اندازه گیری ذهن آگاهی؟ یک آیتم تجزیه و تحلیل تئوری پاسخ از مقیاس آگاهی توجه آگاهی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|32247||2010||6 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Personality and Individual Differences, Volume 49, Issue 7, November 2010, Pages 805–810
The Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS) is one of the most popular measures of mindfulness, exhibiting promising psychometric properties and theoretically consistent relationships to brain activity, mindfulness-based intervention (MBI) outcomes, and mediation of MBI effects. The present study investigated the response patterns and scale properties in a large sample of undergraduate students (N = 414) using Item Response Theory analyses. The findings suggest that general statements of “automatic inattentiveness” or “automatic pilot” confer greater statistical information about the underlying latent trait. Evidence of limited abilities to report on mindlessness and of response bias to “mindfulness-absent” items suggests challenges to the construct validity of the MAAS. The current findings, along with pre-existing data, suggest that reverse-scoring the scale may be inadequate to represent intentional attention or awareness. Further research is needed to determine which variations, components, and correlates of the numerous operationalizations of mindfulness are theoretically consistent and most salient to positive outcomes, especially in psychopathology.
Mindfulness has become an increasingly popular construct with diverse clinical and scientific applications (Bishop et al., 2004). Despite efforts at achieving operational definitions and corresponding measurement, disagreement seems the rule rather than the exception (see Psychological Inquiry, 2007, Vol. 18, 4). Traditionally, mindfulness involves the active engagement of cognitive-perceptual processes manifest in two broad phases. “The initial phase of mindfulness is the cultivation of sustained bare attention resulting from the practice of non-forgetful attention, followed by… introspective awareness to understand the moment to moment workings of adaptive and maladaptive thoughts and feelings” ( Rapgay & Bystrisky, 2009, pp. 153–154). Clinical scientists have attempted to define mindfulness in a way that makes the construct amenable to training and measurement. Bishop and colleagues (2004) provided one of the most integrative and theoretically consistent definitions of the construct. The first component involves the self-regulation of attention so that it is maintained on immediate experience, thereby allowing for increased recognition of mental events in the present moment. The second component involves adopting a particular orientation towards one’s experiences in the present moment, an orientation that is characterized by curiosity, openness, and acceptance (Bishop et al., 2004, p. 232). Some have argued that even this elaborate definition fails to represent the true character of mindfulness and has lead to miscomprehension of how mindfulness is developed (Leary and Tate, 2007 and Rosch, 2007). Rapgay and Bystrisky (2009) emphasize that mindfulness is an active skill developed by a combination of concentrative and analytical insight-based meditation practices. They also provide an important distinction between attention (a particular cognitive faculty) and awareness (a directable, but broader aspect of consciousness) stating that mindfulness practice entails “…the ability to flexibly apportion…between primary attention to the foreground and secondary awareness to the background…” (p. 155). There is also debate about therapies related to the construct (e.g., Hofmann & Asmundson, 2008). While many treatments claim a theoretical reliance on mindfulness, the construct has been defined and applied inconsistently (Kabat-Zinn, 2003). Some definitions are based on the Buddhist path towards well-being (e.g., Kabat-Zinn, 1990) while others rely on a reductionist notion of mindfulness (see Hofmann and Asmundson (2008)). Despite theoretical variations, MBIs have been shown to be efficacious treatments for physical and psychological symptoms and conditions (Grossman et al., 2004 and Hofmann et al., 2010). MBIs often improve health and stress, but change self-reported mindfulness inconsistently (Grossman, 2008). Dramatic variations in operationalizations of mindfulness have led some to question whether scales of “mindfulness” measure the same construct (Rosch, 2007). Grossman (2008) emphasized several concerns with self-reported mindfulness, including issues of scale construction, potential bias, and item miscomprehension (see also Van Dam, Earleywine, and Danoff-Burg (2009)). Interrelationships among scales purportedly assessing state versus trait mindfulness (e.g., Thompson & Waltz, 2007), as well as behavioral versus self-report mindfulness and predicted outcomes (Frewen, Evans, Maraj, Dozois, & Partridge, 2008) have been inconsistent. Recent evaluation of two of the most popular self-report measures across a Thai and US sample exhibited serious psychometric complications, including no latent mean difference between groups on the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003) despite large differences in meditation and endorsement of Buddhist ideology (Christopher, Charoensuk, Gilbert, Neary, & Pearce, 2009). Further, a recent examination of meditators and non-meditators on the Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ; Baer, Smith, Hopkins, Krietemeyer, & Toney, 2006) showed large differential item functioning (Van Dam et al., 2009). While self-report mindfulness scales often have well-established nomothetic span (appropriate correlations with related and unrelated construct measures), they lack construct representationalism (psychological processes underlying responses to a task), an important component of establishing construct validity (Strauss & Smith, 2009). The MAAS (Brown & Ryan, 2003) is a possible exception to the construct representation problem, with a specific cognitive theory related to scale development. Brown and Ryan (2003) specifically chose items representing mindlessness because “…states reflecting less mindlessness are likely more accessible to most individuals, given that mindless states are much more common than mindful states…” (p. 826). The MAAS has also shown theoretically consistent relationships to brain activity (e.g., Creswell, Way, Eisenberger, & Lieberman, 2007), treatment outcome in MBIs (e.g., Michalak, Heidenreich, Meibert, & Schulte, 2008), mediation of targeted MBI outcomes (e.g., Nykliček & Kuijpers, 2008), and salutary non-targeted benefits resulting from MBIs ( Frewen et al., 2008). The MAAS has a strongly supported unidimensional factor structure and good nomothetic span (e.g., Brown and Ryan, 2003 and MacKillop and Anderson, 2007), making it a seemingly good candidate to represent mindfulness. Unfortunately, the assumption regarding the accessibility of mindless states is challenged by empirical investigation in cognitive neuroscience. Recent studies in meta-awareness and attention suggest that mind wandering (typically a mindless state) is associated with a lack of meta-awareness (awareness that one is not aware). Further, attention is decoupled from task engagement during a mind-wandering episode (Smallwood, McSpadden, & Schooler, 2007). These findings suggest that one’s ability to accurately report about mindless states may be limited without specific training. Lack of meta-awareness regarding mindless states (or mindfulness-absent states) suggests that responses on the MAAS are likely not the result of the proposed cognitive process. Further, a recent examination of mindfulness-absent items on the FFMQ suggests a general response bias to reject items suggesting higher prevalence of mindlessness ( Van Dam et al., 2009), revealing construct-inconsistent response processes.