پویایی های آموزش در سیاست های پولی : سیاست تهاجمی استحکام ثبات تورم
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|25584||2005||9 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Macroeconomics, Volume 27, Issue 1, March 2005, Pages 143–151
This paper investigates the effect of an aggressive inflation stabilizing monetary policy on the ability of agents to reach a rational expectations equilibrium for inflation and output. Using an adaptive learning framework, we develop a model that combines a real wage contracting rigidity with an interest rate rule. We show that an AR(1) equilibrium requires more aggressive monetary policy to achieve both determinacy and learnability. This model and policy findings contrast with Bullard and Mitra’s [Determinacy, learnability and monetary policy inertia (2001); Journal of Monetary Economics 49 (2002) 1105] model (no inflation persistence) and policy findings (less aggressive policy). These results suggest that aggressive policy is robust in different model specifications.
In this paper, we examine the determinacy and expectational stability condition 1 of the rational expectations equilibrium (REE) in a simple macroeconomic model.2 These conditions are established using a particular monetary policy tack under an interest rate rule––the Taylor rule. In previous work, Bullard and Mitra, 2001 and Bullard and Mitra, 2002 evaluate the determinacy and learnability of an REE with alternative policy rules. They use a purely forward-looking model of the economy suggested by Woodford (1999, p. 16) and combine that model with four information structures of the Taylor rule: (1) contemporaneous data, (2) lagged data, (3) forward-looking expectations, and (4) contemporaneous expectations. They find that policy rules which respond relatively aggressively to inflation with little or no reaction to the output gap generally induce both determinate and learnable REE (Bullard and Mitra, 2001 and Bullard and Mitra, 2002). We extend this line of thought by introducing a relative-real wage contracting model in combination with a Taylor rule (Fuhrer, 1995, Fuhrer and Moore, 1995, Taylor, 1993, Taylor, 1994 and Taylor, 1999).3 This model contains the characteristic of inflation persistence since agents not only consider a forward-looking component of the inflation rate but they also are concerned with the past values of inflation. A number of studies have argued that the model without inflation inertia is not realistic (Woodford, 1999). Owyang, 2001, Siklos, 1999 and Granato and Wong, 2002 also show that the inflation rate in the United States is persistent. Ironically, it is Woodford who states that “the complete absence of inertial terms in the structural equations is not entirely realistic” (Woodford, 1999, p. 13).4 McCallum (2002) also argues that Woodford (1999) model is not robust to the inflation persistence situation. McCallum (2002) solves the model of Woodford (1999) with full price flexibility and shows that an alternative AR(1) REE of inflation is explosive if Taylor rule is aggressive to the deviations of inflation (McCallum, 2002, p. 5).5 Comparing with the results suggested in Bullard and Mitra, 2001 and Bullard and Mitra, 2002 we show that the condition for determinacy and learnability of the AR(1) REE occurs when the policymaker responds more aggressively to inflation. This result provides a stronger argument about the overall robustness of following an aggressive inflation stabilizing monetary policy. The paper is organized as follows. We describe the model in the next section. Section 3 examines the determinacy condition of the model. Section 4 introduces an adaptive learning approach to show the E-stability condition. Section 5 concludes the paper.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
This paper extends the study of Bullard and Mitra, 2001 and Bullard and Mitra, 2002 on determinacy and learnability of an REE when policymakers follow a Taylor interest rate policy rule. Instead of following a purely forward-looking model suggested by Woodford (1999), we modify a real wage contract model by Fuhrer, 1995 and Fuhrer and Moore, 1995 along with a contemporaneous Taylor rule. The real wage contract model contains the characteristic of inflation persistence since agents concern themselves with both past and future inflation rates. Based on this model, we find a stronger, more robust result about aggressive, inflation stabilizing monetary policy than the one given by Bullard and Mitra, 2001 and Bullard and Mitra, 2002. We show that if inflation is more persistent in an economy, the policy rule should have larger value of parameters on inflation and output derivations so that the AR(1) rational expectation equilibrium is determinate and learnable. If inflation is extremely persistent in an economy, the policy rule should respond aggressively to deviations from their inflation target for determinacy and learnability. Our finding has important implications for policy since it focuses exclusive attention on inflation stabilization. Policymakers who respond aggressively to deviations from their inflation target will be more successful in stabilizing business cycle fluctuations.