ارزیابی شناختی مرتبط با صفت خشم بالا
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|33256||2001||15 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Personality and Individual Differences, Volume 30, Issue 1, 5 January 2001, Pages 31–45
This study compares the cognitive processes of high and low trait anger individuals in terms of the appraisal components and core relational theme of blame identified in the Smith and Lazarus (1993) appraisal theory. Participants were asked to rate two social interaction scenarios, both of which resulted in negative consequences. The intent of the antagonist in the video was varied, as was the cognitive load of the participants. High trait individuals blamed the antagonist more, more readily identified another person as an antagonist, more readily identified circumstances as being of relevance to their own interests, and responded more angrily to the same events, than low trait anger individuals. These appraisal biases are more marked for high trait anger individuals when there is some ambiguity as to the deliberateness of the provoking event. Cognitive load did not affect appraisals. The implications of these findings for therapeutic interventions are discussed.
The emotion of anger has been the subject of increasing theoretical analysis and clinical application in the last 15 years, but the empirical literature investigating the nature of anger remains relatively scant. At the same time, the clinical application of theoretical models of anger has burgeoned, arguably at a faster rate than the fundamental research required to support such an application. Meta-analytic (Edmondson and Conger, 1996 and Beck and Fernandez, 1998) and narrative (Howells, 1998 and Novaco, 1997) reviews of the effectiveness of anger management treatments have suggested that such methods are promising in reducing problematic anger, though a number of obstacles to intervention, particularly with more severely disturbed clients, (Novaco, 1997, Howells et al., 1997 and Howells, 1998) have been identified. Clinical applications are likely to be predominantly directed at individuals with high trait anger (Deffenbacher et al., 1996). Such people have, typically, engaged in problematic behaviour (aggression, domestic violence etc) or experienced distress or illness as a consequence of their high level of trait anger. In principle, excessively low anger levels of trait anger (‘overcontrol’) might also be targetted in anger management, but few, if any, outcome studies have been reported with this group. High trait anger, therefore, in practice, is a precondition for consideration for clinical intervention. It follows that a key task is to determine the nature of, and contributory factors for, high trait anger. Studies of the antecedents for state anger in response to a provocation (for example, Ellis, Howells & Day, 2000) may provide a guide to what factors distinguish high and low trait anger individuals, but they do not demonstrate conclusively that these factors are important. For example, high physiological arousal may be an important antecedent for the state experience of high anger, but it does not necessarily follow that high and low trait anger individuals differ in their level of physiological arousal. 1.1. Appraisals and anger Appraisal is a central concept in current emotion theory (Frijda, 1993a and Frijda, 1993b). The link between perception and emotion is thought to be an appraisal: an evaluation of the significance of the change in relation to the person (Smith & Ellsworth, 1987). Appraisals are considered to take place immediately prior to, and to determine the subsequent emotion (Sonnemans and Frijda, 1995 and Reisenzein and Hofmann, 1993). Smith and Lazarus (1993) identify appraisals at the individual component level, and at a molar level that combines individual appraisal components into a summary dimension of a core relational theme. The individual components are primary appraisals (motivational relevance and motivational congruence), which are concerned with how the encounter is relevant to the person’s well-being, and secondary appraisals (accountability, either self or other, problem focused coping potential, emotion focused coping potential and future expectancy). Smith and Lazarus (1993) propose that anger elicitation is related to a reduction in motivational congruence, an increase in motivational relevance and an increase in other-accountability. The core relational theme of anger is regarded as other-blame. Blame combines the primary appraisals of increased motivational relevance and reduced motivational congruence with the secondary appraisals of other-accountability. Lazarus (1993), (postscript, in Smith & Lazarus, 1993), later refined the model to include the role of ego involvement in the maintenance of self-esteem (Tangney et al., 1992 and Baumeister et al., 1996) and high coping potential in anger elicitation. 1.2. High and low trait anger and anger intensity In a series of studies, Deffenbacher et al. (1996) were able to differentiate between individuals who experienced high trait anger or anger-proneness on a number of anger characteristics. Whilst high and low anger individuals did not differ in the range of provocative situations that they encountered, high trait anger individuals tended to report ‘more anger in every type of situation’ (p.137). For the purposes of the present study, it was predicted that high trait anger subjects would show greater cognitive biases on the core relational theme of blame and the appraisal components identified by Smith and Lazarus (1993) than would low anger subjects. They are also expected to rate higher on coping potential as indicated by Lazarus (1993). 1.3. Anger and intent of provocation Copello and Tata (1990) reported that while an offender group tended to ascribe threatening interpretations to ambiguous sentences, a non-offender group tended to offer neutral interpretations. The work of Dodge and colleagues (Dodge, 1993, Dodge and Schwartz, 1997, Dodge and Coie, 1987, Dodge and Crick, 1990 and Dodge et al., 1990), conducted with children and juveniles with conduct disorders, suggests that angry forms of aggression may relate to biased attributions of intent. There is a need to assess similar attributional biases in ‘normal’ adults who vary in their level of trait anger. One difference between high and low trait anger groups may lie in a cognitive bias in response to ambiguous provocations. Not all individuals may be sensitive to the cues that differentiate ambiguous from deliberate provocations (Copello & Tata, 1990). A second aim of this study is to investigate whether anger is more likely to be elicited in a high trait anger group when the intent of an anger provoking incident is ambiguous. 1.4. Cognitive load and emotion A third area of investigation relates to the impact of cognitive load on anger arousal. There has been some debate about the role of conscious appraisal activity in the generation of emotion. Research by Smith and Lazarus (1993), Roseman, Antoniou and Jose (1996), and Sonnemans and Frijda (1995) has suggested that at least some part of the cognitive appraisal process is a conscious activity. Gilbert and Hixon (1991) distinguished conscious and automatic processes by means of varying the cognitive busyness of experiment participants. Subjects who were subjected to cognitive busyness while watching videos were no less likely to perform the tasks, but were less likely to activate stereotypes. A study on the effects of rumination and distraction on angry mood by Rusting and Nolen-Hoeksema (1998) suggested that whilst rumination increased anger, distraction either decreased anger or had no effect. In the current study it is predicted that a cognitive load (distraction) will interfere with the conscious appraisal of provoking events leading to reduced anger arousal. 1.5. Overview of the study The aim of this study was to use the appraisal components and core relational theme of blame as identified in the Smith and Lazarus (1993) appraisal theory, to compare cognitive processes of high and low trait anger individuals. The study aims to examine the following four hypotheses: 1. That high trait anger individuals will respond with more intense state anger to a provoking event. 2. That high and low trait anger individuals differ in their appraisals of a provoking event. 3. That the relatively higher state anger responses and the angry cognitions of high trait subjects will be most marked under conditions of ambiguity of intent on the part of the provoking agent. This amounts to the prediction of an interaction between trait anger and ambiguity of intent in determining state anger levels and angry cognitions. 4. That for both high and low trait anger individuals, cognitive load, provided by a rehearsal activity while watching an anger eliciting video, will result in reduced anger arousal when compared with no cognitive load. Reduction in anger arousal will be more pronounced for high trait anger individuals (an interaction between trait anger and cognitive load).
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
High trait individuals blame the antagonist more, more readily identify another person as an antagonist, more readily identify negative events as being of relevance to their own interests, and respond more angrily to the same events, than do low trait anger individuals. These appraisal biases are more marked for high trait anger individuals when there is some ambiguity as to the deliberateness of the provoking event. These findings confirm the relevance of cognitive-behavioural and similar therapies in the treatment of anger problems. The high trait anger person shows biases in the appraisal and evaluation of social events as suggested by Novaco and Welsh (1989), and these need to be addressed therapeutically. The blaming of other, for bad events, for example, and judgment that their negative behaviour was intended are amenable to cognitive treatment methods (Deffenbacher, 1999; Howells, 1998) which encourage the client to generate alternative appraisals and inferences to test habitual cognitions against the evidence.