بازی فقر و بازی بازنشستگی: نقش متقابل
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|36562||1998||37 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Economic Psychology, Volume 19, Issue 1, February 1998, Pages 5–41
We examine the force of the reciprocity norm in gift giving experiments in which mutual gift giving is efficient but gifts are individually costly. Our main result is that we find almost no evidence for reciprocity. Gifts supplied are unrelated to gifts received. This applies equally to the Poverty Game (player 1 gives to player 2, player 2 gives to player 1) and the Pension Game (player 2 gives to player 1, player 3 gives to player 2, player 4 gives to player 3, etc.). Nevertheless, we do find substantial levels of gift giving. Furthermore, these levels are higher in the Pension Game than in the Poverty Game.
Experimental inquiry has produced a substantial body of evidence indicating that strategic decision-making is often at odds with the presumptions of strict gamesmanship. For instance, several experimental studies have shown a substantial degree of cooperation among players in social dilemmas. Both among economists and psychologists, these results have sparked a serious interest, both theoretically and experimentally, in the strength and consequences of ethical values and social norms. In spite of this acknowledged importance, social norms have rarely been the direct focus of research (see, e.g., Kerr, 1995). In this paper we examine more closely the norm of reciprocity. An important and well-recognized feature of reciprocity is that it sometimes allows a more efficient outcome to be achieved in situations with partially conflicting interests. Therefore, reciprocity has been called a “natural law” (Sugden, 1986) and one of the “cements of society” (Elster, 1989). If there is trust that a cooperative choice will be reciprocated, there is room for mutually beneficial cooperation.