چشم اندازها و نتایج تاکنون فرانچایزینگ راه آهن مسافری قزاقستان
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|2947||2010||17 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Research in Transportation Economics, Volume 29, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 19–35
From 1991 till 2004 passenger rail transportation in Kazakhstan was organized by a public company without financial contribution from the state budget. As in any post-Soviet country losses from passenger sector in the integrated rail company were covered at the expense of the freight transportations. From 2005 the Government is trying to introduce competition in passenger rail industry by competitive tendering rights to operate on particular route and providing subsidies. This paper reviews the Kazakhstan passenger rail franchising policy from statement and implementation with analysis of results so far. To get sense about the current policy’s perception survey among managers of the government bodies and railway companies had been performed. It indicates respondents’ opinion about main concerns and suggestions for improvement in passenger rail industry. According to provided analysis there are opportunities for improvements in operation of public and private companies as well as in the Government policy.
With length of more than 14500 km (4700 km – double track, 4200 km – electrified lines) the Kazakhstan railways provide region-to-region connection and joint with neighboring states via 15 border points (map of the railways provided in Appendix 2). According to the basic indexes of railways technical equipment (operating length, extent of electrified lines, working fleet of rolling stock, etc.), Kazakhstan occupies the third place after Russia and Ukraine among the Republics of the former USSR (KTZ, 2009). In 1990s as all railways of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Kazakhstan industry faced the problems of asset deterioration, lack of investments, reduction of productivity and overall efficiency. Fig. 1 shows changes in passenger rail turnover and number of passengers carried by railways during 1991–2009.Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 show evolution of the Kazakhstan rolling stock availability in 1995–2008. In that period a number of locomotives reduced from 3045 to 1720 (more then by 40%), fleet of passenger cars decreased by 20% from 1995 to 2005 and increased in 2006–2008 till 2188 cars.In 1995–2008 the number of freight cars reduced by almost 14% (from 109,555 to 94,917 units) but share of private car operators and industrial companies with own rolling stock increased from 10 to 37% (see Fig. 3). Fig. 4 shows share of railways in total passenger turnover (in mln passenger-km) which declines over the last 18 years: in 1990–1993 it grew up from 19.7 (28% of passenger turnover by all kinds of transport) to 20.5 bln passenger-km (42%) and then dropped to 8.8 bln passenger-km (13%) in 1999 with subsequent growth till 14.1 bln passenger-km in 2008 (or 12% of total turnover).Share of railways in freight transportation was changed dramatically. Fig. 5 shows that from 407 bln tonne-km (86% of all freight turnover) in 1990 it dropped to 215 bln tonne-km (58%) in 2008 mostly due to increased share of pipelines and road transport.Performance in 1990–1995 was deteriorated mostly due to the collapse of the USSR with further bond cutting among the former Soviet Republics which became independent states. For passenger transportation these trends are still continuing and parameters for passenger performance are still lower in 2008 than in 1990–1993. In these conditions changes were essential and rail restructuring was aimed to transform relationship in the industry which based on the post-soviet practice with the centrally planned economy to a new market conditions involving private initiative and efficiency amelioration. In 2001 the Government started restructuring aimed at solution of raised problems and introduction of competition (where it was possible). The main target of the reforms was declared as to form optimal system of railways operation for the state and for public. The main objectives of the reforms to get this target were as following: -separation of railway maintenance activities from the core ones (transportation process); -formation of competitive market of carriers with non-discriminatory access to the trunk railway network; -optimization of productive capacity and increase of railway effectiveness; -development of normative legal base in the sphere of railway transport. Passenger services as well were undergone by reforms with the aim to provide better service and to meet requirements of the customers subject to budget and other constraints. In this sector, apart from the referred targets, reforms envisage the following actions: -financial and organizational separation of passenger services from the freight ones; -full transparency of the financial flows, decrease in the losses and strengthening opportunity for private sector participation; -subsidizing passenger services and introduction of competition. The model of vertical separation of infrastructure from operation has been chosen and the Government believes that the main targets will be achieved and Kazakhstan will have railway system which optimal both for the society and the state (the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2004a). The next chapters describe in details how implementation was performed.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
Due to quite short period from start of the reforms it is not easy to draw precise conclusions from experience of Kazakhstan passenger rail restructuring however some points might be stand out. 1)Current analysis showed main aspects of Kazakhstan passenger rail franchising: -contracts was concluded only for one year with further prospects for extension to three year period which is quite short even for running service without investments; -subsidies provided by the Government aimed only to cover carriers’ losses, in calculations of necessary level of the Government support profitability and investments are not included; -due to such conditions there is no opportunity to carriers for the long-term investments; - performance in franchising contract measured by only train frequency and average number of cars without incentives for carriers to improve service for passengers; -subsidies cover only about half of carriers’ losses, another source of funding is from discounted infrastructure and locomotive tariffs for passenger train operating companies. Thus cross subsidization of passenger services at the expense of freight ones is still presented in the industry and hampered private initiatives in both sectors. Along with high level of assets deterioration these factors aggravates situation with private sector participation in passenger rail sector in Kazakhstan. For further development of the industry it is essential to design a franchising scheme with appropriate incentives for carriers to be interested bring better results to the customers for Government subsidies. According to the results of the survey appropriate model for Kazakhstan is franchising with average length of the contracts for 3–7 years, with mean number of intercity carriers from 5 to 8, with level of subsidy $67–134 per year and amendments in contract aimed to monitor service improvements for passengers (such as train punctuality, comfort during the trip, staff competency etc.). 2)Reforming railways the Government wished to divide industry for transparency in relations, begin to subsidize it and introduce competition. Plans seemed too ambitious and they were implemented in comparatively short time period. Envisaged objectives of the reforms were achieved in part of organizational separation of companies who provide particular service in the industry. As showed on organizational structure almost all passenger service organizations are within one holding company. On this scheme where NPC or other KTZ subsidiaries compete with private carriers it is necessary to obtain full independence from any form of discrimination of new entrants. This may be achieved with complete separation of companies from each other and assurance of independence in decision taking process. Probably now it is not right time to do in Kazakhstan because of early start of the reforms and current problems with the Government obligations in terms of necessary level of subsidies and move from cross subsidization as well as problems with private sector participation in terms of service improvements and renewals. 3)Level of competition during the tendering was comparatively low (one or two (rarely three) bidder per route) except for some services with higher patronage and revenues which were tendered in 2008 and where MTC observed from two to four carriers per bid. Achieved competition level might be questioned after introduction of tougher requirements for rolling stock availability. Currently, the carriers provide services basically with state-owned cars with a small part of the fleet involved from outside. Rules toughening for carriers may lead them to leave this business and competition will be weaker. 4)During the last years demand for rail transportation demonstrates steady growth and has reserves to continue this trend if rolling stock availability, fare dodging and other connected problems will be solved. This is another challenge for railways that have to struggle a lot to satisfy growing demand subject to current constraints. 5)With high level of wear railways improved safety and this result might be considered as good achievement. But assets wear is still one of the main threats for Kazakhstan railways and substantial investments necessary to reduce critical level of deterioration. In current conditions the Government has to take leading role possibly by direct funding of PLCC, NPC or private carriers. 6)Due to lack of available data it is not easy to conclude how private companies performed in comparing with NPC or other state-owned carriers. This topic might be chosen for further analysis. But presence of the new entrants of course provides good opportunity for wider services with subsequent improve in quality and advantages for rail users. Again it might be done only in proper performance of all involved parties: Government, LEA, carriers, KTZ, maintenance providers and others. 7)Qualitative opinion survey in general indicates medium or low level of satisfaction with current passenger service. As far as taxpayers’ money already used in railway finance it is essential to provide regular (monthly, quarterly, semi-annual, annual etc.) rail overview of users’ opinion to indicate their perception as well as satisfaction. Analogy with National Passenger Survey in Great Britain might be considered. As was mentioned before some kind of Public performance measures desirably to be introduced and they might be used for franchises amendment for monitoring by authorities who pay subsidies. 8)As international experience showed (see, for example Gomez-Ibanez & de Rus, 2006; Nash, 2008) there are number of ways to run passenger services: from completely integrated companies as in America to another extreme of vertical separation. Kazakhstan Government chose model of vertical separation with private initiatives and competition aimed to solve problem of the industry. It should me mentioned that only introduction of mentioned measures by themselves will not bring optimal results for users and policy makes. A lot of works have to be done to clear up relations aimed for common target, build appropriate incentives mechanism, overcome Government’s perception about railways necessity and intervention into relations during the process. Of course this broad analysis could not provide precise picture and cannot be used in decision making process. But it showed that lack of information have to be covered and necessity of new researches in rail industry is essential. Decisions have to be theoretically underpinned and provide clear economical evaluation without political influence – objectives which not easy to get in practice. This may include modeling framework for all market participants, interaction with other transport modes, demand and revenue forecasting mechanisms etc. Based on clear objectives, real values and explicit policy it is achievable to get working system with correct incentives for delivering railway services which are optimal for society and business.