ارتباط بین نظارت بانکی و سیاست تقسیم سود شرکت های بزرگ: مورد حذفیات سود سهام
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|26156||2001||19 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Banking & Finance, Volume 25, Issue 11, November 2001, Pages 2069–2087
This study investigates whether bank monitoring influences investor response to a borrowing firm's decision to omit its dividend payments. We establish a new link between the theories of banking and dividend policy in an examination of how bank monitoring and firm dividend signals complement one another to resolve information asymmetries. Results indicate that, for small firms, investors interpret the dividend decision as a function of bank monitoring and the dividend signals taken together. Also reported are the results of tests examining the differences between the monitoring effects of banks versus public and private non-bank lenders.
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether bank monitoring influences the market's response to a firm's decision to omit its cash dividend. In particular, this study establishes a new link between the theories of banking and dividend policy by examining how bank monitoring and dividends as signals may complement each other in mitigating information asymmetries. Information-based theories of financial intermediation suggest that banks provide a unique information production and monitoring service in an informationally asymmetric capital market.1 These theories imply that an imperfect capital market recognizes the value of bank monitoring and uses bank debt as a signal of firm value. A number of empirical studies show that the presence of a bank lending relationship disseminates information about the firm that influences the market's assessment of major corporate decisions.2 For example, studies have shown that the presence of bank debt affects the market assessment of corporate selloff decisions, the issuance of commercial paper, and seasoned equity offerings. Other studies have demonstrated a relationship between bank debt, firm value, and the underpricing of initial public offerings. In short, the theoretical basis and empirical evidence suggest that bank debt serves as an important signal of firm quality and thus contributes to reducing information asymmetries. Research also suggests that the benefits of banks as information specialists and monitors of corporate activity may have the greatest effect on small firms (e.g., Fama, 1985 and Slovin et al., 1992). Whereas much information may be available about large firms, providing them easier access to capital markets, small firms are less well known. Hence, their ability to obtain credit from banks may serve as a signal of value. It is in this context that we study the interaction between firm size and banking relationships. In previous studies of payout policy, various theories have been set forth to explain the relationship between dividends and firm value. Signaling theory suggests that in a market characterized by asymmetric information, dividends can be used as a signaling device to communicate private information. In general, dividend-signaling models posit that dividend announcements convey information about the firm's current and/or future cash flows, therefore changes in the value of the firm around the time of dividend announcements should be proportionate to the unexpected change in dividend policy (e.g., Bhattacharya, 1979, Miller and Rock, 1985 and John and Williams, 1985). While a large body of empirical evidence documents a positive association between the announcement of dividend changes and firm value, more recent empirical evidence calls into question the value of dividends as signals.3 This leads to the conjecture that the market reaction to a firm's dividend decision may be influenced by other factors, such as the presence of banks as monitors of firm activity. To investigate the relationship between the market reaction to dividend omission announcements and bank debt, a sample of firms that omitted their dividends between 1978 and 1996 is identified. Daily stock price returns for each firm in the sample are collected along with various measures of bank debt. The sample is further divided into subsamples consisting of large and small firms using the same classification scheme as Slovin et al. (1992). A sequence of multivariate statistical tests is then conducted to examine the role of banks as lender/monitors. Our findings show a strong positive relationship between bank lending and the market's assessment of dividend omission announcements for small firms. Further, the market's reaction to dividend omissions by small firms having high levels of bank debt is far less negative than it is when small firms have little or no bank debt. On the other hand, for large firms there appears to be little relationship between bank debt and the market response to dividend omission. Our findings also suggest that bank debt has a greater mitigating impact on the market response to dividend omission than either non-bank private debt or public debt. The balance of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relationship between bank monitoring and dividend omission announcements. Section 3 describes the research design employed by this study. Section 4 presents our empirical findings and Section 5 offers our conclusions.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
This study investigates the role of bank monitoring in influencing the market's response to a firm's decision to omit cash dividend payments. Results show that in the presence of a bank lending relationship, announcements of dividend omission by small firms are interpreted differently than similar announcements made by large firms. More specifically, in the case of small firms the signal associated with the firm's banking relationship provides a framework for interpretation of the firm's dividend decision. Further, the presence of banks as monitors is observed to be of greater informational value to investors than the presence of private non-bank lenders. The results for large firms indicate that investors do not value the role of bank monitoring, and tend to react more negatively to announcements of dividend omission in the presence of high levels of bank debt. This response appears to be driven by concern over the firm's ability to meet its financial obligations, rather than any third-party review of these better-known firms. In a broader context, by considering the impact of bank monitoring on the market's response to dividend announcements, this study makes two contributions. First, it extends the banking literature by expanding the bank's monitoring role to include inferences drawn from dividend theory. Further, by partitioning private debt into bank and non-bank sources, this study provides a better understanding of the differential impact of lender monitoring on equity value. As its second contribution, the study adds to our understanding of whether banks, as monitors, add credibility to the dividend decisions of firms, and small firms in particular. Consistent with the theory of bank monitoring, it is shown that banks serve an important signaling role in influencing investors' assessment of the dividend decisions of small firms.