سیاست های اقتصادی در جاده اسلوونی به منطقه یورو
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|24431||2008||11 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||4770 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Economic Systems, Volume 32, Issue 1, March 2008, Pages 92–102
On 1 January 2007, Slovenia was the first new EU member state to enter the euro area. Since June 2004, the Slovenian tolar participated in the exchange rate mechanism ERM-II with a central parity of 239.64 against the euro. This parity was also the conversion rate upon euro area accession. Applying a macroeconometric model of Slovenia, this paper analyses the macroeconomic effects of different conversion rates. These simulations are compared to a scenario with flexible exchange rates. The best results are obtained with the actual conversion rate. In addition, it is shown that the labour market performance can be significantly improved by cutting non-wage labour costs
On 1 January 2007, the euro area was enlarged for the first time since the euro cash changeover in 2002. In addition, Slovenia was the first of the eight countries from Central and Eastern Europe that had joined the European Union in May 2004 (together with Cyprus and Malta) to adopt the common currency. Becoming a part of the euro area further enhances the European economic integration of Slovenia. From the first day of membership onwards, the new member countries have been participating in the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). However, being EMU members does not imply introducing the euro immediately. Before having the right to adopt the common currency, the new EU member states are required to fulfil the criteria set out in the Maastricht Treaty. In May 2006, the European Commission and the European Central Bank decided that Slovenia fulfilled all relevant criteria. Thus, as of 2007, Slovenia replaced its domestic currency by the euro. The choice of the exchange rate regime before adopting the euro was of particular importance. With effect from 28 June 2004, Slovenia joined the Exchange Rate Mechanism ERM-II of the European Monetary System. The ERM-II links the currencies of non-euro area member states to the euro. For each participating currency, a central parity against the euro and a standard fluctuation band of ±15% (±2.25% in case of the Danish krone) are defined. In the case of Slovenia, the central parity was set at 239.64 Slovenian tolar per euro. Introducing the euro requires that the member state has participated in the ERM-II without any break and without severe tensions during the two years preceding the examination of the situation regarding the readiness to join the euro area. Furthermore, it must not have devalued its currency on its own initiative during the same period. In addition to this exchange rate criterion, the Maastricht treaty requires sound public finances as well as low inflation and long-term interest rates.1 It is not required that the conversion rate at which the domestic currency is converted into euro upon euro area accession equals the central parity of the currency in the ERM-II. Thus, using SLOPOL, a macroeconometric model of the Slovenian economy, this paper analyses whether a better macroeconomic performance could have been expected with a somewhat lower or higher conversion rate. While no formal optimisation is undertaken, the implications for important macroeconomic indicators are explored. In particular, the effects on real GDP growth, inflation, employment, unemployment, the budget balance and the current account are investigated. These simulations are contrasted to a counterfactual experiment with totally flexible exchange rates, implying a postponement of euro area accession.2 As in the euro area monetary policy is conducted by the Eurosystem and the European Central Bank in particular, an independent monetary policy is no longer possible, and other policy instruments become increasingly important. This pertains, in particular, to policies affecting labour costs as an important determinant of the international competitiveness of domestic companies. This issue is explored by simulating the macroeconomic effects of cuts in direct taxes and social security contribution rates. In Neck et al., 2004a and Neck et al., 2004b, the issue of cutting non-wage labour costs is addressed in connection with the choice of the exchange rate regime. In these papers, a system of totally flexible exchange rates is compared to a crawling peg regime and a regime of completely fixed exchange rates. It turns out that the best overall macroeconomic performance can be expected with a “crawling peg”, allowing a slight depreciation of the Slovenian tolar in 2006 before joining the euro area in 2007. In the present paper, the implications of different conversion rates upon euro area accession in 2007 are explored. As in Neck et al., 2004a and Neck et al., 2004b, the implications of reductions in non-wage labour costs are also addressed. The paper is organised as follows. In the next section, the SLOPOL model is shortly described and the set of policy instruments and the simulation design are outlined. The simulation results are discussed in Sections 3 and 4. Finally, in Section 5 the main findings are summarised and conclusions are drawn.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
In this paper, simulations with SLOPOL, a medium-sized macroeconometric model of the Slovenian economy, have been performed to investigate the influence of the conversion rate at which Slovenia entered the euro area on the macroeconomic performance. In addition, a counterfactual experiment with totally flexible exchange rates has been performed. Summing up the simulation results, the best overall results are obtained with the actually chosen conversion rate of 239.64 upon euro area accession in 2007. Thus, the overall macroeconomic performance would not have been better with flexible exchange rates or with a higher or lower conversion rate. With a lower conversion rate, GDP growth and employment would have been higher, but the current account would have worsened significantly, and the lower inflation upon euro area accession would not have been sustainable. With a higher conversion rate, the current account and the inflation development would have been better, but GDP growth and employment would have been somewhat lower. In addition to the issue of the conversion rate, the simulations showed that by cutting the tax wedge on labour income, the labour market performance can be very effectively and favourably affected. On average, the number of employees exceeds the level without a cut in non-wage labour costs by 3600 persons, though GDP growth is almost identical. The higher the conversion rate upon euro area accession, the larger the additional employment effect of the tax cut. The largest impact of the reduction in non-wage labour costs is achieved with flexible exchange rates. In all simulations, in 2006, i.e. the first year in which the fiscal policy measures are implemented, the negative effect arising from the cut in government spending dominates, and unemployment rises. But from the second year onwards, the positive supply-side effects arising from the cut in the tax rate and the social security contribution rate dominate, and employment creation is stimulated. By containing wage claims, the reduction in the tax wedge results in lower inflation. On average, the inflation rate is reduced by half a percentage point. By reducing inflation, Slovenian goods and services become more competitive on the world market, thus the current account performance is favourably affected by a reduction in public spending and non-wage labour costs. These results show clearly that the optimal policy-mix requires not only counter-cyclical demand-side reactions (either through automatic stabilizers or through discretionary policies) but also structural (supply-side) reforms, such as a reduction of the size of the government and a cut in labour taxation. It should be stressed that factors like structural imbalances between labour supply and demand, which may be very important determinants of unemployment, cannot be captured with an aggregated model like SLOPOL. In addition, further positive supply-side effects of replacing the domestic currency by the euro, in particular the reduction in transaction costs, have not been considered in this paper.