NAFTA operation. However, trade with its natural partner and the importance of Mexico's market access in North America seems to continue and even deepen in the foreseeable future. Moreover, trade of intra-industrial nature as has been experienced by NAFTA has deepened integration among trading and investment partners in key sectors of the North American panorama, to increase the competitive position of the entire North American region that faces apparent open regionalism. A second line of reasoning is that Mexico's experience with NAFTA has generated a learning curve effect in signing multiple RTAs, mainly free trade agreements (FTAs) with other countries, where most of them contain all the issues and clauses of NAFTA, or what could be called NAFTA-consistency. Aspects such as market access, tariffication, customs procedures, scheduling of liberalization, as well as national treatment/MFN, norms, special treatment of sectors and dispute resolution mechanisms, are integral part of Mexico's negotiation and signing of RTAs. Moreover, in some agreements, side accords on labor and mainly the environment have also been signed. In such argument, NAFTA becomes a sellable vehicle for trade and investment liberalization, taken strategically or appropriated by Mexico. However, in line with this argument, a limit would exist set by the ability of authorities to administer multiple RTAs. A third hypothesis is that Mexico's objectives are the political economy ones, where additional to trade and investment liberalization, a rationale of political representation of partners, mainly in Latin America and the Caribbean, is sought in other multilateral negotiations. According to the World Bank (1999), other political objectives are an increased bargaining position of members of a RTA, a strategy of ‘being noticed’ in multilateral rules of the game, cooperation in areas of government policy making and among incipient multinational companies of developing countries, and commitment to lock-in free market policies inside economies. A fourth hypothesis is that additional to the learning curve effect, the political economy of generating a network of RTAs is that by seeking bilaterals instead of expanding original RTAs mainly NAFTA, Mexican authorities and economic agents, face economies of scale in negotiating increasing number of RTAs, or to put it in a different context, the cost of NAFTA expansion in political arenas among Mexico, the United States and Canada, and possibly Chile, is too high both in each country's political market, and also in coordinating a regional effort. For such a reason, it seems easier for one of the regional partners to seek individual RTAs. The case that Mexico, the less developed of the NAFTA partners, has been the most active in signing multiple trade agreements could only be circumstantial, but could also imply that a race for strategic trade policy would stay as part of the foreign trade and investment environment in the foreseeable future, with all its implications and worries for trade-dependent and liberalizing economies. The present essay addresses these issues of the recent strategy by Mexico. It also tries to explain whether the growing number of RTAs has negative or positive effects in members' welfare functions and overall welfare, using a simple Cournot model of market access following Freund (2000). The paper is organized as follows: After briefly presenting evidence of Mexico's network of RTAs and NAFTA parity, a simple stylized model of market access is presented that clarifies the rationale for multiple RTAs as building blocks toward multilateral liberalization. In the fourth part, other economic considerations such as the role of rules of origin and dispute resolution mechanisms are presented, that give rise to concerns on multiple trade areas. The next part presents non-economic reasons that could be behind government negotiators in making Mexico a leader in RTA networking. The paper then presents final comments and a conclusion.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
Can one say that NAFTA is a success to the point of becoming the model for integrating the hemisphere? Mexico has sought NAFTA parity in its 10 FTAs, both in Latin America, but also in Europe, and possibly with Japan in the foreseeable future. What does the analysis of such a strategy show: A spaghetti regionalism or a strategic move towards becoming leader of hemispheric and multilateral integration? It has been argued that welfare improves by increasing membership into a RTA, if the competitive effect and consumer surplus, outweigh government revenue loss and decline in profits. In the case of economies of scale, cost reduction and rationalization minimizes profit loss of domestic interests and makes the results of either multiple RTAs or extension of a RTA non-conclusive. Finally, political economy reasons mainly are apparent in lock-in and administration of bilaterals, but not necessarily in cooperation, bargaining or visibility in policy making. The reasoning for the network of 10 FTAs by Mexico is that NAFTA parity has been useful and does necessarily make the so-called spaghetti regionalism less a concern than generally advocated, except for disputes that can give rise to free riding. However, commitment is shown not only to depend from the clauses and obligations set forth by a new FTA, but from endogenous commitment if players gain from a deal, as well as an overall pre-commitment by governments, if a strong underlying paradigm of integration emerges, and punishments are enforceable. Finally, the model shows that the effects on production, profits and market access under the various alternatives depend on the partner characteristics. Then a question would be not only if there are limits to the number of RTAs to pursue, but also with whom to seek them.