بیمه بیکاری و مالیات بهینه در مدل جستجوی بازار کار
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|41618||2015||16 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||12900 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Review of Economic Dynamics, Volume 18, Issue 2, April 2015, Pages 365–380
In many search models of the labor market, unemployment insurance (UI) is conveniently interpreted as the value of leisure or home production and is, therefore, treated as a parameter. However, in reality, UI has to be funded through taxation that might be distortionary. In this paper, I analyze the welfare implications of raising funds towards UI benefits through different taxation systems within a directed search model. Since firms “direct” workers to apply to them by posting wages, raising UI funds in a lump-sum manner always distorts the efficient allocation, as it gives firms an incentive to be excessively aggressive in their attempt to maximize the probability of filing up their vacancies. I discuss two ways through which this externality can be internalized and efficiency can be restored.