تظاهرات برای به کارگیری : تجزیه و تحلیل اقتصادی سیاست های حمایت برای جذب و ذخیره سازی کربن
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|29155||2013||11 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||9640 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Energy Policy, Volume 60, September 2013, Pages 753–763
This paper argues that an integrated policy architecture consisting of multiple policy phases and economic instruments is needed to support the development of carbon capture and storage (CCS) from its present demonstration phase to full-scale deployment. Building on an analysis of the different types of policy instruments to correct market failures specific to CCS in its various stages of development, we suggest a way to combine these into an integrated policy architecture. This policy architecture adapts to the need of a maturing technology, meets the requirement of policymakers to maintain flexibility to respond to changing circumstances while providing investors with the policy certainty that is needed to encourage private sector investment. This combination of flexibility and predictability is achieved through the use of ‘policy gateways’ which explicitly define rules and criteria for when and how policy settings will change. Our findings extend to bioenergy-based CCS applications (BECCS), which could potentially achieve negative emissions. We argue that within a framework of correcting the carbon externality, the added environmental benefits of BECCS should be reflected in an extra incentive.
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is an emerging climate change mitigation technology that prevents CO2 produced by power stations and by industrial processes from entering the atmosphere. This is achieved by collecting the CO2 where it is produced and pumping it into deep underground storage formations where it can be trapped by rocks through a variety of physical and geophysical trapping processes (IPCC, 2005). Since the publication of the IPCC's Special Report on CCS in 2005 (IPCC, 2005), the interest in CCS in the climate change policy making community has increased significantly; a relevant role for CCS in a portfolio of measures to achieve large-scale CO2 emissions reductions is now widely accepted (Edenhofer et al., 2010). However, it is fair to say that CCS is currently not on the path to deliver on its promises (IEA, 2012a). CCS continues to be an emerging and technically immature abatement technology which is expensive in comparison with other options. Even though there are a few large-scale CCS projects world-wide in operation or under construction, their number falls short of what would be needed for CCS to mature to a cost-effective abatement technology. Many reasons have been put forward to explain the currently unsatisfying state of CCS (von Hirschhausen et al., 2012). The inadequacy of governmental support policies is probably key among them. High-level political commitments by governments to support CCS are often not translated into policy programmes that effectively and efficiently drive CCS development; in addition, there are no strong expectations that the climate externality will be meaningfully addressed in the near term in a way that would lend support to CCS investment. Examples for this situation can be found in the EU where the reliance on the European Emission Trading Scheme to support CCS has so far not delivered a single integrated large-scale project, or in the US where relevant policy action regarding CCS is exhausted by support for demonstration projects. While it is currently unclear whether CCS will indeed develop into a cost competitive component of a future emission reduction portfolio once relevant market failures are addressed, it is clear that CCS will not become a viable abatement option without policy support. To secure the option of future deployment, a sound policy framework is needed now. Policy options to promote CCS were analysed in work by Groenenberg and de Coninck (2008), Von Stechow et al. (2011) and Al-Juaied (2010), with the latter papers focussing on the specific application of CCS in the European and US electricity generation sector. Our contribution extends this work by presenting a comprehensive policy framework composed of multiple and mutually supporting policy instruments aimed at promoting the development of CCS from its present immature status towards a potentially cost-competitive technology that could be deployed at large scale in both industrial and power sectors. Rather than focussing on single, uniform policy instruments such as a price on CO2 emissions, the paper proposes a policy framework for CCS where the policy mix evolves over time. Recognising that CCS may fail to become cost effective, the evolution of policies to support CCS needs to be tied to the performance of CCS relative to other technologies, and should allow for the the possibility of phasing out support for CCS. After discussing, in the next two sections, the role of CCS for reaching stabilisation targets and examining the current status of CCS technology, we start the construction of the policy framework with a review of the different market failures faced by CCS during its various phases of development. We then proceed to analyse the main economic instruments available to correct relevant market failures, and score their suitability to support CCS at the various stages of development against a set of criteria. Much of our analysis of market failures and the choice of scoring criteria have been inspired by the work of Goulder and Parry (2008) on the selection of instruments for environmental policy. The ranking process produces a set of preferred policies, which we integrate into a policy programme through the incorporation of ‘policy gateways’. These gateways spell out the conditions for the transition of policy from one phase to the next. Their objective is to facilitate the smooth transition between different policies, to render policy evolution predictable to private sector investors, and to provide policy makers with the flexibility to learn from experience and to minimise costs.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
CCS has the potential to significantly reduce GHG emissions that cause dangerous climate change. When used in combination with bioenergy (BECCS), it is actually one of the very few technologies available to reduce the atmospheric stock of CO2, as opposed to merely avoiding additional emissions to the atmosphere. However, to secure the option of possible future deployment at scale, the number of CCS projects needs to increase substantially over the next few decades. Such an increase requires support policies that establish CCS as a mature technology that can potentially compete commercially with other abatements options when CO2 emissions are priced. As CCS will encounter multiple market failures with changing importance on its development path, support policies need to involve multiple instruments over time. The paper outlines a policy architecture for CCS that is structured into 3 phases, namely technical demonstration, sector-specific deployment and wide-scale deployment, and corrects market failures related to − the negative externality from greenhouse gas emissions; − the public good from the creation of knowledge and innovation; − the asymmetry of information which discourages the provision of capital; − the presence of complementary markets when one firm depends upon another to get its goods to market; and − imperfect competition where transport and storage can be natural monopolies. The immediate implication is that a policy that only corrects the emission externality, for example by putting a price on CO2 emissions, will not suffice to secure the option of future CCS deployment. Pricing instruments need to be complemented by instruments that tackle the underinvestment in CCS that results from the public good character of innovation in CCS technology, and by instruments that hedge the risks for capital providers that lack the information relevant for making informed CCS investment decisions. As regard to the former a premium feed-in tariff or a quantity-based instrument may be effective, while information asymmetries could be obviated by public provision of investment capital or guarantees. To tackle issues related to complementary markets, government may facilitate and coordinate the formation of CO2 transportation networks connecting multiple capture plants to storage facilities. Public supervision through regulation could then be modelled on electricity transmission and distribution networks, in order to address the question of imperfect competition and natural monopoly. As CCS evolves over time, the significance of different market failures will change, requiring in turn changes in support policy. Specifically, governments will want to retain the option of reducing or ending CCS support policy because of the uncertain costs and technical performance of CCS in relation to rival technologies. However, private investors seek certainty and may hesitate to invest unless an appropriate degree of policy stability is achieved. We set out a solution to this dilemma: support within the policy framework hinges on meeting certain conditions. By offering only conditional policy commitments, policy makers can hedge against risks. At the same time, by making explicit what these policies are, and what the private sector needs to deliver for governments to continue supporting CCS, the architecture offers the private sector a high degree of predictability. This allows government to commit funds without the risk of overstretching its resources or imposing poor value‐for‐money obligations on others. The deployment of BECCS faces the same type of market failures as conventional, fossil-fuel based CCS, so that the insights gained so far also apply to BECCS. However, public support for BECCS should be commensurate with its environmental benefits which potentially exceed that of conventional, fossil-fuel based CCS. To develop economy-specific policy recommendations, the present qualitative analysis would need to be supplemented by quantitative economic modelling. While relevant work is available (e.g., van der Zwaan and Gerlagh 2006), a quantitative analysis of an integrated policy architecture for CCS appears not to have been undertaken to date.