قیمت گذاری حمل و نقل و مشارکت بخش دولتی ـ خصوصی در تئوری : مسائل و پیشنهادات
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|3516||2010||9 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||8447 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Research in Transportation Economics, Volume 30, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 6–14
This chapter offers a theoretical examination of the following questions: what are the issues that arise when Social Marginal Cost Pricing is to be incorporated in Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs); and how may these issues be dealt with? We first briefly discuss Public-Private Partnerships in transport: what are the defining characteristics and what are the main types that exist in the different modes of transport? Next we consider the economics of Public-Private Partnerships, in particular from the viewpoint of incentives. Subsequently we identify and examine the issues that arise when Social Marginal Cost Pricing is to be incorporated in PPPs as a regulation with regard to pricing in the transport sector. Lastly, we investigate the possibilities of resolving these issues.
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) have become a much favoured way of introducing private capital into transport projects whilst maintaining an element of public interest. This chapter considers the potential conflicts that might arise between the freedom of the private operator within a PPP and other elements of the public sector’s transport policy. Specifically it tackles the question of the problems that might arise when the public sector wishes to implement Social Marginal Cost Pricing (SMCP) as a form of transport pricing, which might appear to limit the freedom of the private interest to maximise its value from the PPP according to the contract. In this chapter we demonstrate theoretically the potential inconsistencies between such policies and suggest ways in which they may be overcome. In Section 2 we begin with a discussion on Public-Private Partnerships in transport: their defining characteristics and the main types that exist in the different modes of transport, In Section 3 we consider the performance drivers that are important within PPP-contacts: the elements within the PPP-contract that produce ‘value-for-money’ and how they do this. After a brief introduction to Social Marginal Cost Pricing, this informs an analysis of potential problems that may arise when trying to incorporate SMCP within a PPP-contract in Section 4. Section 5 examines possible solutions to the issues identified in Section 4. Section 6 presents our main conclusions.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
Incorporating SMCP in PPPs, may give rise to a number of issues: insufficient revenues to cover long run average costs, but also perverse effects on the performance drivers of PPPs. In this latter category, implementing SMCP may mean additional risks, because of changes in the external cost components that make up the SMCP, and non-linear, unpredictable effects on revenues when the number of users increases or decreases. In addition, perverse incentives may work on the private operator as it may be tempted to favour users with high external costs, keeping external costs artificially high, or avoiding to invest in capacity expansion. For PPPs in road, railway and inland waterways, a PPP-model in which the income from charges and reward for provision are separated (i.e. the operated receives performance based payments from the government), is in most cases the best option to avoid these issues, when SMCP is to be introduced. However, also in that case each PPP-contract should be designed to take the specific circumstances into account: e.g. some part of performance can be tied to actual usage to reflect the influence the private party may still have over traffic, or the cost components (maintenance) that are tied directly to demand. For PPPs related to the operation of port and airports however performance based contracts seem a less attractive option, and a better option is to harmonise competition and regulation policies for ports and airports for the European Union to attain the most important goals behind Social Marginal Cost Pricing: a level playing field within and between the modes of transport, and internalisation of external costs. For public transport services, integrating SMCP into the PPP-contract seems the best alternative, supplementing revenues with subsidies in case cost recovery is not achieved. This is not much different from current practice, in which additional subsidies are already supplied through Public Service Obligations. Again, adequate incentives need to be supplied in the contract to offset possible perverse incentives.