مالیات نفت مطلوب در یک اقتصاد کوچک باز
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|25383||2006||17 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||6020 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Review of Economic Dynamics, Volume 9, Issue 3, July 2006, Pages 438–454
The international oil market has been very volatile over the past three decades. In industrialized economies, especially in Europe, taxes represent a large fraction of oil prices and governments do not seem to react to oil price shocks by using oil taxes strategically. The aim of this paper is to analyze optimal oil taxation in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of a small open economy that imports oil. We find that in general it is not optimal to distort the oil price paid by firms with taxes, neither in the long run nor over the business cycle. The general result could be reversed depending on environmental considerations and available fiscal instruments. We provide simulations to illustrate the optimal response to shocks in such cases.
The international oil market has been very volatile over the past three decades. In 1999 and 2000 significant increases in oil prices have been observed, due to restrictions in oil supply by OPEC, prompting economic agents to advocate government policies to mitigate the effects of oil price increases by cutting taxes. Figure 1 represents the evolution of gasoline prices with and without taxes (see International Energy Agency, 2000). We observe that both series follow similar paths; so we can conclude that governments do not seem to react to oil price shocks by using oil taxes strategically. Given that taxes represent a large fraction of oil prices in indus- trialized economies (especially in Europe), governments have significant scope to use taxes to accommodate oil price shocks. The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of oil taxes in small open economies that import oil and take as given the international oil price. A fundamental question in this framework is, how oil taxes should be set over the long run and over the business cycle. To address this question we combine two different strands of the literature: the macroeconomic incidence of oil price shocks on the one hand and optimal taxation on the other hand. The effects of energy price shocks on economic activity have long been recognized in the literature. Kim and Loungani (1992) and Finn (1995) focus on the analysis of energy price shocks, finding that this kind of shocks can contribute to economic fluctuations. Such a contribution could be even larger in a small open economy framework, as DeMiguel et al. (2003) stress. Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) argue that modifying the standard neoclassical growth model by assuming imperfect competition makes it easier to explain the size of the declines in output and real wages that follow increases in the price of oil. Atkeson and Kehoe (1999) explore implications of considering alternative models of energy use, finding different implications for how capital and output respond to permanent differences in energy prices. The literature on optimal taxation suggests that the government should raise revenue by using the tax instruments with the lowest efficiency cost (Diamond and McFadden, 1974). Many authors, such as Bizer and Stuart (1987) and Goulder (1994), point out that energy taxes have a high efficiency cost, which becomes even larger under the imperfect competition assumption (Rotemberg and Woodford, 1994). If environmental damage is taken into account, the efficiency cost of energy taxes decreases by reducing pollution (Goulder, 1994). The framework used in this paper is a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of a small open economy that imports oil. The oil price as well as the interest rate is assumed to be set by the international markets, so we consider a small open economy one in which those prices are taken as given. The economy consists of consumers and firms that behave competitively and a government that finances an exogenous flow of public spending by using consumption and oil taxes and by issuing debt. The government chooses the state-contingent optimal fiscal policy by maximizing welfare and taking as given the behavior of private agents. We find that, in general, the government should not distort the oil price paid by firms with taxes, even when consumption of oil is considered and the government distinguishes between the taxes paid by the households and the firms. These results also hold over the business cycle: in general, in a small open economy it is not optimal to use oil taxes paid by firms to accommodate shocks. In such cases, consumption and household oil taxes and the public debt return would be the optimal fiscal instruments used by the government in response to shocks. This result could change depending on environmental issues and available tax instruments. When we assume that the use of oil generates a negative externality, the oil tax acts as a Pigouvian tax correcting such a negative impact. When oil is also considered as a final consumption good and both uses of oil cannot be taxed at different rates, it is optimal to tax oil. In both cases it would be optimal to react to shocks by using oil taxes. The paper is organized as follows. In the second section we present the baseline model of a small open economy that imports oil. In the third section we extend the model assuming that imported oil is also used by households as a consumption good. In the fourth section we illustrate the optimal response of oil taxes to shocks when the optimal oil tax is not zero. Finally, in the fifth section we summarize the conclusions.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
In this paper we analyze optimal taxation in oil dependent economies. Using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that includes oil as an input, we study how oil taxes should be in both the long and the short run. The standard literature points out that energy taxes have greater efficiency costs than other kinds of taxes. In a general framework this result holds, and the government should not distort the oil price paid by the firm over the long run and over the business cycle with taxes. When environmental damages are considered, the result is reversed and a non-zero oil tax is optimal. In this case we simulate the optimal response of oil taxes to shocks, obtaining that shocks that stimulate the economy (positive productivity shocks and negative oil price shock) lead to an increase in oil taxes, controlling the additional pollution caused by the increase in oil use. Extending the model to include oil consumption by households, two different situations arise. When the government can distinguish between oil taxes paid by the household and the firm, it is optimal to tax the two different uses of oil at different rates. Thus, whereas the zero taxation result holds for oil used by firms, the government sets household oil taxes jointly with consumption taxes to raise revenue and to accommodate shocks. Moreover, under suitable assumptions on preferences, the government would tax consumption and household oil at the same rate across time. When it is not possible to tax oil at different rates, an incomplete tax system problem arises, and it is optimal to distort the oil price paid by the firm. Otherwise a new tax instrument is required and oil should not be taxed.We also simulate the optimal response of oil taxes to shocks when the tax system is incomplete, obtaining oil tax cuts both with positive productivity and oil price shocks.