تجزیه و تحلیل اقتصادی تعهدات آب و هوایی از کپنهاگ برای اتحادیه اروپا و سایر کشورهای مهم
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|29007||2011||7 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||6170 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Energy Economics, Volume 33, Supplement 1, December 2011, Pages S34–S40
This article uses the world GEM-E3 computable general equilibrium model to assess the economic consequences of the climate ‘Copenhagen Accord’. The model allows analyzing the macroeconomic costs in terms of GDP, the change in employment, as well as the impacts on production of specific energy-intensive sectors. Various 2020 climate scenarios are evaluated depending on the GHG mitigation pledges. We find that the cost for the developed countries is around 0.5% of GDP in 2020 for the more ambitious pledges, whereas the GDP effects are more heterogeneous across developing countries and Russia, reflecting the different pledges and the assumptions in the reference scenario across these countries. Further, the article explores whether there is a form of double dividend in the EU when the revenues from auctioning or taxation of GHG emissions are used to reduce the social security contributions of employees. We conclude that GDP and employment perform better compared to the free allocation of permits when more sectors are subject to auctioning or GHG taxes and the additional government revenues are used to reduce the cost of labour.
Although short of a comprehensive legally binding agreement, the result of COP152 in Copenhagen was an extensive list of ‘pledges’ for GHG emission reductions in 2020 by all major economies and many other countries (UNFCCC, 2009). Under the Cancun agreements of COP16 the mitigation pledges of the ‘Copenhagen Accord’ have been anchored in the UN process. The United Nations (UN) also formally adopted that global temperature must be kept below 2 °C compared to the pre-industrial level. The EU pledges state that the EU will unilaterally reduce its GHG emissions by 20% in 2020 compared to 1990. If there is an ambitious international agreement on GHG mitigation, the EU would reduce emissions by 30% in 2020. These pledges were already formally adopted by the European parliament and the European Council in June 2009 – in a legislation known as the ‘Climate and Energy Package’3 (European Commission, 2008). After COP15 the European Commission analyzed the economic implications of going beyond the 20% reduction target in the context of the ‘Copenhagen Accord’ (European Commission, 2010a). The accompanying economic assessment relied on economic modelling4 (European Commission, 2010b), including, among other models, the computable general equilibrium (CGE) GEM-E3 model. This paper presents in detail the GEM-E3 results of this analysis. It builds further on the GEM-E3 modelling for the 2009 Communication “Towards a comprehensive climate change agreement in Copenhagen” (Russ et al., 2009), and the 2007 Communication “Limiting global climate change to 2 °C” (Russ et al., 2007).5 The EU ‘Climate and Energy Package’ foresees an enhanced use of auctioning in the EU Emission Trading System (EU ETS) from less than 4% in phase 2 (2008–2012) to more than 50% in phase 3 (2013–2020). This implies a substantial generation of public revenues. Auctioning (and taxation) complies better with the ‘polluter pays principle’ and avoids handing out ‘windfall profits’ to sectors that can easily pass on the opportunity cost of allowances to their customers. Indeed, full auctioning will be the rule in the power sector from 2013 onwards. Sectors exposed to a significant risk of ‘carbon leakage’ are exempted from auctioning and receive their share of allowances up to a benchmark level for free. In December 2009, the European Commission published the list of sectors and subsectors that are deemed to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage (European Commission, 2009b). Since auctioning raises government revenues, other taxes such as labour or capital taxes could be reduced, potentially improving the overall efficiency of the economy. This links the analysis of this article with the ‘double dividend’ literature.6 This literature argues that substituting environmental taxes for pre-existing distorting taxes (i.e. an environmental tax reform) may yield not only a cleaner environment but a second non-environmental dividend. The ‘double dividend’ literature implicitly assumes that the initial state of the economy may be suboptimal from a non-environmental point of view. This state can be observed in the real world, which can be explained, alternatively, by interest groups, distributional concerns, or the export of the tax-burden to non-residents. A number of different definitions for the non-environmental dividend have been analysed. In this study we look at three of the main forms7: Weak double dividend: The recycling of the additional environmental tax revenues through lower pre-existing distorting taxes (e.g. capital or labour) reduces the costs of the environmental policy, compared to the case where the environmental tax revenues are recycled in a lump-sum way. The weak double dividend is relatively uncontroversial (Goulder, 1995). Strong double dividend: The environmental tax reform not only reduces the costs of the environmental policy, but even generates a non-environmental benefit (‘dividend’) in the form of a more efficient tax system, raising the non-environmental welfare. Recent studies qualify in detail under which conditions a (strong) double dividend may appear,8 whereas others have studied the double dividend hypothesis in the context of climate change policies.9 Employment double dividend: The environmental tax reform increases the environmental quality and boosts employment as well. This study tries to answer three policy questions with respect to the EU climate policy in an international context. Firstly, it studies the macroeconomic implications of the Copenhagen Accord for the major world economies in 2020. Secondly, the research also pays particular attention to the economic implications on the EU in terms of GDP and employment, taking into account various possible auctioning and tax schemes. Thirdly, we explore the politically sensitive issue of the competitiveness effects in the energy intensive sectors in the EU. This paper has the following structure: Section 2 describes the main features of the GEM-E3 model. Section 3 presents the reference, with which the Copenhagen Accord scenario will be compared. The reference scenario considers the ‘Climate and Energy Package’ and the effects of the on-going economic crisis. Section 4 presents the policy scenarios assessed. Section 5 analyses the results for the major world economies and the EU. Section 6 concludes.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
The computable general equilibrium GEM-E3 model has been used to estimate the economic consequences of the various ways in which the Copenhagen Accord can be implemented, depending mainly on the ranges of mitigation efforts announced, and the allocation schemes for the emissions permits. The allocation schemes are potentially of significant relevance. They can be appropriately modelled within a general equilibrium model setup because such analytical framework considers in a consistent way the interaction of all relevant economic agents (firms, consumers, public sector and external sector) in all markets (factor and goods and services). The main result of the assessment is that the GDP losses for the EU in the various scenarios are relatively low, when compared to the current commitment of 20% already implemented in the reference scenario. Furthermore, if public revenues are generated via auctioning of permits and taxation of GHG emissions and those revenues are used to reduce the social contributions of employees, GDP variation could become positive in the EU. The higher private consumption seems to be the main driver for the higher GDP. The higher private consumption is boosted by the higher employment level and higher after-tax wages. The additional employment is estimated to be about one million jobs. We conclude that the more sectors that are subject to auctioning of emission permits or GHG taxes, the higher the GDP, employment becomes compared to the free allocation of permits. The energy intensive sectors are not worse off and the effect on production for some sectors may even become less negative with a shift to auctioning and GHG taxation. Our analysis obviously holds a number of caveats which may be the topic of further research. First, one could explore the results for more alternative revenue recycling options (e.g. capital taxes, VAT, direct taxes or subsidies). Secondly, we did not address the role of the international carbon market. It is widely accepted that developed countries with ambitious emission targets may reduce the cost of the climate policy if they can buy cheap emission reductions abroad, instead of reducing internally. However, this access to cheap reductions also lowers the carbon price domestically. If the same developed country also uses GHG auctioning and taxation, its government will receive less revenues for auctioning or taxation, limiting the scope to reduce other pre-existing taxes. In other words the combination of international carbon market and auctioning/taxation may reduce the potential for double dividend. Third, although auctioning/taxation of GHG emissions is an interesting alternative of government financing on the short- and mid-term, it may on the long term become obsolete if the transition to the low carbon society has been completed.