شهرهای جهانی در جنوب: عمیق تر شدن شکاف های اجتماعی و فضایی در کیپ تاون
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|250||2007||14 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Cities, Volume 24, Issue 6, December 2007, Pages 448–461
Global Cities are characterised by their dominance in world affairs, linked to population size and political, economic, social and cultural infrastructure. As urban centres expand, particularly in the developing regions of the South, a new generation of Global Cities seems likely to emerge. Indeed, non-Western Global Cities have already emerged in some Asian (e.g. Hong Kong, Singapore) and Latin American (e.g. Mexico City, São Paulo) contexts. However, Global Cities remain rare in Africa, although Johannesburg has emerged as the region’s dominant metropolis, followed by Cape Town, Lagos and Nairobi. This paper considers firstly, the development of Global Cities in the South, and secondly, the implications of this drive for global competitiveness on social and spatial division in cities of the South, with a particular emphasis on Cape Town. Given arguments that Global Cities demonstrate increased social and spatial polarisation, aspirations for global competitiveness are problematic for cities in the developing world, where poverty is widespread and resources are limited. This is particularly the case in South Africa where apartheid legacies already provide a strong infrastructure of inequality. This paper uses the case study of Cape Town to consider whether it is possible for a city to be both globally competitive and address domestic socio-economic redistribution. Given evidence elsewhere that the former can inhibit, or at least dilute, the latter, the wider question of whether cities in South Africa (and more broadly, cities of the South) should perhaps be avoiding the drive for globalised status is considered. But if so, what other choice exists in the global milieu?
Global Cities are characterised by their dominance in world affairs, linked to population size and political, economic, social and cultural infrastructure. The notion of ‘Global Cities’ as an academic discourse was popularised in the late-1980s and early-1990s by writers such as Friedmann, 1986 and Castells, 1989 and Sassen, 1991 and Sassen, 1994. The emphasis was on cities that functioned as essential ‘nodes’ in the global economy, with London, New York and Tokyo cited as prime examples. Their dominance of the global city agenda is a consequence of the strength of their financial institutions, corporate headquarters and service-related industries, with obvious implications for their population size and property market. Global Cities require strong infrastructure, particularly telecommunications and transport, as well as a stable socio-economic and political system in which to thrive as economic ‘hubs’. Indeed, Derudder’s (2006) summary of the Global Cities literature lists corporate organisation and infrastructure as the two key empirical criteria for Global City status. This status is also reliant on networks, through which goods, information, people and money flow between different Global Cities, and in doing so, ultimately determine the nature of the world economy (Beaverstock et al., 1999, Sassen, 1994, Short and Kim, 1999 and Taylor, 2001). Thus, entry onto the Global City stage provides access to significant prestige and resources for both the city and its national economy. The dominance of achieving Global City status as the overarching criteria for urban (and national) success is criticised for its emphasis on economic measurements (Smith, 1998) alongside its Anglo-American ethnocentrism (Robinson, 2002). Global City theories and discourses are predominantly drawn from Western approaches and use Western economic criteria for success. Thus, the concept itself is situated in a specific economic and geographical realm rather than an international model of urban achievement. Indeed, Robinson (2002, p. 539) indicates that a map of Global Cities would appear very different if, for example, Islamic nodes of global socio-economic activity were seen as a principal criterion. Robinson, 2002 and Robinson, 2006 further develops this idea to highlight the inadequacies of distinguishing between cities of the South (or ‘Third World’ cities) as a ‘Development Studies’ problem, while cities of the North (or ‘Western’ cities) exclusively dominate the ‘Urban Studies’ agenda.1 Although empirical research on Global Cities theoretically enables a fusion of cities of the North and South under the same banner, in fact, rather than recognising their relative achievements within the Global Cities standard, the former are seen as the model to which the latter are striving. Thus the division between North and South continues through the Global City categorisation, in which the former remains dominant. This paper considers firstly, the development of Global Cities in the South; and secondly, the implications of this drive for global competitiveness on social and spatial segregation and polarisation in cities of the South, with a particular emphasis on the city of Cape Town, South Africa. The case study of Cape Town is used to consider whether it is possible for a city to be both globally competitive and address domestic socio-economic redistribution. In addition, this paper ultimately considers the validity of the Global City label for cities in the South, using the example of Cape Town to highlight the problems of implementing such Western constructs and agendas in non-Western settings.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
“Urban areas are the keys to a country’s success in the global marketplace … but cities can also be problematic: they have the capacity to exclude, to marginalise, to reinforce patterns of inequality, and to create insiders and outsiders” (SACN, 2006, p. 2-2). As the discussion has indicated, Cape Town has become increasingly global in its outlook and interactions, mirroring international trends with an expanse in service-provider firms, corporate headquarters and tourism, alongside the growing polarisation of its spaces and social groups, between those with access to international networks, opportunities and resources and those resigned to isolation and poverty. Indeed, despite the increasingly global status of Cape Town, with economic growth and infrastructural development, poverty and inequality remain dominant. The extent to which the drive for global competitiveness has caused this is hard to quantify, although evidence presented earlier indicates some causality. However, it is clear that Cape Town’s increasing global strength has not alleviated poverty or segregation in the city, and that the spoils of globalisation have not been equally shared. Indeed, 77.3% of South Africa’s residents living under the Minimum Living Level are located within 60km of areas that generate at least R1billion16 of GVA per annum (SACN, 2006, pp. 2-9, 2-11), thus indicating the failure of economic spoils to be equally distributed. Robins (2002, p. 684) aptly describes Global Cape Town as a place in which: “Investors and businesses continue to gravitate towards the well policed, historically white, middle spaces of the city. These parts of Cape Town have indeed been incorporated into a representation of Cape Town as a globally competitive, multicultural city driven by the tourism industry and the IT and financial service sectors.” However, while he sees “two other sides” to globalising Cape Town, one of middle-class gated communities on the one hand, and urban ghettos of poverty on the other, in fact these segregated spaces are inextricably part of the global drive. Any city aiming for global status must recognise and accept the negative impact of this international economic status on its domestic social status, particularly in cities of the South where the Western construct of global competitiveness deepens existing polarisation and fragmentation. Thus, given the significant poverty in cities of the South alongside evidence that the drive for global competitiveness has negative implications for the domestic population (particularly in cities of the South) in terms of socio-spatial inequality and fragmentation, then perhaps such cities should not be aspiring Global City status, but what other choice exists in the global milieu? While easy to suggest that cities (especially those in the South with dire poverty) should be directing their resources and energies to securing the basic needs of their residents, such as housing, education, health, employment and education, rather than striving to develop certain areas as mega-malls and global financial centres so as to secure the Global City tag; in fact, avoiding the global economy is not such an easy choice. As Jenkins and Wilkinson (2002, p. 33) stress, in the contemporary era “cities … have to compete globally to develop their local economies if they wish to maintain or improve their position”, and thus ignoring global demands appears an impossible choice for city leaders, and in fact would ultimately deny their residents even further as the absence of international investment would curtail domestic resources and thus limit services to the poor. Therefore, the question remains as to whether it is possible for a city to be both globally competitive and address domestic socio-economic redistribution? Evidence from Cape Town indicates that even when cities prioritise both, the former can inhibit, or at least dilute, the latter, as the benefits of global competitiveness favour the upper echelons of socio-economic society. Although pro-growth global city and pro-poor domestic city agendas are not necessarily incompatible goals for city leaders in theory, for example, Cape Town’s municipal leaders promote both, evidence from the Cape Town case study raises concerns that in practice, success in the global marketplace has negative consequences for the urban poor, thus inhibiting the success of a pro-poor agenda. The inherent problems in trying to balance these two goals are summarised by urban theorist Jenny Robinson: “Securing growth at the same time as expanding service delivery in politically contested and resource-poor environments represents a great challenge for local governments. Electoral or popular support may be dependent on developing effective services, and increasingly, ensuring that private firms meet the needs of the poor. On the other hand, long-term viability or national state approval may depend on promoting dynamic economic growth” (Robinson, 2006). South Africa’s cities (alongside other cities in the South) suffer from the contrasting demands, agendas and pressures (from both internal and external groups) to simultaneously strengthen their economic status so as to compete in the global economic market, but also to provide social welfare for the majority of the population struggling to exist in everyday poverty. Although these rival agendas are no different to cities throughout the world, in Cape Town (and in cities of the South) the welfare needs of the population are often more significant and less likely to benefit from the spoils of global activity. Furthermore, in South Africa the legacies of apartheid ensure a particular tension between achieving capitalist macro-economic success and securing the post-apartheid goal of a just and equitable society (Lemon, 2004). Thus, the fashion in which city managers respond to this dilemma is crucial. However, as long as the two goals remain mutually incompatible in practice, and for as long as cities feel under domestic and international pressure to prioritise global economic advancement in order to move up the ‘hierarchy’ of global cities, the poor and their spaces will ultimately suffer.