مکانیسم های اداره و بهره وری رابطه ای در هماهنگی عمودی برای توسعه محصول جدید
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|2680||2006||9 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||6097 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Technovation, Volume 26, Issue 7, July 2006, Pages 761–769
This article explores the theoretical explanations of governance mechanisms in vertical coordination between firms over the product life cycle stages with reference to the high-technology industry. Firms in the high-tech industry face uncertainties of fast-changing environments such as rapid technological innovations and shortening product life cycles. Drawing on transaction cost analysis in vertical coordination, conditions under which transactional inefficiencies may arise are analyzed on different stages of product life cycle theory. Theoretical analysis suggests that interaction patterns over a product life cycle produce differing implications for achieving cost minimization and value maximization. The implications of this variation in transaction cost inefficiencies suggest that there are different opportunities for enhancing efficiencies or for creating value at different stages of the product life cycle. The article proposes that by considering the impact of exogenous factors on the stage of a product life cycle and relationship productivity, high-tech firms operating in volatile markets can safeguard their exposure to transactional inefficiencies.
In today's network economy, firms are confronted with rapid technological changes and global competition. A formative idea in marketing is that interfirm relations in marketing channels have gradually moved from transaction-oriented marketing (e.g. Williamson, 1979) and relationship management (e.g. Heide, 1994) to emphasize on coordination between networks of firms (Achrol and Kotler, 1999). In particular, suppliers of high-tech products often face technological skepticism frequently exhibited by buyers who delay or postpone their purchase of the product (Shanklin and Ryann, 1987) as well as obsolescence and the threat of competing technologies (Moriarty and Kosnik, 1989). It is therefore not surprising that the productivity of purchasing ties is particularly significant for vertical coordination between firms in new product development relationships. In vertical coordination, buyers and sellers engage each other in ways that are more intense than simple exchanges of products for payments (Clemons et al., 1993). This is pertinent in the relationship quality of new product development (NPD). Relationship quality has been defined as a concept that includes conflict, trust, commitment and the partner's willingness to invest in the relationship and expectation of continuity (Kumar et al., 1995). High quality relationships would have greater trust, commitment, willingness to invest, expectation of relationship continuity and lower levels of conflict. Consequently, researchers in marketing have taken an interest in the concept for the development and management of long-term relationships such as alliances and partnerships (e.g. Anderson and Weitz, 1989, Anderson and Weitz, 1992, Anderson and Narus, 1990, Dywer et al., 1987 and Heide and John, 1990). While there are models and frameworks for understanding working relationships between firms in business markets, there is little research in governance mechanisms of vertically connected NPD ties in volatile or high-tech industries that often have a direct impact on a product life cycle as well as the bottom line of buyers and sellers. This impact is significant to the quality of the relationship due to the complex nature and volatility of high-tech markets that contribute to a high perceived risk both on the supply and the demand side (Beard and Easingwood, 1992). An understanding of the implications of a product life cycle for governance mechanisms can help firms add value and satisfy partners' requirements and circumstances in vertical coordination for new product development. It is not surprising that firms in high-tech industries often engage in outsourcing to develop fewer but closer value-adding ties (Clemons et al., 1993 and Wilson, 1994). However, high-tech products have a short product life cycle that can make relationship investments uneconomical in vertical coordination. Participants of NPD in high-tech markets are often confronted with high switching costs as a result of commitments they have made in a certain technology or a particular vendor (see e.g. Jackson, 1985, Wilson, 1994 and Heide and Weiss, 1995). The high volatility of high-tech markets adds to the difficulty in determining the relationship productivity between partners. Firms in the high-tech industry operate in a dynamic environment in which semiconductor production can increase the price/performance ratio of microprocessor-based computer systems by 10 times every two and a half years. This gives rise to discontinuous innovation and shortening product life cycles and hence businesses are forced to adopt dynamic paradigms such as competing and collaborating with competitors (Bengtsson and Kock, 2000) and inviting suppliers rather than recruit. Also, high-tech firms engage in a variety of network forms such as vertical networks that are dynamic and knowledge-rich, which have implications for generating innovations (Eng, 2004a). The purpose of this article is to explore the governance mechanisms for vertical coordination between firms in NPD. In doing so, research propositions are developed in relation to understanding the productivity of relationship for different stages of product life cycle theory. Although there are many studies on different approaches of relationship governance in channel management (e.g. Anderson and Narus, 1984, Gundlach et al., 1995 and Andaleeb, 1996), no particular conceptualization has yet been developed for explaining the forms of vertical coordination in a product life cycle of firms operating in high-tech markets. Thus, this article attempts to fill this gap in marketing literature and NPD.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
Although the study of relationship governance phenomena has been influenced profoundly by TCA, its contributions to choice of governance mechanisms for vertical coordination between firms has not yet been conceptualized. This article illustrates the governance structures of vertical coordination in the context of the high-tech industry and NPD by examining their influence on product life cycle stages and relationship productivity. As shown in Fig. 1, consideration of exogenous factors includes attributes noted in marketing literature for efficient governance. By combining these exogenous factors, it is possible to account for both implications of transactional inefficiencies over the product life cycle as well as relationship-based factors in the relationship productivity construct for gaining a better theoretical insight and managerial understanding. In Table 1, four major themes emerged from the TCA perspective of vertical coordination over the product life cycle stages; first, a firm's investment in specific assets are exposed to different degrees of transactional inefficiencies on different stages of a product life cycle. The implications of this variation in transaction cost inefficiencies suggest that there are different opportunities for enhancing efficiencies or developing value at different stages of the product life cycle. Second, complete, contingent contracts are of little relevance in vertical coordination of partnership between firms in NPD activities. Within each of the different stages of a product life cycle, firms have the opportunities to shift or revise activities to lower transactional inefficiencies. Coordinated interaction patterns have been noted to produce better adaptation (Lusch and Brown, 1996). Third, though a firm can profit from its actions in response to transactional inefficiencies for the firm's own purposes, tactical manipulations may expose the other party's assets to inefficiencies. Buvik and John (2000) contend that fast changing demand conditions and rapid technological changes provide greater opportunities for appropriating exposed assets. Close ties in vertically coordinated patterns are not limited to competition among firms but may include business networks. Fourth, while a firm's own strategy may expose the other party's assets or create additional opportunities, vertical interaction patterns are also subject to contextual and relationship-based exogenous factors. It is suggested that these factors can be examined using the relationship productivity construct. Within the context of highly volatile markets such as the high-tech industry, fast changing supply and demand conditions have a profound impact on the relational approach to building long-term relationships. The present article set out to examine the implications of these exogenous factors with regards to the form of governance mechanisms in vertical coordination for new product development activities. It has been shown through theoretical analysis that interaction patterns over a product life cycle produce differing implications for achieving cost minimization and value maximization. The lack of systematic empirical work on these issues means that the analysis was largely based on theoretical reasoning and explanation. Finally, it is hoped that the refutable propositions and implications put forward in this article would encourage further research in this area.