فراشناخت و ذهن خوانی: قضاوت ها در مورد یادگیری برای خود و دیگری در طول مطالعه خود گام
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|34679||2010||14 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||11395 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Consciousness and Cognition, Volume 19, Issue 1, March 2010, Pages 251–264
The relationship between metacognition and mindreading was investigated by comparing the monitoring of one’s own learning (Self) and another person’s learning (Other). Previous studies indicated that in self-paced study judgments of learning (JOLs) for oneself are inversely related to the amount of study time (ST) invested in each item. This suggested reliance on the memorizing-effort heuristic that shorter ST is diagnostic of better recall. In this study although an inverse ST–JOL relationship was observed for Self, it was found for Other only when the Other condition followed the Self condition. The results were interpreted in terms of the proposal that the processes underlying experience-based metacognitive judgments are largely unconscious. However, participants can derive insight from observing themselves as they monitor their own learning, and transfer that insight to Other, thus exhibiting a shift from experience-based to theory-based judgments. Although different processes mediate metacognition and mindreading, metacognition can inform mindreading.
There has been extensive research and discussion in both philosophy and psychology on the processes underlying the knowledge of other minds. The ability to infer another person’s mental state has been assumed to represent a basic social capability that enables explaining and predicting the behavior of others (Barr & Keysar, 2005). One of the central issues concerns the relationship between metacognition – knowing one’s mind – and mindreading – understanding other minds (Carruthers, 2009 and Dimaggio et al., 2008). The present study explores this question in a circumscribed area of research – the monitoring of learning during the study of new materials. In many situations in everyday life people need to monitor their own learning and comprehension of the studied material (metacognition). In other conditions, however, they must also monitor the learning and understanding of another person (mindreading). Sometimes, as in a conversation involving several people, each of them engages in both types of monitoring, often “reading” different clues that disclose others’ metacognitive states (Brennan and Williams, 1995 and Koriat et al., 1991). We examined the question whether the processes underlying this ability are the same as those engaged in the on-line monitoring of one’s own learning.