هماهنگی سیاست های پولی و مالی در کشورهای مستقل مشترک المنافع : آیا یک نظریه از منطقه مالی مطلوب است؟
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|25991||2006||19 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Research in International Business and Finance, Volume 20, Issue 2, June 2006, Pages 256–274
The following paper analyze the problem of fiscal and monetary coordination in selected CIS-countries and compare it with the institutional structure in the EMU. To enhance the literature in that field it is necessary to take into account some new approaches. Most of our interest are spill-over effects, free-riding behavior and pre-coordination within fiscal and monetary areas. Besides the more institutional economic analysis we try to build-up an economic model that analyze the optimal degree of coordination. Moreover, numerical simulations complete the theoretical analysis and illustrates a ‘coordination-frontier’. We show that the optimal degree of coordination depends on fiscal rules and government size. Furthermore, another new result illustrates that spill over effects are not sufficient for deepening coordination. Therefore, our model is an interesting research object for the future of ‘Economic-Coordination’ literature. Hence, we solve the following key-problem in fiscal coordination: What is the optimal degree of fiscal coordination between different countries in a monetary area?
It is really impressive to see the rapid transformation process and the development of the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC) as well as the transformation process in the selected CIS-countries. The chronology of the EEC has many similarities with the development of the current European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) two decades ago. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) consists in general of: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. In Juni 2001, the following five CIS-countries—Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan—announced in Belarussian capital Minsk on Thursday to set up the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC). The main target is to boost cooperation between the five member countries, which earlier formed also a Customs Union (Ellman, 1998). In this paper, we analyze a specific set of macroeconomic policy particularly the coordination of fiscal and monetary policy in the main CIS-countries.1 We find some new results and suggestions regarding the design of fiscal cooperation frameworks, especially for interacting economies in monetary issues. Moreover, we try to analyze the impact of spill-over effects in interacting fiscal and monetary areas to internalize the coordination burden. We consider a model where fiscal policy reputation, homogeneity, and output variance (volatility) affect the degree of coordination between fiscal policies in CIS-countries, and therefore explain the problem of different coordination behaviors in those countries. Countries with high past reputation or negotiation power, such as Russia, intend to coordinate fiscal and monetary policy issues on a lower degree or more slowly than smaller countries because of the risk-premium on interest rates, higher free-riding incentives and, the well-known signaling effect caused by asymmetric information (Bohn, 1998). Delays in coordination are particularly inefficient, as the longer a country waits the more costly the policy adjustment and the more the spill-over effects lead to free-riding and undersupply. The reason is that longer periods of un-coordination and instability imply higher inefficiencies. This paper studies the economic determinants of delays in the coordination of fiscal policy in selected CIS-countries. We present a simple model that describes some determinants of delayed coordination due to a strategic-interaction game. Concerning the determinants of coordination, we show that the values of output volatility, homogeneity within fiscal policy rules, and the credibility of other participating countries in fiscal issues are the most relevant variables for explaining differences in the intended degree of fiscal coordination within the main CIS-countries. Moreover, we suggest that CIS-countries that focus on coordination in monetary issues have to look closer to fiscal policy issues. There are two main reasons: on the one hand there are strong interactions between fiscal and monetary policy issues shown in the ‘Fiscal Theory of Price Level (FTPL)’ (Woodford, 2003). On the other hand a recent article in the new fiscal–monetary interaction literature by Dixit and Lambertini (2003) show also the importance of fiscal policy in monetary areas. Our model illustrates that argument from a public finance perspective. We show that there are different incentives to coordinate fiscal issues between larger and smaller CIS-countries (cf. Alesina and Drazen, 1991 and Alesina and Spolaore, 1997). That result is pretty surprising because it is mostly ignored or unaccounted in discussions on coordination of monetary policy issues in CIS-countries. To maintain price stability during the coordination of monetary policy we have to look to the fiscal policy framework. Hence, fiscal policy is necessary to evaluate the main target price stability. Sometimes it is assumed that central banks are accused of being obsessed with inflation. This is totally untrue. If they are obsessed with anything, it is with ‘fiscal policy’ coordination (King, 1998). Therefore, we focus in our paper on that dimension and analyze the key determinants and impacts of fiscal policy coordination. Hence, summing up: our approach is a first step towards a “Theory of Optimum Fiscal Area”. Moreover, we discuss in general the costs and benefits of fiscal and monetary coordination and show again in a simple model which mode of coordination or non-coordination is more successful in an area with different spill-over intensities. Therefore, it seems to us very interesting to understand fiscal policy coordination behavior in a game-theoretic framework. That model approach is the most appropriate one in transition economies where ‘Lucas critique’ is in function. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a short literature review. Section 3 starts with the description of the institutional development in CIS-countries and compare it with the European Framework especially with some issues in the fiscal framework. Both following Sections 4 and 5 concentrates on the economic modelling and continues with the discussion of the results. Policy conclusions are taken up in Section 6. The last, Section 7 provides discussion and concluding remarks.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
Fiscal and Monetary coordination is a more complex issue as sometimes assumed in economic models. To explain at least some complexity in that framework we first analyzed a model of strategic interaction between ‘weak’ and ‘tough’ member states and big and small countries. In a second step we integrate that findings in a model of spill over analysis. We conclude the paper by discussing some generalizations and by touching on some issues that the model did not address but that are important in explaining the right degree of coordination. First, our argument is much more general than initially considered. The results are thus very similar to the model of Alesina and Drazen (1991). However, the determinants for international coordination and cooperation are more complex and general than in a pure national framework. The model shows that credibility, the missing parameter in Alesina and Drazen (1991), plays a very important role in the case of international fiscal policy coordination. A second generalization in our model is the explicit modelling of coordination incentives within, the different size and behavior of governments, and the interaction of fiscal policy between countries. Finally, we note some issues not discussed earlier in the paper. The major omission is a closer endogenous political-economic description of the model, considering for instance important political events such as elections, veto power, and decisions about distribution policy. Moreover, the linkage of both model results show us several new findings. That lead us to the following policy conclusion: to close the gap in macroeconomic policy coordination, a sound institutional framework is on the one hand needed and on the other it is necessary to reduce national concerns of losses for most in the bigger and more powerful countries. Furthermore, discussing monetary coordination in CIS-countries require an analysis of fiscal coordination. The reasons are: fiscal–monetary interaction and the complex incentives and determinants of fiscal policy coordination. Therefore, this paper can be seen as a first step towards a coherent ‘Theory of Optimum Fiscal Area’.