ترکیب ذخایر بانک مرکزی آسیایی : آیا یورو جایگزین دلار خواهد شد؟
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|24653||2006||10 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Asian Economics, Volume 17, Issue 3, June 2006, Pages 417–426
Recent discussion in the financial markets has considered the possibility that Asian central banks might be shifting some of their international reserve holdings out of the dollar and into the euro. Prompted by this recent interest, we empirically examine the composition of central bank reserves in Japan, China, and Korea. The currency composition of reserves is a well-guarded secret for these central banks, so we offer statistical estimates of the quantity of euro reserves held based on the time series properties of total reserves and the value of the euro. We find that, over the period 1999–2004, euro reserves may average 1/3 of the total reserves of these countries. In contrast, in the pre-euro period 1993–1998, reserves in currencies that were replaced by the euro were generally insignificant. Because there has been a large build-up of foreign currency reserves in Asian central banks, the rise in the holdings of euros was likely accomplished without selling dollars and buying euros. However, euro acquisition must have amounted to nearly half of the large build-up in reserves. The main conclusion is that the euro is likely to be increasingly important in Asian central bank reserve portfolios, and may surpass dollar holdings if Asian central banks see the benefits of currency diversification or if Asian currencies reduce their traditional stability vis-à-vis the dollar in favor of a link to a currency basket.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
The empirical results in this paper suggest that the euro has become a more important reserve currency in Asian central bank portfolios during the 1999–2004 euro era than European currencies had been during the 1993–1998 pre-euro era. Euro reserves may be 27.5% of total foreign currency reserves in Japan; 35.7% of foreign currency reserves in China; and 33.5% of foreign currency reserves in Korea. Since these countries have experienced rapid build-up of their foreign currency reserves during the euro era, it appears that a substantial amount of the additions to international reserves, nearly 50%, may have been in euros rather than dollars. The empirical findings presented here may be somewhat surprising within the context of the exchange rate regimes prevailing in Asia. There is currently a consensus that Asia remains on a dollar peg. McKinnon and Schnabl (2004) and McKinnon (2005) refer to an “East Asian Dollar Standard.” Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2004a) even refer to a “Revived Bretton Woods System”. With Asian countries essentially utilizing exchange rate regimes that link their currencies to the U.S. dollar, the presumption is that international reserves will be held predominantly as U.S. dollars. Asian countries, especially China and Korea, do not lend much in their own currencies. Instead, high domestic saving and the resulting current account surpluses are largely financed by building up dollar claims; McKinnon (2005) refers to this as “conflicted virtue.” There are some countervailing forces opposing the role of the dollar in Asian central bank reserves. First, there are some pressures to diversify international reserve holdings as a portfolio management technique (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber, 2004b). A well-diversified portfolio has less overall exchange rate risk than an undiversified portfolio because of imperfect correlations in exchange rate changes among currencies. Second, there are some policy pressures that suggest the dollar standard might be replaced by a currency basket peg. For example, in July 2005, as a response to pressure from the U.S., China announced that it was cutting the peg to the dollar in favor of a peg to a broader currency basket.7 Although, the composition of the currency basket remains a secret, it is obviously likely that the euro would have a weight greater than zero. Both of these developments suggest that the dollar may indeed be less important as an international reserve currency in Asian central bank portfolios than it previously had been, largely due to the emergence of the euro as a credible competitor.