احمق های احساساتی: نقد مفهوم آمارتیا سن از تعهد
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|36541||1999||14 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Volume 40, Issue 4, December 1999, Pages 373–386
Commitment is problematic because one sometimes pursues it against one’s interest. To solve it, the paper proposes a distinction between ‘non-binding’ and ‘binding’ commitments. Non-binding commitment is about ambition, such as becoming a great chef, which bolsters welfare in the pecuniary sense as well as self-respect. In contrast, ‘binding commitment’ is about honesty. While it diminishes welfare, it augments self-integrity. The neoclassical view reduces both commitments to interest, while the multiple-self approach separates both commitments from interest. The separation permits the confusion of sentimental fools, who enter commitments without regard to interest, with rational sentimentalists, who take interest into consideration.
Given that commitment appears to negate interest, some theorists, such as Amartya Sen, propose that agents have conflicting selves. Defenders of the standard approach, on the other hand, deny the existence of the problem; they simply regard commitment as an ordinary preference stemming from a unitary self. While this paper recognizes the phenomenon of commitment as a problem, it tries to solve it without appealing to the multiple-self view. It does so by distinguishing two kinds of commitment and how each relates differently to interest–a necessary distinction to discern admirable acts from sentimental foolishness. Let us start with three kinds of preferences, which may overlap, facing the self (S): Situation 1:S decides to enter a training program in the culinary art of French cuisine because the going wage rate for chefs, given the cost of training and the responsibility of the job, is more attractive than other options. Situation 2: In addition to Situation 1, S has been impressed by the creative art involved in French cooking. He takes on a commitment to try to become the best chef in the city. Situation 3: In addition to Situation 2, S takes on the commitment to be truthful. In specific, he prepares, in light of his advertisement, dishes made only from fresh ingredients, even when the pecuniary benefit from a cheating strategy is unambiguously greater than expected pecuniary cost resulting possibly from a tarnished market reputation. Situation 1 involves what I call ‘substantive interest’, pecuniary calculation. Situation 2 consists of ‘non-binding commitment’ because the promise cannot be obligatory given that the agent is uncertain whether he can fulfill it. Situation 3 entails ‘binding commitment’ because the agent is certain that he can meet his obligation. The agent fulfills his binding commitment to enjoy self-integrity. If he fulfills it exclusively out of substantive calculation concerning penalty, it would fail to generate the sense of self-integrity. While Situation 2 advances substantive preference, Situation 3 by definition reduces it. Nonetheless, both kinds of commitment satisfy a sense of selfhood, dubbed here ‘symbolic preference’ as opposed to ‘substantive preference’. As summed up in Fig. 1, while the negation of one’s substantive interest would be irrational, the negation of either kind of commitment is usually described as the result of weak will. There are two kinds of weak will (‘lethargic’ and ‘crooked’), and two kinds of symbolic preference (‘self-respect’ and ‘self-integrity’), following the two kinds of commitment.