اقتصاد سیاسی مقررات تشویقی : نظریه و شواهد به دست آمده از ایالات آمریکا
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|3268||2013||17 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||12240 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Comparative Economics, Volume 41, Issue 1, February 2013, Pages 91–107
The determinants of incentive regulation are an important issue in economics. More powerful rules relax allocative distortions at the cost of lower rent extraction. Hence, they should be found where the reformer is more concerned with stimulating investments by granting higher expected profits, and where rent extraction is less necessary since the extent of information asymmetries is more limited. This prediction is consistent with US power market data. During the 1990s, performance based contracts were signed by firms operating in states where generation costs were historically higher than those characterizing neighboring markets and the regulator had stronger incentives to exert information-gathering effort because elected instead of being appointed.