سرمایه گذاری مستقیم خارجی توسط شرکت های ژاپنی و اداره شرکت ها : در رابطه با سیاست های پولی چین، کره و ژاپن
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|24862||2003||18 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Asian Economics, Volume 13, Issue 6, January 2003, Pages 731–748
Reflecting upon the lessons from the Asian currency crises, more attention is being paid to the importance of consolidation for the domestic financial and capital markets, as well as international cooperation to avoid disturbing factors from abroad, such as massive inflows of speculative capital. The aim of financial reforms being executed in the East Asian countries, such as Japan, Korea, and China, is to improve the managerial efficiency of the business corporations and financial institutions. Recently, foreign direct investment by Japanese firms in the rest of the East Asia has been recovering. However, the existence of a financial system to realize optimal corporate governance is indispensable for the enhancement of direct investment. Namely, it is necessary to improve corporate profitability, and to distribute the increment of such profits between the host and the investor countries, in order to boost the welfare of the respective citizens, notwithstanding the type of foreign direct investment.
It has been more than ten years since the Bubble economy had burst in Japan, yet the managerial competence of Japanese financial institutions still remains sluggish. Meanwhile, in the ASEAN countries—Korea, and China—the managerial weaknesses of the business corporations and financial institutions, and the delay in financial reforms were made apparent by the currency crises. Such managerial sluggishness of the companies and financial institutions are mainly caused by low capital efficiency. This problem, while is common throughout much of the East Asia, derives from inadequacies in the economic deregulations and prudential regulations. The best way to mitigate this problem, perhaps, is to strengthen the capabilities to check and monitor these organizations through participation by the citizens. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the possibility of a financial system to realize optimal corporate governance, through the examples of direct investment activities by Japanese enterprises. We anticipate that, in the future, individual investors as well as domestic and foreign institutional investors should play important roles as relevant entities in corporate governance. In this paper, we shall expand the definition of the individual investors to include citizens in general as the main participants in corporate governance. It should be so, because the citizens not only check and monitor corporate management as individual investors, but in the Asian countries, where indirect financing is dominant, they monitor the financial institutions as depositors. Since the Asian currency crises, some changes in the international financial environment have been apparent. One notable example is the recovery of direct investment, to replace short-term funds. In order to further direct investment, it is necessary to improve corporate profitability, and to distribute the increment of such profits between the host country and the investor country, in order to foster the welfare of the respective citizens, no matter how the direct investment takes place. And this may be realized by the following: (1) strengthening the corporate profitability in both investor and host countries, (2) developing and enhancing the financial and capital markets in the host country, which is achieved by strengthening the prudential regulations. In other words, we aim at the establishment of the optimal financial infrastructure. In order to discuss this issue, in Section 2, we shall overview how the profitability and dividend rates of Japanese manufacturers had changed through the Asian currency crises, and argue that they exercised managerial efforts to reduce financing costs. In Section 3, we shall discuss the directions of the financial reforms in Japan, China, and Korea, which are important sources of financing for direct investment, in order to foster corporate governance. And in the final section, we shall summarize the discussions, and make some proposals.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
Given the lessons from the Asian currency crises, more attention is being paid to the importance of international cooperation, as there is more caution against disturbing factors from abroad, such as massive inflows of speculative capital. So far, some arguments have been made to curtail fund transfer directly, and some measures were implemented in this respect. However, efforts in the future should be exercised to furbish indirect regulations through international cooperation, such as the observance of the Core Principles of the Basle Committee, and the establishment of the early warning system or the home/host reciprocal supervision of commercial banks. Both Japan and the other East Asian countries should be expected to consolidate respective financial and capital markets, and to make their monetary, fiscal, and currency policies more valid. The basis for such efforts lies with the financial infrastructure. The purpose of this article was to contemplate the need for the establishment of a sound financial infrastructure, or improved prudential regulations, which would serve as the basis for optimal corporate governance, by looking into the cases of direct investment. No matter how the direct investment takes place, it is necessary to improve both corporate profitability and dividend rates, in order to boost the economic benefits of the citizens in both the investor and host countries. In this article, we chose the ratios of profits for the term to total assets (ROAs) as well as the ratios of profits for the term to sales, as classified by region and by industry, and considered how they were changed by the Asian currency crises. Consequently, we discovered that the automotives among the industries, and NIEs among the regions, outperformed the rest in terms of profitability, but the overall profitability for all manufacturers rather worsened. However, the average dividend rate for all manufacturers improved in spite of this trend. We may conclude, therefore, that enterprises opted for corporate strategies that take corporate governance quite seriously. Improved managerial efficiency is indispensable in this regard, as well. The managerial efficiency of Japanese enterprises actually bottomed out in 1993, and is on the rise. This upturn was supported by reduction of financial costs and other managerial efforts, yet they still rely on bank borrowing as major sources of financing. In terms of direct investment through subsidiaries, Japanese enterprises took advantage of capital infusion from parent companies, borrowings from Japanese banks in the host countries, and borrowings from local banks in the host countries, as sources of their financing needs. However, according to a 1999 fiscal year survey by METI, “Survey of Overseas Business Activities by Japanese Enterprises”, some discoveries were made. Namely, there appeared no distinction between the characteristics of both pro trade and anti trade types, but breakdowns in financing showed that enterprises in ASEAN locations relied heavily on financing from the domestic financial and capital markets in Japan, while enterprises in China and NIEs relied much on financing from local financial institutions in host countries. The high profitability in enterprises located in Korea, and other NIEs, reflects relatively successful financial reforms in Korea, etc. In order for Japanese enterprises to improve managerial efficiency, optimization of the financial infrastructure in Japan, China and Korea is absolutely indispensable. In this paper, we anticipated that both shareholders and depositors should take the leading roles in corporate governance. Prerequisites for their roles include the following: (1) sound and sustainable macroeconomic policies, (2) trained specialists who have the capabilities to manage the financial infrastructure, (3) an effective market discipline, (4) effectual procedures to dispose NPLs off the banking sector, (5) prudential regulations to foster systematic risk management. Financial reforms have been taking place in Japan, China and Korea, in such respects. However, there are many remaining issues, and the following measures should be necessary. First, in case of Japan, they must go through with the restructuring of capital and labor in the banking sector, in order to improve capital distribution rates. In addition, Japanese banks must contemplate management strategies to secure high levels of internal rates of return (IRR), so that the IRR should exceed the costs of capital, by specializing in core competencies or strong areas of business, such as wholesale banking, or retail banking, instead of having very comprehensive business operations as they have been doing so far. Furthermore, the authorities must stop protective interference, and demonstrate clearly to the banks, that they must choose such management strategies that emphasize the market mechanism, in order for survival. They must also shift from the ad hoc type of administration, to the transparent style of administration, with objective rules and yardsticks. Secondly, in case of China, they need to improve the managerial efficiency of state-owned enterprises and financial institutions as soon as possible. The system of supervision and inspections by the central bank must be strengthened, and commercial banks must improve their awareness of risk, while they need to be properly monitored, in order to avoid interference by the SOEs as well as central and local governments. Thirdly, in case of Korea, the financial reform efforts pertaining to the Chaebol companies and non-banks, which were mainly responsible for the NPLs, have proved successful, and the performances of commercial banks have quickly recovered in fiscal 2001. Consequently, they should continue in the same direction, with the following points. First, the authorities must be able to move more quickly, and the supervision procedures must be strengthened to allow this. Secondly, they need a system to analyze the credit risks of borrower enterprises on a continual basis, as well as a method for the prompt restructuring of insolvent enterprises.