تاثیر نوع دوستی و حسادت بر رفتار رقابتی و رضایتمندی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|32955||2001||13 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : International Journal of Research in Marketing, Volume 18, Issues 1–2, June 2001, Pages 5–17
This paper argues that it is important to include the other party's payoff in a competitor's utility (satisfaction) function. Examples of the impact are provided as well as implications for multi-stage games (competitions). A sample of 200 provides empirical support for the critical role other party results play in satisfaction, in particular the importance of relative payoffs. Several implications emerge, including a parsimonious explanation for the exponential pattern of shares in mature markets.
The mere mention of the word competition brings to mind battles where one person's gain can only come at the expense of the other's. Of course, zero-sum thinking is not a requirement, as phrases like coopetition suggest. Still, the primary model of bargaining is of zero-sum games. Further, parties are typically assumed to place no weight on the outcome the other party receives except for (a) that necessary to keep the party in the current or future negotiations or (b) some (usually minimal) concern about fairness. Yet there are a number of reasons why a party might positively (e.g., friendship, charity) or negatively (e.g., war) value outcomes received by other parties. In this paper we refer to positively valuing the other's payoff as altruism and negatively valuing it as envy. While we provide some evidence as to their existence, the main purpose of this paper is to explore the impacts of altruism and envy on bargaining outcomes. Work exploring the impact of others' welfare on own preferences has begun to appear in many fields including marketing (Corfman and Lehmann, 1993) and economics Rabin, 1991 and Levine, 1996. Essentially, these approaches expand the valuation function to include both own and other's payoffs. In this paper, we explicitly include other parties' payoffs in a party's own value function, expanding on Assunção and Lehmann (1992). We then examine the impact of doing so for particular functions. The focus here is on the consequences of this type of utility function; we leave process issues and the comparison of different models of this type to future work. We demonstrate how relatively small amounts of altruism or envy can substantially affect the outcomes. One interesting consequence is that, under certain conditions, the model suggests side agreements may develop where one party freely gives the other payoffs not contained in the original scope of the negotiations. Another implication of a simple extension of the model is an explanation for the distribution of shares according to Zipf's Law.