اقتصاد بازار و رفتار حرفه ای و اجتماعی: شواهد تجربی از آسیای مرکزی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|28675||2012||8 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||7134 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : The Journal of Socio-Economics, Volume 41, Issue 1, January 2012, Pages 64–71
This study seeks to extend the body of knowledge of pro-social behavior in comparative market settings by reporting on a high-stakes ultimatum game and revelation game experiments in two transition economies: Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. While controlling for cultural differences and framing effects, we find statistically significant differences in fairness and honesty behavior between the two countries. Specifically, subjects in Uzbekistan (in an earlier stage of transition to a market economy) are fairer and more honest than their later-stage Kazakh counterparts. Our experimental findings have implications for the literature on pro-social behavior and market economies, and more generally, on the transmission process between formal and informal institutions.
In a series of experiments conducted in small-scale societies, Henrich et al., 2001, Henrich et al., 2005 and Henrich et al., 2010 find strong evidence that pro-social norms1 of fairness and reciprocity increase with greater market integration. The intuitive logic is appealing. Greater market integration dilutes the strong community enforcement mechanisms associated with small-scale societies, increasing the likelihood of opportunism. Recognizing this, and motivated to realize the gains from the greater division of labor, exchange parties respond by rewarding attributes such as fairness and reciprocity in dealings with strangers, while punishing incidences of unfair behavior. Accordingly, greater market integration strengthens pro-social norms toward strangers (Henrich et al., 2001, Henrich et al., 2005 and Henrich et al., 2010). However, in their treatment of market integration, Henrich et al. focus exclusively on the role of informal institutions (such as community enforcement mechanisms) in structuring and regulating exchange in rudimentary societies. Accordingly, their notion of market integration fails to account for (a) the vast, impersonal markets and highly specialized division of labor characterizing present day exchange, and (b) that exchange transactions are governed by both formal and informal institutions (North, 1990). The purpose of this paper is to extend this line of research in both dimensions to examine whether pro-social behavior is stronger or weaker in more market-oriented economies. First, we broaden the focus to incorporate vast markets where exchange transactions are more ephemeral and anonymous (Platteau, 2000) to examine predispositions to be fair and honest toward strangers in situations where the gains from trade are enhanced, but where monitoring and community enforcement mechanisms become correspondingly more diffuse (Kandori, 1992). Second, by explicitly incorporating formal institutions which develop concurrently to support exchange in vast markets (North, 1990), we can examine whether pro-social behavior is crowded-in or crowded-out by more developed, market-compatible formal institutions (Bowles and Gintis, 1998, Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997 and Reeson and Tisdell, 2008). We investigate the above by conducting economic experiments with subjects in two transition societies: Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Specifically, we report on two high-stake experiments: the ultimatum game and the (novel) revelation game, which respectively tap into norms of fairness/reciprocity and honesty. In the one-shot ultimatum bargaining game (Güth et al., 1982), a proposer offers an allocation of money to a responder. If the latter accepts the proposed split, the payoffs are divided accordingly, whereas if the respondent declines the offer, neither player receives anything. In the revelation game, subjects must individually and privately decide whether to voluntarily reveal a monetary discrepancy in their favor to the experimenter. The canonical model of self-interest predicts that the respective dominant strategies of the above games would be to (a) offer the lowest possible positive offer (which, being preferable to receiving nothing, would be accepted), and (b) pocket the serendipitous money (Rubinstein, 1982). Economies at different stages of transition provide an appropriate setting to tease out the predominance of pro-social vis-a-vis self-interested behavior. While early-stage economies are characterized by relatively small, homogeneous clan and kinship networks, endemic corruption and concern for the collective interest (Duch and Palmer, 2004 and Platteau, 2000), more market-oriented, later-stage economies feature more impersonal trade with increasingly heterogeneous counterparts and enhanced pecuniary incentives. In this regard, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan were purposefully selected on the grounds that, although exhibiting very high degrees of cultural homogeneity, a common historical heritage and similar initial conditions (Alam and Banerji, 2000 and Pomfret, 1995), they display wide variations in the degree to which they resemble fully-functioning market economies, as evidenced by their respective European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) average transition scores. A number of related studies have conducted experiments in both single- (cf. Bahry and Wilson, 2006, Chen and Tang, 2009 and Slonim and Roth, 1998) and comparative transition country settings (cf. Gächter et al., 2004 and Herrmann et al., 2008), but without transition (or market integration) being the focal issue. Conversely, the few experimental studies that explicitly focus on transition (cf. Duch and Palmer, 2004 and Ockenfels and Weimann, 1999) are conducted in single settings. There is thus a gap in the experimental literature examining the relationship between transition stage and pro-social behavior. In view of the documented role of such behavior in structuring exchange relations (Kahneman et al., 1986), the growing number of exchange transactions conducted with firms from transition countries (Peng, 2003), and the plethora of economies on the transition path (EBRD, 2009), this is clearly a non-trivial issue. The remainder of this paper comprises five sections. Section 2 reviews the prior literature and develops two propositions. Section 3 describes the experimental design and procedures. Section 4 presents the experimental results and discusses their implications, while Section 5 concludes.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
While the role of pro-social behavior in structuring and regulating exchange relations is well-established, the degree to which such behavior prevails in different formal institutional settings is less known. This paper reports on two laboratory experiments examining evidence of pro-social behavior in early-stage Uzbekistan and later-stage Kazakhstan. While carefully controlling for differences in cultural background, participant pool composition, and experimental procedures, we found statistically significant differences between subject pools in both ultimatum and revelation games, suggesting that Uzbeks were fairer and more honest than their Kazakh counterparts. It would thus appear that pro-social behavior becomes weaker in more market-oriented economies. Our findings also have normative implications. While firms may have previously been deterred from entering collaborative arrangements with counterparts domiciled in relatively weak formal institutional settings, the observed prevalence of other-regarding preferences in Uzbekistan may provide encouragement that contractual obligations may, indeed, be upheld. Conversely, in view of the incomplete nature of contracts (Frey, 1998), firms should exercise caution in entering agreements with firms from later-stage transition economies, where reliance on formal institutions may not provide sufficient redress against heightened self-interested motives. Our study elucidated two elements of normative behavior, namely fairness/reciprocity and honesty. In view of the multi-dimensional nature of pro-social norms, future studies which attempt to elicit other forms of normative behavior (such as cooperation or altruism) in similar settings would further our knowledge of this complex area. Relatedly, in light of the differences in findings between our study into fairness and honesty and those of Ockenfels and Weimann (1999) into cooperation, more research specifically aimed at investigating the different ways in which transition may affect different types of behavior or norms is required. Additionally, in view of the cross-sectional nature of the current study, future studies conducted in other transition countries may enhance the external validity of the findings in this paper. Similarly, and related to the discussion point in the previous section, future research providing longitudinal evidence would similarly enrich our understanding the relationship between formal and informal institutional development. Finally, we wish to emphasize the exploratory nature of the current study which means that our conclusions remain tentative. In view of the attested importance of normative behavior in exchange relations (Kahneman et al., 1986) and the burgeoning number of exchange interactions with firms from transition economies (Peng, 2003), future contributions to this subject area will be both timely and pertinent.