تمرکز زدایی سیاست های فعال بازار کار : مورد کمیته های خدمات اشتغال محلی سوئدی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی|
|3097||2006||24 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید|
نسخه انگلیسی مقاله همین الان قابل دانلود است.
هزینه ترجمه مقاله بر اساس تعداد کلمات مقاله انگلیسی محاسبه می شود.
این مقاله تقریباً شامل 10050 کلمه می باشد.
هزینه ترجمه مقاله توسط مترجمان با تجربه، طبق جدول زیر محاسبه می شود:
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Public Economics, Volume 90, Issues 4–5, May 2006, Pages 775–798
Decentralisation of decision-making in labour market policy may increase efficiency, since local authorities have first-hand knowledge about local labour market problems. However, decentralisation may also be associated with fiscal externalities generating misallocation. The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of a Swedish pilot programme in 1996, which strengthened the role of the local authorities in labour market policy in certain regions. Our econometric findings do not indicate any increase in geographical lock-in of the unemployed, but decentralisation seems to spur local initiatives in the form of projects organised by the municipalities and increase targeting on outsiders in the labour market. The latter result is consistent with the hypothesis that municipalities used their increasing influence in order to improve municipal budgets at the expense of the central government.
Decentralisation of decision-making may increase the efficiency of active labour market programmes (ALMPs), since local authorities have first-hand knowledge about the nature of local labour market problems. Decentralisation of labour market policy can, however, also be associated with various types of fiscal externalities generating misallocation. Firstly, decisions regarding ALMPs made by one local government are likely to affect other local units. The programmes may serve as a means of increasing or maintaining local population and the municipal tax base, by reducing migration among the unemployed to other regions. Programme participation has a direct migration-reducing effect while the programme lasts. Geographical lock-in may also linger on if training that is useful only to employers outside the locality tends to be not provided. Secondly, it is possible that decentralisation leads to free-rider problems for the central government. For example, municipal budgets are likely to be favourably affected by shifting persons from social assistance, which in Sweden is funded by the local authorities, to participation in programmes, financed by the central government. In addition, job-creation programmes may crowd out regular municipal jobs, implying subsidisation of labour in services that typically local authorities provide, e.g., infrastructure, health, children's day-care and old age care.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
We have evaluated the effects of a pilot programme, which implied a shift towards more decentralised decision-making in active labour market policy. To be specific, the programme involved the introduction of a municipal majority in local employment service committees in parts of the country in 1996. Our econometric results, based on a large micro-data set, indicate no geographical lock-in effects of decentralisation. But we do find that decentralisation spurred local initiatives in the form of a rise in the share of participants in relief works and Objective 3 programmes with the municipality as organiser. Furthermore, targeting on outsiders, i.e., persons with low qualifications and immigrants, is in most cases more common in municipal projects than in others. Objective 3 programmes, with a traditionally large share of immigrants, is also the type of active measure that increased the most in the pilot programme regions. The above findings turned out to be robust to numerous checks. The results indicate that political reforms aiming at increasing the municipal influence over labour market policies do not lead to geographical lock-in effects, at least in the short run. However, we do not know much about the long-term effects due to the short duration of the pilot programme. A possible explanation as to why we do not find any short-run effects is that the committee members from the PES and the County Labour Boards have acted successfully against measures that could hamper mobility. According to the rules stipulated by the central government, the National Labour Market Administration should promote mobility. The PES and the County Labour Boards should act accordingly and not give undue consideration to local conditions and needs. The fact that unemployment registration is handled by the PES offices also gives them the possibility to encourage the unemployed to register themselves as interregional jobsearchers.