احیای مقدمات تجاری منطقه ای: یک ارزیابی کلی از تاثیر آن بر کشورهای کوچک
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|23959||2002||19 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Policy Modeling, Volume 24, Issue 2, May 2002, Pages 83–101
In this paper we analyse the implications of various potential regional trade arrangements on the globe for small, medium, and large countries using a general equilibrium multi-region model of world trade. We show that the effects of regional trade arrangements on member and non-member countries are different for different equilibrium concept and the nature of agreements. In a traditional competitive equilibrium framework the welfare effects are small and non-member nations lose marginally due to a trade diversion. In a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium framework small non-member nations are worse affected. Since the larger regions can bring the terms of trade in their favor by retaliation, and hence could gain from retaliation, the growth of regional trade arrangements is a great cause of concern for the smaller regions. This concern becomes stronger if these trade arrangements are customs unions (CU). This makes small and medium size nations seeking trading arrangement with larger nations as a safe heaven strategy.
In recent years there has been an outburst of literature on the regional trade arrangements using general equilibrium models. Most of these modeling exercises display simulation results of various trade arrangements on the globe from a static competitive general equilibrium analysis and indicate very small effects from trade integration both on the member nations’ and non-member nations’ trade and welfare. The reason is that in most of these countries trade barriers are already at a low level due to unilateral, regional or multilateral under the GATT (WTO) tariff liberalizations that had taken place in the eighties and nineties. Even though the estimated effects of a trade integration on a non-member nation from these model simulations are very small, there has been widespread and growing concerns among the developing nations about the growth of regionalism. Why is this growing concern among small and medium size countries? The kind of analyses mentioned above cannot provide much light on the reasons behind the proliferation of regional trading arrangements
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
In search for an explanation for the growing surge for regional trade arrangements and the consequent concerns of many small and medium size countries who are not its participants, in this paper we perform simulation exercises using a eight region computable general equilibrium model of world trade. We compute the effects of regional trade arrangements on member and non-member nations using both competitive equilibrium structures in which regional trade arrangements take the form of tariff reductions within members and keeping tariffs with other nations constant and a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium structure in which tariff retaliation with non-member nations takes place. In a competitive equilibrium, the effects of regional trade arrangements are small in terms of benefits accruing to member nations and the loss to the non-members. This result is quite obvious as the tariff base in many of these nations are already at a low level due to tariff reductions undertaken in successive GATT (WTO) rounds and unilateral attempts in many countries. Using standard CGE modeling tools, thus, cannot provide adequate explanation for the growth and concerns for regionalism.