اقتصاد سیاسی قانون فروش بین المللی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|3162||2005||41 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||23136 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : International Review of Law and Economics, Volume 25, Issue 3, September 2005, Pages 446–486
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, or CISG, purports to harmonize the law that applies to international sales contracts. In this paper, we argue that the effort to create uniform international sales law (ISL) fails to supply contracting parties with the default terms they prefer, thus violating the normative criterion that justifies the law-making process for commercial actors in the first instance. Our argument rests on three claims. First, we contend that the process by which uniform ISL is drafted will dictate the form that many provisions take. Second, we contend that the legal form dictated by the drafting process has significant substantive consequences, particularly for the policy objectives of uniform ISL. Third, we predict that in order to achieve uniform ISL that is widely adopted, those involved in the drafting process will systematically promulgate many vague standards that contracting parties would not choose for themselves. These defaults cannot be justified as the inevitable cost of achieving an optimal level of uniformity. If the products of a uniform ISL are default terms that parties do not want, then the underlying justification for the law-making function – reduction of contracting costs – vanishes. We find significant correspondence between our predictions about the drafting of uniform international sales law and the CISG. The CISG was drafted by parties whose objectives did not necessarily coincide with those of the commercial actors whose conduct the treaty was intended to regulate. The result is a variety of vague standards and compromises that appear inconsistent with commercial interests. We conclude by suggesting that commercial actors involved in international sales would prefer to choose governing law from among legal regimes that compete to supply parties with more desirable substantive terms.
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) organized the effort to create the CISG in response to the failure of prior efforts to create widely acceptable uniform sales law.4 The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, or UNIDROIT, had previously undertaken a three-decade effort that resulted in the 1964 promulgation of two treaties, the Uniform Law for International Sales (ULIS) and the Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for International Sales (ULF). Neither attracted adoption in more than nine states, in part because the result was considered to have been dominated by European legal concepts that were not recognized elsewhere.5 UNCITRAL believed that it could increase adoptions by revising the prior treaties to reflect a more international flavor. UNCITRAL's membership was organized to ensure broad representation in drafting projects. Membership is limited to delegations from 36 states selected by the United Nations General Assembly, and is allocated along geographic lines. States from Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and “Western Europe and Others” all have membership assured under the UNCITRAL charter.6 Thus, the project of reforming the ULIS and ULF necessarily involved representation from affluent and developing countries, common law and civil law systems, and (recall that the project pre-dated democratic movements in Eastern Europe) market-based and Socialist economies.7
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
In many respects, the drafting process of the CISG exemplifies all of the problems with the creation of sales law default rules by quasi-private legislative bodies. These bodies suffer from the same deficits as ordinary legislative bodies but, in addition, lack many of the constraints on legislative behavior that mediate the product of ordinary legislatures. Where the products of this drafting process are rules governing commercial sales transactions, there is no reason to expect interest group competition to emerge and influence the process, either negatively or positively. Parties to commercial sales transactions are both buyers and sellers, and thus there is little risk that one group or class will be distributionally disadvantaged over another. But, by the same token, the absence of interest group pressure generates a legislative product that is shaped primarily by the motivations and incentives of the drafters themselves. In the case of international sales law, the incentives to maximize initial adoptions generate default rules that are formally uniform but whose substantive terms are vague and ambiguous. Commercial parties value clarity and predictability, which they can achieve in their contracts by carefully drafted combinations of bright-line rules coupled with broader standards. The promulgation of many vague default terms is inconsistent with the need to balance standards with rules. Thus, commercial parties frequently will opt-out of the CISG's vague terms. This, in turn, will undermine one of the principal goals of a uniform ISL—to reduce the legal knowledge costs associated with different rules governed by different legal regimes. In the case of the CISG, the lack of meaningful uniformity is exacerbated by the failure to create interpretive mechanisms that, over time, might have given substantive content to the vague default standards.