سیگنال های با کیفیت؟ نقش اختراع ثبت شده، اتحاد، و تجربه تیم در تامین مالی سرمایه
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|42650||2015||16 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Research Policy, Volume 44, Issue 5, June 2015, Pages 1049–1064
Observable resources, particularly patents, alliances, and team experience, are known to affect a start-up's ability to attract venture capital financing. In this context they potentially fulfill a twofold function: as productive assets and, likely, as signals of characteristics of a venture that are not observable at the time of assessment. In particular, patents, alliances, and team experience may serve as signals of the unobservable quality of a venture's technology. Most existing studies based on firm-level transaction data cannot disentangle signaling from productive effects. Using a conjoint-based survey among 187 European and U.S. venture capitalists, we find they rely on research alliances and, partly, on team experience as signals of technological quality. While patents affect the venture capitalists’ decision making in their property rights function, we find no indication that they serve as technology quality signals.