دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی شماره 26550
عنوان فارسی مقاله

یک مدل که در آن سیاست های پولی در مورد پول است

کد مقاله سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی ترجمه فارسی تعداد کلمات
26550 2009 6 صفحه PDF سفارش دهید محاسبه نشده
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عنوان انگلیسی
A model in which monetary policy is about money
منبع

Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)

Journal : Journal of Monetary Economics, Volume 56, Issue 3, April 2009, Pages 283–288

کلمات کلیدی
سیاست های پولی - جستجو - مداخله بانک مرکزی -
پیش نمایش مقاله
پیش نمایش مقاله یک مدل که در آن سیاست های پولی در مورد پول است

چکیده انگلیسی

Optimal monetary policy is studied in a model with (i) heterogeneity in the degree to which different people are monitored (have publicly known histories); (ii) idiosyncratic shocks that give rise to heterogeneity in earning and spending realizations; and (iii) central-bank intervention in a “market” in claims or credit in which the participants are those who are heavily monitored. A special case of the model has everyone perfectly monitored. In that case, there is no role for money and no role for central-bank intervention. In the example displayed with imperfect monitoring, optimal intervention is not simple.

مقدمه انگلیسی

Most modern monetary systems evolved from systems in which there were private banknotes. In modern systems, central banks have a de jure or de facto monopoly on note issue. Optimal central-bank policy is described under the monopoly against the background of a model that has been used to provide a mechanism-design analysis of private banknote-issue systems (see Cavalcanti and Wallace, 1999 [CW, hereafter]). 1 A virtue of the model is its consistency with the main idea of modern monetary theory; namely, that money, whether it consists of private banknotes or the money issued by a central-bank monopoly, has a role because at least some people are imperfectly monitored in the sense that their previous actions are not common knowledge (see Ostroy, 1973, Townsend, 1989 and Kocherlakota, 1998). Here, following CW, there are two kinds of people. An exogenous fraction, the would-be issuers of private banknotes, are perfectly monitored in the sense that their actions are common knowledge. The rest are anonymous, not monitored at all, and their presence gives rise to a demand for money, which is best thought of as currency. Under the monopoly, there is a role for the monitored to borrow and lend among themselves. To allow that to occur, the model has two stages of trade at each date: a stage at which production and consumption occur in pairwise single-coincidence meetings and a centralized stage where the monitored borrow and lend and where central-bank intervention occurs—as in a federal funds or commercial paper market. To give a role for intervention in a simple way, there is a seasonal—a two-date periodic and deterministic aggregate productivity process. The marginal benefit of central-bank intervention is found by studying two maximization problems. In both, the objective is ex ante, prior to the permanent assignment of people into the monitored and anonymous groups, representative-agent welfare and the choice is over implementable two-date periodic allocations—essentially, trades and transfers—where implementability means subject to participation and truth-telling constraints. In the no-intervention problem, the planner is constrained to choose a constant stock of money. In the intervention problem, the planner can choose a two-date periodic stock of money, but must bring about changes in the quantity of money through transfers at the centralized stage—transfers that are also subject to the implementability constraints. A role for central-bank intervention is tied to the role of money. A special case of the model has everyone monitored. In that case, the optimum is cashless and has no role for intervention. Even in the general case, optimal intervention does not take the form of paying interest on money. Instead, it resembles loans to the aggregate of would-be issuers of banknotes at one date with repayment at the next date. The optimum is displayed for one numerical example. And even though the model is very simple and even though money is a simple object in the model, optimal intervention does not seem simple.

نتیجه گیری انگلیسی

Aside from the extreme assumption that money holdings are in the set {0,1}{0,1}, commented on above, there are many other extreme and, perhaps, controversial features of the model. Four of them are discussed here. One extreme assumption is exogeneity of the set of mm people. Instead, it could be assumed that there is a distribution of private costs of getting monitored and that individuals make once-for-all choices regarding their monitored status after seeing the allocation proposed by the planner. The version above is the special case in which a fraction of people has zero costs and the rest have infinite costs. With a more general distribution, the fraction who are monitored would be influenced by the allocation chosen by the planner. Also extreme is the absence of any policy that resembles the Friedman rule. That rule is infeasible with {0,1}{0,1} money holdings. With a larger set of individual holdings, it could be approximated.5 However, any such scheme would be redistributive because the net taxes needed to support it are collected from mm people at stage 2, while the transfers that mimic deflation go to nn people. Because there is already ample scope to tax mm people through production in pairwise meetings, it is far from obvious that any such scheme would be desirable. In particular, even in the current model it is feasible to pay average interest on money holdings of nn people by having higher prices in (n,m)(n,m) meetings than in (m,n)(m,n) meetings. However, as shown in Table 3, the reverse occurs (presumably, because of the need to reward mm people). Also, with larger money holdings, lump-sum money transfers to nn people could play a risk-sharing role as in Levine (1991), Molico (2006), and Deviatov (2006), and those transfers would have to be financed. Another possibly controversial assumption is that all utility-producing activity is in pairwise meetings—in stage 1. In contrast, Lagos and Wright (2005) and the many follow-ups to it use stage 2 for centralized trade in goods with quasi-linear preferences. Quasi-linearity is extreme in that it eliminates the possibility that idiosyncratic realizations at stage 1 affect wealth and, thereby, subsequent pairwise trades. As is well known, centralized trade in goods at stage 2 without quasi-linearity would not have that consequence (see Chiu and Molico, 2007 and Zhu, 2008). Also, as suggested above, stage 2 is intended to mimic activities like clearing, borrowing, and lending using commercial paper or federal funds, and the operation of a discount window—activities that do not involve production or consumption. And, obviously, a deterministic seasonal is a special case of more complicated productivity processes. Clearly, nothing in the structure of the model precludes trying to study other productivity processes or other kinds of shocks. Finally, what should one conclude from the seeming complicated nature of optimal intervention? (We did not anticipate even the qualitative direction of the intervention that shows up in the above example.) To simplify optimal intervention, the model would have to be simplified further. However, it is doubtful that can be done while staying true to the goal of analyzing policy against the background of a model that also permits an analysis of private banknote issue.

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