چالش و تهدید پاسخ به ارتباطات خشم در شکل گیری ائتلاف
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|33448||2013||8 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Economic Psychology, Volume 38, October 2013, Pages 50–57
Research on multiparty negotiation has investigated how parties form coalitions to secure payoffs but has not assessed the underlying self-regulatory and physiological principles. Integrating insights from research on the social functions of emotions and the bio-psychosocial model as proposed by Blascovich and colleagues, we assessed threat and challenge responses to anger communication in a three-player coalition setting. Depending on condition, participants were confronted with an angry message from either their initially-preferred coalition partner or from both their preferred and not-preferred coalition partner. Results showed that this manipulation had an impact on the cardiovascular (CV) response of participants and their subsequent behavior. In the “preferred player angry” condition participants displayed a CV-pattern indicative of challenge while in the “all player angry” condition participants displayed a CV-pattern indicative of threat. Moreover, compared to threatened participants, challenged participants were more likely to switch coalition partner. We discuss the implications of these results for theorizing on emotions, coalition formation, and the BPSM.
Negotiation is a useful and often non-violent way to resolve conflict. It can be defined as the process in which two or more parties try to resolve a (perceived) divergence of interest by exchanging offers and counter offers (Lewicki, Saunders, & Barry, 2006). When two parties negotiate, they face the difficult task of reaching an agreement; they may succeed, or may fail. When three parties negotiate it becomes more complex. Now, two parties may reach an agreement whereas the third party may not be included in the deal. This process of coalition formation is what is central in the current paper. We draw attention to the fact that negotiation is often a heated process which may give rise to intense negative emotions (Allred, 1999) and test how coalition bargainers respond to anger (Van Beest, Van Kleef, & Van Dijk, 2008). We build on prior research that has addressed the interpersonal effects of anger in negotiation (for review see Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2010), but note that this research has overlooked the precise self-regulatory processes that are caused by anger. More specifically, by integrating negotiation research with principles derived from the biopsychosocial model (BPSM; Blascovich, 2008a and Blascovich, 2008b), we examine how angry messages from potential coalition partners induce cardiovascular indices of challenge or threat motivational states, and how these states affect the decision to form a specific coalition.