رفتار حرفه ای و اجتماعی در یک محیط طبیعی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|28659||2004||24 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||10350 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Volume 54, Issue 1, May 2004, Pages 65–88
Empirical evidence is provided for the importance of pro-social behavior of individuals in an anonymous, n-person public good setting. A unique panel data set of 136,000 observations is matched with an extensive survey. Even under anonymous conditions, a large number of individuals are prepared to donate quite a significant sum of money. Cooperation conditional on giving by specific other persons is present, but the causal relationship is ambiguous. The manner in which one is asked to donate is crucial. Identification with the organization, and with specific groups, is also important.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
This paper provides empirical evidence for the importance of pro-social behavior of individuals in an anonymous, n-person public good setting. We use a unique panel data set of 136,000 observations (roughly 33,000 persons) concerning the decisions of students at the University of Zurich to contribute to two Social Funds administered by the University. These field observations are matched with an extensive survey of the same sample group of students to find out more about the conditions and motives for giving. Four hypotheses are tested with these data: 1. A substantial number of people are prepared to act in a pro-social way in an anonymous situation in which no direct enforcement mechanism exists. The results of the statistics are consistent with Hypothesis 1: even after several rounds, a large number of students act pro-socially in an anonymous decision setting. However, conditional cooperation cannot be excluded by the evidence presented. 2. Expectations about the contributions of other people matter. The more people expect others to cooperate, the more they cooperate themselves. The results of the empirical analysis are also consistent with Hypothesis 2. Students compare themselves with others and make their actions dependent on the way they expect others to behave. The evidence for this ‘indirect’ reciprocity, in the form of conditional cooperation, is ambiguous. While the correlation between the expected cooperation rate and the actual contribution of the students is quite large, the causality is unclear. Only approximately every fifth student knows the behavior of his or her colleagues or talks with others to find out about the appropriateness of his or her own behavior. Students thus seem to behave pro-socially but not exclusively conditional on the behavior of others. 3. The environment in which the donations take place matters. In particular, it is essential that people are asked to contribute in a way they conceive to be acceptable. The empirical results suggest that pro-social behavior depends on environmental and institutional conditions. The way one is asked to contribute to a public good is of great importance, even in the absence of any personal contact. Moreover, our results support the crucial effect of identification and identity for giving behavior. 4. People differ in their pro-social attitudes. The type of person (as partially reflected by the choice of study) influences donating even when standard personal characteristics (gender and age) are controlled for. Our data suggest that students indeed select different disciplines according to differences in their pro-social preferences. The results derived are based on the behavior of the students and a survey carried out at the University of Zurich. Future research must establish whether the giving behavior identified applies to other persons and to other settings. However, we are confident that our findings are not peculiar to these students but apply more generally.