خوشه های کاهش قیمت در بازار عمده فروشی از طریق قیمت گذاری مبتنی بر بازار در بازارهای خرده فروشی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|3020||2000||11 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : The Electricity Journal, Volume 13, Issue 3, April 2000, Pages 13–23
Introducing a modest number of spot-based products into the retail portfolio would provide significant price relief and stability by connecting the retail and wholesale markets in a cost-effective and market-based manner.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
The price spikes of the past two summers are symptoms of a dysfunctional electricity market. The dysfunction arises from the disconnection between the retail and wholesale electricity markets. The disconnection of markets results from the failure of retail customers to receive price signals indicating wholesale market conditions. Retail customers fail to receive these signals because, as a result of the institutional evolution of electricity price regulation, retail customers face guaranteed prices and suppliers have an obligation to meet customer demands. As a result of these archaic retail market arrangements, wholesale markets are vulnerable to price spikes. These spikes are not fluke events resulting from the unlikely coincidence of random events. Instead, they are the direct result of an inadequate market design that impedes the ability of prices to convey information about demand–supply imbalances to market participants. Until the retail and wholesale market are connected, wholesale markets remain vulnerable to price spikes during extreme weather conditions and, most alarmingly, no market mechanism is in place to keep prices from spiking even higher. This problem can be solved by the introduction of voluntary spot-price products in retail markets and the market-based pricing of all retail products. Diversification of the retail product portfolio would benefit all market participants. Retail customers with flexibility could benefit from lower average energy prices. Less flexible retail customers could continue with a guaranteed price product, but the market cost of that product would come down as wholesale price volatility subsides. The energy service provider would face less volatile wholesale markets, pass some of the price risk through to retail customers, and simultaneously increase profit and overall customer satisfaction. Introducing spot-priced products into the retail industry portfolio would facilitate the transition to efficiently-competitive electricity markets. Achieving this portfolio should not require a regulatory mandate, but does require regulatory encouragement. There should be incentives for ESPs to offer a diverse portfolio of products. A way should be found for providing meaningful price signals to retail customers in the presence of transition issues such as stranded cost recovery and price freezes. The hourly price elasticity of demand is the key benefit that results from connecting wholesale and retail markets. This elasticity results from customer participation on spot-priced products and the price responsiveness of those customers who do choose spot-priced electricity products. Evidence indicates that targeted marketing and education can influence both participation and price responsiveness. In addition, technological advances in communication hardware and intelligent, time-flexible end-use technologies have enhanced electricity customers' ability to respond to price signals and expanded the set of customers who can respond. Finally, the price spikes and market disruptions experienced the past two summers have caused many to question whether competition is working. Many believe that inherent market failures lead to too little generation capacity and this explains the price spikes. We disagree with these views. We believe strongly that competition is the correct path to efficient and smoothly operating electricity markets. We believe the fundamental problem with electricity markets at present is the disconnection between retail consumption decisions and wholesale costs. The market approach provides incentives for remedying the dysfunctional market. This is a first step from which rational market-based decisions on generation and transmission capacities and market rules and regulations can be based.