تحویل بهینه سازی احراز هویت مبتنی بر بلیط در شبکه های مبتنی بر مدیریت تحرک
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|28343||2013||14 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Information Sciences, Volume 230, 1 May 2013, Pages 64–77
Proxy Mobile IPv6 (PMIPv6), a network-based mobility management protocol, has clearly different perceptions compared with host-based mobility management protocols. In PMIPv6, a mobile node (MN) is not involved in any mobility signaling as mobility service provisioning entities provide mobility services for the MN. This characteristic leads us to develop a new handover authentication scheme that satisfies certain security and performance requirements. In this paper, handover optimized ticket-based authentication (HOTA) is developed to enable an MN to securely reuse a credential issued by an authentication server (AS) when the MN performs handover authentication over different access networks. The proposed secure reuse of the credential reduces the handover latency while it simplifies a handover authentication procedure. Initial authentication and handover authentication procedures of HOTA are presented in detail and analyzed with a formal authentication analysis method, BAN Logic. Analytical models are also developed to evaluate the authentication and handover latencies, packet loss, and handover failure probability. The conducted numerical analysis corroborates that HOTA outperforms previously developed handover authentication schemes for PMIPv6.
Significant developments in IP mobility have taken place over last decade. Especially, for node mobility, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) developed Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6)  as a baseline mobility management protocol for the forthcoming next-generation network. By registering location information of an MN to its home agent (HA), the MN is always reachable even if it changes its point of attachment on the Internet. However, the MN is required to register its location information by sending its own mobility signaling , because MIPv6 has been developed from the concept of host-based mobility management. Telecommunication providers have recognized that such mobility signaling occurred for every movement must be burdens on lightweight MNs. Protocol extensions to MIPv6 such as Fast Mobile IPv6  and Hierarchical Mobile IPv6  also inherit such limitations. Accordingly, the IETF started to develop a new type of mobility management, i.e., network-based mobility management, and as a result, PMIPv6 was developed in 2008 . PMIPv6 has been developed as a network-based mobility management protocol, wherein node mobility is supported by network entities residing in a mobility support domain. In PMIPv6, an MN is not required to generate and maintain its own mobility signaling and status. The newly introduced mobility service provisioning entities such as local mobility anchor (LMA) and mobile access gateway (MAG) provide mobility services for the MN. PMIPv6 is obviously a lightweight mobility management protocol for host mobility  and , but the current specification of PMIPv6 only defines its protocol operation . Then, authentication issue, i.e., handover authentication, is left in the basket for further work or relies on existing authentication schemes. However, it is clear that previously developed authentication schemes , , ,  and  cannot be well adapted to PMIPv6 because PMIPv6 involves different characteristics compared to the host-based mobility management protocols  and . For instance, an MN in PMIPv6 does not maintain its binding update cache that can be used in authentication, as the MN does not generate its own mobility signaling. In addition, the mobility coverage of the MN is limited in a PMIPv6 domain. Without being secured, an illegitimate MN could access network resources and launch various attacks in a PMIPv6 domain. In other words, only an authenticated and authorized MN, i.e., legitimate MN, must access mobility services. For instance, an illegitimate MN could send forge messages to masquerade as other legitimate node or to redirect data packets. In order to thwart such attacks, handover optimized ticket-based authentication (HOTA) is introduced in this paper to provide enhanced handover performance compared with previously developed schemes  and  while satisfying security and performance requirements. In particular, the following are contributions of this paper. • Ticket-based fast handover authentication in which an MN reuses a ticket obtained from its initial access stage for its handover authentication while it moves around in a given PMIPv6 domain. By utilizing the ticket as a credential of authentication, the handover authentication latency is significantly reduced. • BAN Logic  based formal authentication analysis in which HOTA is thoroughly investigated and proved. • Comparative performance analysis in which HOTA is numerically evaluated in term of authentication and handover latencies, packet loss, and handover failure probability and also compared with existing schemes. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 the overview of PMIPv6 is provided. Then, initial authentication and handover authentication procedures of HOTA are described in Section 3. In Section 4, HOTA is analyzed from the perspective of security views using BAN Logic. Numerical analysis results are given in Section 5. We conclude this paper in Section 6.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
Without being secured, an illegitimate mobile node (MN) could access network resources and launch various attacks in a Proxy Mobile IPv6 (PMIPv6) domain. In this paper, we have presented handover optimized ticket-based authentication (HOTA) that protects access network resources of the PMIPv6 domain against unauthorized access from illegitimate MNs. HOTA further improves handover performance as it enables a legitimate MN to securely reuse a credential provided from an authentication server when the MN performs handover authentication at different access networks. Initial authentication and handover authentication procedures of HOTA have been illustrated and then analyzed by BAN Logic. The numerical analysis results have confirmed that HOTA outperforms previously developed handover authentication schemes in terms of authentication latency, handover latency, packet loss, and handover failure probability. HOTA has been proposed for centralized mobility management in which mobility context and routing status of registered MNs are maintained and handled by a single-handed mobility anchor, i.e., local mobility anchor (LMA) of PMIPv6. However, it is expected that centralized mobility management will suffer from rapidly increasing mobile Internet traffic. In order to cope with recent mobile Internet traffic growth, distributed mobility management within flat mobile network architectures is being standardized at the IETF. As mobility anchors are distributed at an access network level, high scalability and no single point of failure can be provided while providing better end-to-end packet transmission performance. As a future work, we plan to extend HOTA further into distributed mobility management.