تاثیر وضعیت اجتماعی و اقتصادی بر روی انتخاب همسر بین نژادی و طلاق
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|37113||2006||20 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : The Social Science Journal, Volume 43, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 239–258
Abstract Four hypotheses about inter-racial marriage are tested, using matched data sets of marriage certificates and divorce records from the state of Hawaii across 14 years. The analysis focuses on the effect of race and socio-economic status, and findings suggest that couples tend to have equal status regardless of their racial origin, but high-status individuals have more choices in selecting a mate across racial groups. When marriages dissolve, inter-racial unions tend to last shorter than intra-racial unions, and high-status individuals are more likely to divorce. In conclusion, high status gives an individual more freedom in choosing a mate and in dissolving a marriage. Status is thus associated with power in making important decisions in family life. Mate selection and marital dissolution are both in part affected by economic considerations. Marriage is, among other things, a unit of economic production (Becker, 1965, Grossbard-Shechtman, 1984 and Grossbard-Shechtman, 1993; Grossbard-Shechtman & Neideffer, 1997). To form or to dismantle such a union is therefore a decision of economic calculation, in addition to other factors that make up the complexity of a marriage. The economic aspect of a marriage may be displayed more dramatically when inter-racial unions are formed, since exchange of socioeconomic status is often more clearly demonstrated in such marriages (Bankston & Henry, 1999; Blau & Schwartz, 1984; Fu & Heaton, 1997; Gurak & Fitzpatrick, 1982; Qian & Lichter, 2001; Schoen, 1986 and Spickard, 1989). Inter-racial marriages are generally considered less stable than intra-racial marriages, but most studies on this difference have only focused on imbedded cultural conflict between such couples. In this paper, I explore the effect of economic status on mate selection and on marital dissolution across several racial groups, utilizing longitudinal marriage and divorce data from the state of Hawaii. Data from Hawaii offer a unique advantage for studying inter-racial mate selection and stability, because intermarriage has been a norm rather than an exception in the islands and a large proportion of all marriages in the state are inter-racial. In addition, Hawaii has a relatively small population with many racial groups, and the commonality of inter-racial unions in the state thus provides valuable data for comparison across many different racial groups.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
5. Conclusion and discussion This paper explores the association between socioeconomic status and intermarriage and divorce, using marriage and divorce data from the state of Hawaii. Findings suggest that the marriage market is somewhat segregated along the line of socioeconomic status, either within or across racial groups. Status also affects probabilities of divorce, but its effect appears weaker than it is on mate selection and opposite to what was expected. Four hypotheses were tested in this study. The first hypothesis tests the theory that mate selection is closely based on status matching, independent of racial preferences. As such, odds of outmarriage will be limited between racial groups that do not have equal status, as is the case in Hawaii where average group status differs by a large margin. In other words, individuals of average status in their own groups can be far apart in status when considered across groups so as to create a “mismatch.” Individuals of lower status from high-status groups and those of high status from low-status groups are more likely to have comparable status, hence higher chances of marriage. The analysis of Hawaii marriage data lends strong support to this hypothesis. The second hypothesis follows the argument put forward in the first hypothesis. High-status individuals from high-status groups and low-status individuals from low-status groups are placed at the two extremes of the status spectrum, so that they have relatively the least chance to marry out. For them, mates are easier to find within groups as far as status matching is concerned. This hypothesis also received support. The test of these two hypotheses seems to suggest that racial lines are often crossed in marriage formation if potential mates have equal status, but seldom do people intermarry into different SES groups. Social class is hence more difficult to penetrate than racial boundary, at least in Hawaii. Intermarriage, a seemingly race-blind practice, actually segregates individuals by social class standing, and creates a restricted marriage market for those of very high and very low status. This practice will probably in the long run help isolate certain racial groups, because the high-status groups will only “lose” individuals at the lower end of the SES scale, while the opposite is true of the low-status groups. Although such a restricted marriage market won’t hurt the high-status group with any real consequences, it will probably make upward social mobility more difficult for the low-status groups because only low-status individuals within these groups tend to inmarry and keep their racial group memberships for the next generation. At the individual level, persons of high status have more choices and a wider spectrum of potential mates to choose from. Personal resources are thus utilized in the marriage market to give people of high status more power. Although individuals of both very high and very low statuses (respectively, from high and low status groups) are less prone to outmarry, it is plausible that those of high status choose not to outmarry, while those of low status cannot outmarry. In other words, high-status individuals can exercise the option of marrying out (read as marrying down), and when they do that, they are most probably accepted. Low status individuals perhaps cannot exercise the same option since they don’t possess the power. When they marry those of high status, the decision is often not theirs. Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 tested probabilities of divorce as related to socioeconomic status and racial combinations of husbands and wives. Hypothesis 3 predicts that inter-racial marriages last shorter than intra-racial marriages, due to a host of factors that make outgroup relationships more difficult to succeed than ingroup relationships. This hypothesis is apparently supported by the Hawaii divorce data, providing new evidence that even in Hawaii where racial tensions are historically low and intermarriage is a long-established norm, inter-racial relationships still face higher odds of disruption. The last hypothesis, which posits that higher socioeconomic status will be a deterrent to divorce, is not supported by the Hawaii data. To the opposite of what is predicted in this hypothesis, SES has a positive, though somewhat weak, association with the probabilities of divorce. This effect, however, seems to interact with race. Japanese are the only racial group where a negative effect of SES on divorce is found, albeit not statistically significant. When studied together, the results of the four tested hypotheses concerning SES actually suggest that socioeconomic status impacts mate selection and divorce consistently, rather than inconsistently. Just as in mate selection higher status gives an individual more choice, it gives one more freedom in dissolving a marriage. Compared to those of low status, high-status individuals command more resources and are better able to re-arrange their life after a dramatic or disastrous event. Therefore, they often foresee more alternatives after a divorce, including the relative easiness of finding another mate in the re-marriage market. The same resourcefulness attached to high-status individuals, however, has often been cited in the literature as a means to better maintain a marriage. It could be true that status does work both ways, and in this study we found that it is more likely to work towards divorce rather than maintaining a marriage. On another note, it is important to distinguish the effect status has on mate selection and on divorce. The two may work quite differently. Relatively speaking, status is one of the most important and direct determinants in mate selection, but its effect on maintaining (or not maintaining) a marriage is indirect. Put differently, potential mates directly compare and measure status when they choose each other, but once a marriage is formed, status of a spouse often works through other aspects of life to impact the marriage. This might explain why the effect of SES is weaker on divorce than on mate selection, as found in this study. Two limitations in this paper need to be discussed. First, sustained high frequency of intermarriage in Hawaii raises questions about how to measure race and ethnicity. Generations of intermarriage have made it very difficult for many Hawaii residents to classify themselves into only one racial category due to their multi-racial background. The racial classifications used in the data may only reflect a perception of which racial/ethnic identity is the most important, and therefore overstate the amount of homogamy. For the same reason, however, they may at the same time overstate the degree of racial differences in intermarried couples. Second, the time-series analysis of divorce is affected by data attrition. The divorce records from the state of Hawaii do not include couples that were married in the state but have since moved away and divorced elsewhere. By its very nature, divorce data from one state cannot include all divorcees who married in the state even if the data are linked to marriage license data. We had to assume that among those who entered marriage in Hawaii during 1983–1994, approximately the same proportion from each racial combination of husband and wife has since left the state of Hawaii, and the divorce rate among them is the same as that of their counterparts who have stayed in the islands. If this assumption is violated, the survival table analysis would have underestimated risks of divorce for some groups while overestimated them for others. Likewise, we had to assume that those who left Hawaii are proportionately the same as those who didn’t in socioeconomic status. If this assumption is not held, the Cox regression coefficients would not accurately reflect the effect of SES on divorce for all cases we wanted to analyze. Given the data in hand, it is not possible to check if these assumptions are met. These limitations are beyond the scope of this study to address, but they will not seriously affect the significance of the findings given above, thanks in part to the large file size and the fact that the data are not considered a sample. The conclusions of this study may not be generalized to patterns of mate selection and divorce in other states, since Hawaii has its unique demographic characteristics. They do accurately depict Hawaii residents who married and stayed in Hawaii. Further studies, especially when focusing on SES's effect on divorce, might benefit from these exploratory findings and conclusions.