تاخیر بوروکراتیک و رشوه گیری
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|3870||2004||8 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Volume 54, Issue 3, July 2004, Pages 313–320
Bureaucrats in LDCs are known to often elicit bribes by delaying the processing of documents (“applications”) submitted by private agents. This paper models this practice and discusses two procedures to control the consequent social welfare loss. We show that, compared to the situation with no sanctions on bribe-taking, imperfect vigilance coupled with penalties for bribe-taking leads to more frequent delays and a pareto-inferior solution. A superior governance mechanism involves a reward/penalty scheme based upon the average time taken to clear applications. An efficiency wage may have to be paid to implement this solution.