مصون سازی ریسک در زنجیره تامین: انتخاب در مقابل تخفیف قیمت
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|28179||2014||9 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||8705 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : International Journal of Production Economics, Volume 151, May 2014, Pages 112–120
In this research, two risk hedging strategies, the option contract and the advance purchase discount contract, are investigated within a manufacturer–retailer two-echelon supply chain context. This study offers three contributions. First, the optimal decisions under the two contracts from the perspectives of both the manufacturer and the retailer are determined. Second, circumstances under which supply chain coordination can be reached are identified. Third, the scenario of loss-averse manufacturer has been explored. The results of the analysis provide practical insights to the manufacturer when she plans production quantity and to the retailer when he replenishes inventory.
The global competition has enhanced the time-to-market performance, shortened product life-cycles, increased time-sensitive customer demand, and popularized outsourcing in supply chain. To deal with these challenges, supply chains are becoming more responsive to market needs (Chen et al., 2012, Li et al., 2012 and Li, 2012). For instance, long lead-time is a fairly common phenomenon in many industries. Long lead-time increases variability in demand and supply which requires more inventories in the supply chain system. In the apparel industry, the lead-time between retailer ordering and manufacturer delivering can be as long as 12 months (Fisher and Raman, 1996). In the toy industry, order fulfill lead-time can be as long as 18 months (Biyalogorsky and Koenigsberg, 2006). Retailers usually place their orders long before the demand is there because manufacturers need to build up capacity, plan production schedule, and purchase raw materials before they can produce the orders (Xu et al., 2012). Given long order fulfillment lead-time and high uncertainty in consumer demand, the matching between supply and demand is very challenging. The Bullwhip effect, which describes the distortion of the demand information as it is passed on from the retailer to the upstream manufacturer, is a typical phenomenon in the supply chain. According to Accenture׳s report,1 in the energy industry, from 2006 to 2010, the production quantity of ethanol and biodiesel in the European Union is not consistent with the consumption quantity. The mismatch between supply and demand usually leads to increased inventory-related cost and lost profit. For example, in early 2001, Cisco Systems built a lot of inventory for a booming market, but they failed to predict the market downturn. As a result, Cisco Systems was forced to write-off 2.25 billion US$ in inventory in May 2001. To reconcile the mismatch between supply and demand, manufacturers (suppliers) would like the retailer to place orders as early as possible. The Advance Purchase Discount (APD) contract is one of the means that encouraging retailers to place their orders early. The APD contract was originally introduced between retailers and customers, and then used as a contract between suppliers and retailers (Prasad et al., 2010). Under the APD contract, the supplier offers the retailer with two wholesale prices: (i) a discount price if the retailer places orders before the selling season starts and (ii) a regular price if the retailer buys during the selling season. The retailer bears the inventory cost if he orders the product before the selling season starts and the opportunity cost on any lost margins because his orders may not be fulfilled during the selling season. On the other hand, the supplier bears the risk on any production in excess of the retailer׳s order quantity. Under the APD contract, the manufacturer׳s production decision has a significant impact on the allocation of supply chain risks, as the APD contract allows for intermediate allocations of inventory risks between supply chain partners. The option contract, a popular method applied by practitioners to cover the discrepancy between supply and demand, was first introduced in the financial area. The option contract specifies a contract between two parties for a future transaction on an asset. Later, it was applied to the supply chain area as a means of hedging risks that stem from uncertain demand. Under the option contract, the option buyer (the retailer) gains the right, but not the obligation, to engage in the transaction, while the seller (the manufacturer) incurs the corresponding obligation to fulfill the transaction. Under the option contract, the manufacturer bears the inventory risk and the retailer pays the option fee. Both European option and American option are common in the market. A European option may be exercised only at the expiration date of the option, while an American option may be exercised at any time before the expiration date. In this paper, we focus on the European option for the reason of tractability. To further understand the risks born by both parties under the APD contract and the option contract, we study a two echelon supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer. Under the APD contract, before the selling season starts, the manufacturer announces the discount price and the retailer places its initial order. Based on the order quantity, the manufacturer determines the production volume accordingly. After the selling season starts, the retailer may replenish its inventory from the manufacturer at the regular price if the product sells fast. Finally, the manufacturer delivers the order in a whole lot. Table 1 summaries the risks shared by the manufacturer and the retailer under the APD contract. The term d denotes the realized demand, q the manufacturer׳s production quantity, and y the retailer׳s order quantity.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
We study two risk hedging strategies, i.e., the option contract and the APD contract, in a two-echelon supply chain context consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer. We have examined the optimal decisions under each contract from the perspective of the manufacturer and the retailer respectively. We have derived the conditions under which the option/APD contract should be adopted by the manufacturer. Specifically, when both the manufacturer and the retailer are risk neutral, then under the option contract, the manufacturer always reserves the system-wide optimal production quantity regardless the option price. If the optimal system-wide production quantity is small enough, the manufacturer prefers the option contract. If the optimal system-wide production quantity is fairly large, the manufacturer prefers the APD contract only when the retailer׳s advance purchasing quantity is smaller than the threshold value. Moreover, our results show that supply chain coordination may be reached under the option contract, but not the APD contract. When the manufacturer is loss-averse, he reserves less quantity under both contracts and the threshold value should be adjusted accordingly. This study offers an opportunity for future research. Firstly, we have only considered a single manufacturer and a single retailer case. When multiple retailers are introduced, the problem becomes complicated as the competition among the retailers may influence the manufacturer׳s decision. Secondly, we have only considered the loss-averse manufacturer. Further study may consider the risk-averse attitudes from both the manufacturer and the retailer. Finally, we leave empirical validation of our results open for future research.