قراردادهای طولانی اشتراک گذاری ریسک بلندمدت به عنوان یک رویکرد برای ایجاد مشارکت های دولتی و خصوصی برای سرمایه گذاری در نسل بعدی شبکه های دسترسی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|3529||2010||12 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Telecommunications Policy, Volume 34, Issue 9, October 2010, Pages 528–539
This paper develops an investment/pricing model for the deployment of basic broadband networks which, along with other applications, is applicable to public–private partnership projects. In particular, a new investment model is suggested to be used for finance deployment over a longer term by enabling both private and public investors to participate in the roll-out of next generation access (NGA) infrastructure. This so-called “long-term risk sharing concept” has several notable benefits compared with the traditional regulatory approach. Above all, the model enables both private operators and public authorities to share the risk of investing in NGA infrastructure. Thus the model offers a way for public authorities to achieve a timely and countrywide roll-out of NGA networks, including in areas where NGA investment would otherwise not occur.
The telecommunications sector is at the beginning of a new era. The roll-out of new access networks, so called next generation access (NGA) networks is driven by technological developments and increasing demand for high speed broadband services. For the first time numerous operators compete with each other right from the beginning in the building of such infrastructure (Pupillo, 2008). Yet, although the issue of NGA network roll-out is on the agenda for some years, in many countries investment in NGAs is so far rather limited. While former incumbents originally proposed huge investments in the roll-out of broadband infrastructure,2 they have recently become very cautious. In some countries operators are only now in the planning process of deploying fibre in their access networks. The reasons for this are manifold, one of them being that in many areas the deployment of an NGA network is just not profitable.3 It is for this reason that governments and/or local authorities increasingly subsidise new networks or participate in public–private partnerships (PPP) for the deployment of NGA broadband infrastructure.4 Examples of public–private partnerships could be public services or public utilities which regularly replace their electric wires or their gas pipes which enables them to deploy fibre infrastructure at the same time on low cost levels. A key feature of such PPP-projects is that the funding of a project in a pre-defined geographical area occurs from the private and the public sector, thus distributing the investment risk between both parties. Thereby the role of the public partner can either be to construct and manage a publicly owned NGA infrastructure or to financially support the construction of a privately owned NGA network.5 The advantage of such projects is that the public partner can define the objectives to be attained in terms of public interest, while at the same time benefiting from the private sector’s management and operational experience. Yet, when granting state funds public authorities must adhere to the European and national state aid regulations with regard to funding local infrastructures (Gómez-Barroso & Feijóo, 2009, p. 8). In particular, it must be ensured that state aid does neither undermine the incentives of market operators to invest in broadband in the first place nor distort competition between different operators. In this paper an investment-pricing model for the deployment of basic broadband networks is developed which is applicable to PPP-projects. In particular, a new investment model is suggested to be used to finance deployment over a longer term by enabling both private and public investors to participate in the roll-out of NGA infrastructure. This so-called “long-term risk-sharing concept” (LTRSC) has several notable benefits compared to the traditional regulatory approach, where contract durations are usually restricted and wholesale rates are regulated on a cost basis. Above all, the model enables both private operators and public authorities to share the risk of investing in NGA infrastructure. Thereby the model offers a way for public authorities to achieve a timely and countrywide roll-out of NGA networks, also in areas where NGA investment would otherwise not occur. The paper is organised as follows: the first section explains the challenges of public–private partnerships for NGA networks. Thereby the requirements to be met in order for state aid to be in line with EU legislation are laid down. Assuming that in certain areas the establishment of a NGA infrastructure will not take place without public financial support it is argued that long-term risk-sharing contracts are an effective approach to address this problem. The main section elaborates the concept of “long-term risk-sharing contracts”. Starting with an outline of requirements to be met by long-term risk-sharing contracts, a pricing model for such contracts is developed. The model uses an example for calculating the price and the duration of such contracts. In the final section it will be shown that the model not only meets the requirements for public funding at the European level, it also meets the objectives of creating an investment-friendly environment for NGA roll-out and ensuring competitive telecom markets under public–private partnerships.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
Market uncertainty in terms of demand for higher bandwidth, willingness to pay and alternative infrastructure development combined with regulatory uncertainty regarding future wholesale and retail regulation negatively affect private investment decisions as to future NGA infrastructure. Especially local authorities from rural areas fear that they will be left behind. Given the reluctance of private investors to roll-out NGA infrastructure in less densely populated areas effective ways have to be discussed in which governments can encourage next-generation access (NGA) network roll-out. One such way is to fund and operate NGA Infrastructure projects through a partnership of government and private telecom operators. Long-term risk-sharing contracts with long-term and short-term prices for NGA investments are an appropriate approach for such partnerships. In view of the objective of encouraging investment the openness to all potential investors – private and public – ensures the highest possible investment incentive in line with socially desirable outcomes. Contract revenues would account for (the specific systematic) risk in the NGA at the time of deployment and this risk would be shared (pooled) across a variety of stakeholders, thus resembling risk-sharing in the case where the investments in the NGA was undertaken cooperatively. Moreover, the model allows competition to evolve not only at the retail level but also at the wholesale level. The model is also compatible with the State aid rules of the Treaty of the European Union that support the deployment of NGA networks in areas where no broadband infrastructure currently exists or for areas where existing broadband operators consider it unprofitable to deploy NGA networks. Based on forecasts as to demand and perceived values of the wholesale services six steps are applied. The calculation results in service-specific prices for long-term and short-term contracts. The service-specific short-term contract prices are decreasing over time because the corresponding number of active lines is increasing. The average service-specific long-term contract prices are constant within the contract duration and reflect – if upfront payments are annualized – the perceived values of the corresponding wholesale services. The proposed long-term risk-sharing model does have some notable benefits compared to the traditional regulatory approach, under which only risk-free short-term contracts are allowed. The approach effectively addresses the particularities of NGA networks by taking into account the option value of the non-investor and making possible penetration pricing strategies without running into margin squeeze problems. Moreover, the concept is able to achieve a symmetric distribution of loss during the penetration phase, and allows (retail) pricing flexibility for a faster recovery of the investment costs. By allowing also for value-based pricing of wholesale access services the transmission of willingness to pay to the wholesale level generates additional incentives for a market driven fibre roll-out. Last but not least, in terms of feasibility, long-term risk-sharing contracts can be relatively easily implemented and are able to react flexibly to changing market and/or regulatory conditions.