بدهی، تورم و استقلال بانک مرکزی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|41916||2015||22 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||17690 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : European Economic Review, Volume 79, October 2015, Pages 129–150
Increasing the independence of a central bank from political influence, although ex-ante socially beneficial and initially successful in reducing inflation, would ultimately fail to lower inflation permanently. The smaller anticipated policy distortions implemented by a more independent central bank would induce the fiscal authority to decrease current distortions by increasing the deficit. Over time, inflation would increase to accommodate a higher public debt. By contrast, imposing a strict inflation target would lower inflation permanently and insulate the primary deficit from political distortions.