ذهنیت در اضطراب اجتماعی: یک نگاه جدید در پردازش اطلاعات انتخابی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|32715||2002||12 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, Volume 33, Issue 2, June 2002, Pages 103–114
According to the Rubicon Model of Action Phases (in: J. Gollwitzer, 1996) , Motivation, volition, and action, Enzyclopedia of psychology, series “motivation and emotion”, Vol. 4, Hogrefe, Göttingen, 1996, pp. 531–582), different stages in goal pursuit are accompanied by different mindsets that enhance processing of mindset-congruous information. Before people engage in action, they usually deliberate possible goals for a given situation (deliberative mindset). Once a goal is chosen, they plan how to achieve this particular goal (implemental mindset). The present experiments tested the hypothesis that people with social anxiety show a reversal of mindsets when approaching social situations. In Experiment 1, 20 students were asked to either deliberate goals for a hypothetical social conflict (deliberation), or to think about steps to solve the conflict (implementation). An unexpected recognition test demonstrated different recognition memory for deliberation-related versus implementation-related information in the two groups, consistent with the hypothesis of different mindsets. In Experiment 2, 48 students who were either high or low in social anxiety were randomly assigned to either the deliberation or the implementation condition. Participants high in social anxiety showed a pattern in the recognition test that was consistent with a reversal of mindsets. When asked to plan social situations, they showed an inappropriate deliberative mindset. In contrast, they lacked a deliberative mindset when deliberating goals for the social situation. The result indicate that socially anxious people engage in information processing that interferes with successful goal attainment when approaching social situations.
Recent models of social phobia assume that biases in information processing play a major role in the maintenance of the disorder (e.g., Clark & Wells, 1995; Hartman, 1983; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997; Schlenker & Leary, 1982). In line with these cognitive models, research has shown that social phobics interpret social events in an excessively negative fashion (for a review see Heinrichs & Hofmann, 2001), and that they show enhanced self-focused attention when anxious, as well as reduced processing of external social cues (Mansell, Clark, Ehlers, & Chen, 1999; Chen, Ehlers, Clark, & Mansell, 2002). Their (reduced) processing of external social cues is biased in favour of detection and recall of cues that could be interpreted as signs of disapproval from others (Gilboa-Schechtmann, Foa, & Amir, 1999; Veljaca & Rapee, 1998). All of these information processing biases contribute to the patients’ impression that they come across badly in social interactions, and thus increase their anxiety. Leary and colleagues (Schlenker & Leary, 1982; Leary & Kowalski, 1995) have pointed out that the impression that one comes across badly in social situations does not necessarily lead to anxiety. Social anxiety only occurs if individuals do not feel able to attain their goals in a social situation. Several models of social phobia have stated that anxiety is triggered when social phobics wish to convey a favourable impression on others but are markedly insecure about their ability to do so (e.g., Clark & Wells, 1995; Trower & Gilbert, 1989). Thus, it appears that the goals people set themselves in social situations are crucial for understanding social anxiety. They may determine how information is processed in social situations. Although the effects of goal-setting on information processing have been well researched in experimental psychology under the umbrella of action theory research (e.g., Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996), this approach has not yet been applied to social anxiety. While cognitive models focus on selective attention for threat-related information and the consequences for the judgment and recollection of social situations (e.g. Mellings & Alden, 2000), action theory emphasizes cognitive processes relevant for successful goal attainment. The goal one is trying to achieve not only defines the demands one has to meet within the course of action, but it also influences cognition, affect and behaviour in a specific way. The aim of the present study was to investigate how goal setting in social anxiety affects self-regulation in feared social situations, focusing on its impact on information processing. The research methods were derived from the Rubicon Model of Action Phases (Heckhausen (1991) and Gollwitzer (1996); Heckhausen, 1991) that describes the consequences of goal setting on information processing within the course of action. The Rubicon Model distinguishes four action phases during goal pursuit. First, in the predecisional phase, people deliberate what potential goals and finally choose one as the basis for future action (intention formation). Second, in the preactional phase they form a plan for how to achieve the intention in the given situation. Third, in the actional phase, the plan is put into action. Fourth, in the postactional phase, the outcomes of the actions are evaluated. Each of the four phases is accompanied by specific mindsets that facilitate the processing of certain types of information and are thought to facilitate successful goal attainment. Most importantly, the first two phases are characterized by different mindsets. The predecisional phase is characterised by a deliberative mindset. Processing of information about the desirability and feasibility of the various goals and an impartial comparison are facilitated. In contrast, the preactional phase is characterised by an implemental mindset. Information about the desirability and feasibility of the chosen goal is now processed preferentially, in a partial and optimistic manner. The mindset hypotheses have been well supported empirically in several studies (e.g., Gollwitzer & Bayer, 1999). To assess mindsets, participants are asked either: (a) to deliberate certain goals, corresponding to the predecisional phase that would normally be accompanied by a deliberative mindset or (b) to plan the implementation of a goal, corresponding to the preactional phase that would normally be accompanied by an implemental mindset. Mindsets are measured by assessing cued recognition memory for deliberation-related versus implementation-related information. This paradigm has not yet been applied to situations that create social anxiety. In the present paper, we explore the idea that people with social anxiety may differ from other people in that they may show a reversal of mindsets when approaching social situations. First, when confronted with a social situation, they may cut the predecisional phase short. Socially anxious people may set themselves the goal to convey a particularly favourable impression by default, without deliberating the desirability and feasibility of this goal. They may thus enter the preactional phase and the associated implemental mindset right away. However, as they also believe that they are unable to achieve this goal, anxiety is increased. The implemental mindset will not be sufficient to maintain an optimistic and partial information processing bias so that the individual becomes focused on his/her inadequacy. This will then activate other goals such as the wish to avoid immediately impending danger (e.g., saying something stupid or spilling the soup) by safety behaviours (Clark & Wells, 1995). The competing goals will then bring on a deliberative mindset in the preactional phase, which is inappropriate. Deliberating the pros and cons of competing goals at this point causes doubts and insecurity instead of an optimistic trust in one's ability. Deliberating different goals in the preactional phase could only be helpful if it lead the individual to choosing a goal that is tailored to the needs of the situation. In socially anxious people, the competing goals are likely to focus on avoidance or safety behaviour, with the effect of further increasing insecurity and anxiety. The present experiments explore the idea of a reversal of mindsets in socially anxious people using an experimental design that builds on the experiments by Gollwitzer and colleagues (e.g. Gollwitzer, 1991). Participants had to be confronted with an imaginary social situation that could potentially induce social anxiety. The goal of Experiment 1 was to demonstrate that different mindsets can be induced by asking participants to deliberate or plan such hypothetical social situations. In Experiment 2 we tested the hypothesis of mindset reversal in socially anxious versus non-anxious people.