پروفایل های پیک نفت از منظر یک ارزیابی تعادل عمومی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|28912||2012||10 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Energy Policy, Volume 48, September 2012, Pages 744–753
This paper disentangles the interactions between oil production profiles, the dynamics of oil prices and growth trends. We do so through a general equilibrium model in which Peak Oil endogenously emerges from the interplay between the geological, technical, macroeconomic and geopolitical determinants of supply and demand under non-perfect expectations. We analyze the macroeconomic effects of oil production profiles and demonstrate that Peak Oil dates that differ only slightly may lead to very different time profiles of oil prices, exportation flows and economic activity. We investigate Middle-East's trade-off between different pricing trajectories in function of two alternative objectives (maximisation of oil revenues or households’ welfare) and assess its impact on OECD growth trajectories. A sensitivity analysis highlights the respective roles of the amount of resources, inertia on the deployment of non conventional oil and short-term oil price dynamics on Peak Oil dates and long-term oil prices. It also examines the effects of these assumptions on OECD growth and Middle-East strategic tradeoffs. Highlights ► Geological determinants behind Hubbert curves in a general equilibrium framework. ► We endogenize the interactions between Peak Oil dates, oil prices and growth trends. ► Close Peak Oil dates lead to different trends of oil prices, exportation and growth. ► Low short-term prices benefit to the long-term macroeconomy of oil exporters. ► High short-term prices hedge oil importers against economic tensions after Peak Oil
The public debates about the future of oil markets have been largely shaped by the so-called ‘Peak Oil’, which relays concerns about the consequences of the inexorable decline of world oil production. The analyses have been focused on the date of this Peak Oil and are essentially conducted under the assumption that, given exogenous assumptions on the total amount of oil resources, oil production levels at a given point in time are only determined by remaining reserves in the soil, in turn depending on the sum of past production (see (Al-Husseini, 2006) for a review). This vision is supported by the generalization, at a global level, of bell-shaped profiles used by Hubbert to predict the decline of US production in the 1970s ((Hubbert, 1956 and Hubbert, 1962; Deffeyes, 2002). Note that these curves are meant to capture geological constraints in the form of depletion effects and inertias on the deployment of production capacities. This paper starts from the idea that the date of Peak Oil is an effective warning about constraints on cheap oil as a crucial energy source (Reynolds, 1994), but distracts the attention from its core determinants and economic consequences. Setting aside controversies about the generalization at a macro level of the Hubbert approach (Lynch, 2003), this paper argues that what matters is not so much the date of Peak Oil than the abruptness of the unanticipated break in oil trends at that period and the capacity of the economies to adapt to it. This abruptness and its economic consequences are determined by the relative evolution rates of oil supply, fuel demand and oil substitutes under imperfect expectations and inertia constraints. To investigate the interplay between these dimensions, we use a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model, which incorporates a comprehensive description of the determinants of oil markets, including the geological constraints behind the Hubbert curves. This framework pictures a world with imperfect foresight, endogenous technical change and inertia on the deployment of end-use equipments and oil substitutes. Section 1 describes and justifies this modeling option. Section 2 conducts a comparative analysis of two oil pricing trajectories: high short-term prices caused by a limited deployment of production capacities vs. moderate short term prices caused by a market flooding behavior. The former allows high short-term revenues for oil-producing countries, while it limits the vulnerability of oil-importing economies to Peak Oil by accelerating oil-free technical change; the latter discourages oil-saving technical change and triggers high prices after the occurrence of Peak Oil. The economic consequences of these two scenarios are investigated from the point of view of both oil exporters (in terms of oil revenues and macroeconomic effects) and oil importers (as measured by growth trajectories). Section 3 conducts a sensitivity analysis on the results by considering different assumptions regarding the amount of oil resources and the extent of inertias that characterize non-conventional production. We assess their impact on economic outcomes and show in particular the parameter sets under which the temporary sacrifice of short-term oil profits under the market flooding option may prove beneficial for Middle-East producers thanks to the later increase of their revenue.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
This paper reviews the notion of Peak Oil in a general equilibrium modeling framework that represents the limits on the short term adaptability of oil supply, oil substitutes and fuel demand. In this framework, inertia and imperfect foresight create the possibility of a sudden acceleration in oil price increases if importing economies are very oil-dependent when entering the period of oil depletion. By considering two counterfactual scenarios, sensitivity tests show that the date of Peak Oil is sensitive to short-term oil price only in case of high reserves and that Peak Oil dates that differ only slightly may lead to very different time profiles of oil prices, rent formation and growth patterns. From oil exporters’ point of view, low oil prices undermine short-term exportation revenues; but they encourage oil consumption, make oil-importing economies more oil-dependent at the Peak Oil date and create room for a rise of long-term oil exportation revenues. It thus may be in the interests of oil producers to accept a temporary sacrifice in their short-term export revenues so as to benefit from higher long-term revenues in the post-Peak Oil period. But, they will do so only if they consider long-term macroeconomic objectives (including industrialization and hedging against Dutch Disease) instead of the maximization of discounted oil revenues. This option is all the more attractive in case of high reserves. From oil importers’ point of view, long periods of low energy prices make the economy more vulnerable to Peak Oil and may not ultimately be beneficial. It may thus be in their interest to correct potentially misleading price-signals by using complementary measures to secure steady technical change. Among them, international climate policies can be envisaged as a hedging strategy against the negative long-term economic outcome of the uncertainty on oil markets (Rozenberg et al., 2010). Indeed, the moderation of short-term oil demand caused by carbon pricing may contribute to anticipate the long-run depletion and make the economy less sensitive to the rarefaction of oil. This possibility, in turn, raises the question of Middle-East countries’ reaction to these measures and in particular their compliance to a global climate agreement, given the adverse impacts of climate policies on their oil exportation revenues. Our paper suggests that examining this question in a partial equilibrium approach or through the lens of a general equilibrium analysis may make a significant difference. To treat these questions, a new step in methodological advancements is necessary to introduce climate policies at the heart of the framework of energy-economy interactions developed in this paper.