رفتار تیمی مقابل رفتار فردی در بازی هماهنگی حداقل تلاش
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|42709||2015||18 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||12000 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Economic Psychology, Volume 47, April 2015, Pages 85–102
We compare coordination success of individuals and teams in the minimum effort coordination game. The game is played by groups of either five individuals or five two-person teams with either fixed or random re-matching protocols. When groups are fixed, teams perform at least as well as individuals, if not better, in terms of coordinating to the payoff dominant outcome. But with random re-matching, teams experience pervasive coordination failures. A public recommendation to a strategy or a performance bonus exhorting players to coordinate to the payoff-dominant equilibrium has similar impact on coordination for both individuals and teams playing with fixed matching. However, coordination is far more difficult to achieve with teams playing under random re-matching. Our results have implications for the design of work-groups in organizations.